WAYNE HUNSUCKER, APPELLANT,

v.

ARROW INSURANCE, A CORPORATION, AND MARSHALL-PITTMAN AGENCY, A CORPORATION, APPELLEES

RAWLS, Judge.

By this appeal Plaintiff Hunsucker seeks reversal of an adverse summary final judgment entered in favor of defendants Arrow Insurance and Marshall-Pittman Agency.

Appellant’s sole point on appeal questions the sufficiency of the notice of cancellation of an insurance policy issued by Arrow.

On June 17, 1968, Hunsucker was involved in an automobile accident and instituted this action to collect on the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy issued to him by Arrow on January 10, 1968. Arrow moved for a summary final judgment supported by an affidavit of the company’s general agent stating that on February 21, 1968, he mailed a cancellation to Hunsucker which stated:

“You are notified that your automobile policy, dated January 10, 1968, is hereby cancelled as of 12:01 A.M. standard time, the 14th day of March, 1968, from and after which date and hour the policy will be no longer in force. This action is occasioned by reason of:

COMPANY REQUEST.”

Appellant contends that the subject notice is inapplicable because Arrow did not comply with the provisions of Section 627.0852, Florida Statutes.1

*207This Court held in Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Simpson 2 that cancellation of an insurance policy may be effectuated in accordance with the contract of insurance. Subsequent to that decision the cited statutory provisions pertaining to cancellation of insurance policies were enacted. It is well settled that such provisions become a part of the insurance contract and preempt any contrary provisions. So we reach the critical question: Did the purported cancellation by Arrow comply with the statutory provisions? We hold that it did not.

Insurance concerning the operation of automobiles, a species of chattel that has been termed a dangerous instrumentality by the Supreme Court of Florida, has increasingly been a subject matter of legislative concern. From a practical standpoint, an owner or operator must be financially responsible or insured in order to own or operate a motor vehicle.3 The cited statutory provision directs the casualty insurance company when it elects to cancel a policy of insurance to do the following: (a) Give 20 days’ notice, (b) Give the reason for cancelling or in the alternative advise the insured in the notice of cancellation, that upon request by him not less than 10 days prior to' the effective date of cancellation, it will specify the reason for such cancellation, (c) Advise the insured in the notice of cancellation that he is permitted by law to appeal the cancellation. Thus, the legislative scheme is clearly designed to require that the insurance company adequately apprise the insured of his rights of recourse prior to the cancellation becoming effective. Arrow did not comply with the above statutory directives and the purported cancellation was ineffective. The words in the cancellation: “This action is occasioned by reason of: COMPANY REQUEST” do not in any manner comply with the statutory mandate. Such language simply tells the insured that the company desires to cancel without specifying the reason as directed by the statutory language.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.