BEEDIE S. STECHER AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
SHELBY DEAN POMEROY AND NORMAN O. POMEROY, HER HUSBAND, APPELLEES
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In a personal injury case arising from an automobile collision, the defendants appealed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing the trial court erred by allowing the jury to learn about and consider liability insurance coverage. The appellate court held that while admission of insurance evidence was error, it was harmless because the underlying evidence of negligence and damages was overwhelming.
The joinder of the liability insurer as a party defendant was proper and the denial of severance was not an abuse of discretion. While it was error to permit direct evidence of the existence and extent of insurance coverage, as such evidence is irrelevant to liability and damages, the error was harmless because the evidence of negligence and damages was overwhelming.
[1] The joinder of a liability insurance carrier as a party defendant in a negligence action is proper.
[2] Denial of a motion for severance made at the commencement of a trial is a matter within the trial court's discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The existence or amount of insurance coverage has no bearing on the issues of liability and damages [in an action seeking damages proximately caused by an insured's alleged negligence] and such evidence should not be considered by the jury.”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle that insurance evidence is irrelevant to negligence and damages issues.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShelby Dean Pomeroy was injured in an automobile collision with Beedie S. Stecher. Pomeroy and her husband sued Stecher and her liability insurer, Uni…
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Shelby Dean Pomeroy sustained personal injury as a result of an automobile collision. She and her husband brought suit against Beedie S. Stecher, the owner-operator of the adverse vehicle, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, the liability insurer of the Stecher vehicle. The jury returned verdicts favorable to the plaintiffs and defendants appeal from the judgment entered thereon.
The point on appeal is that they were deprived of a fair trial by the trial court (a) informing the jury that the liability insurance carrier was a party defendant, (b) permitting plaintiffs to publish to the jury answers to the interrogatories disclosing the existence and extent of liability insurance coverage, and (c) refusing to instruct the jury to ignore the existence of the insurance coverage.
The joinder of the liability insurance carrier as a party defendant was proper, Shingleton v. Bussey, Fla. 1969, 223 So.2d 713, and the trial court’s denial of the motion for severance made at the commencement of the trial, being a matter addressed to the courts’ discretion, Beta Eta House Corporation, Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, Fla.1970, 237 So.2d 163, has not been shown to have been an abuse of discretion.
The existence or amount of insurance coverage has no bearing on the issues of liability and damages [in an action seeking damages proximately caused by an insured’s alleged negligence] and such evidence should not be considered by the jury. Beta Eta House Corporation, Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, supra. How the trial court, in a negligence action of this type, can possibly prevent a mature and sophisticated jury from inferring the likely existence of liability insurance coverage, so long as the insurer is a party at trial, is beyond us. But to permit direct evidence on not only the existence of liability insurance coverage, but also the extent thereof, when neither matter is relevant to any issue then being tried, is clearly error.
The existence or amount of insurance coverage is no more relevant to the issues of liability and damages in a personal injury action of this type than would be the non-existence of such insurance coverage, or evidence bearing on the defendant’s personal wealth or lack thereof.
*490In the instant case, after an examination of the entire record, it does not appear to us that the improper admission of this evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The evidence pertaining to the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by Shelby Dean Pomeroy as a result of the admitted negligence of Beedie S. Stecher, and the past and future damages proximately flowing therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, would clearly sustain the amount of verdict returned by the jury upon which the judgment was entered. We conclude that while it was' error for the trial court to permit evidence as to the amount of insurance coverage, such error was harmless. F.S. Section 59.-041, F.S.A.
The judgment is affirmed.
CROSS, C. J., and McCAIN, DAVID L., Associate Judge, concur.
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Compania Dominicana de Aviacion & Underwriters at Lloyds v. Knapp, 251 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)…s discretion or commit error in the denial of [*20] the motions for severance or the motions for new trial. See Beta Eta, supra; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Myers, Fla.App.1971, 247 So. 2d 83, 2 D.C.A.; Stecher v. Pomeroy, Fla.App.1971, 244 So. 2d 488; Durrett v. Davidson, Fla. App.1970, 239 So. 2d 46; and Rule 1.270(h), R.C.P., 30 F.S.A. Defendants next contend that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial or motion for a new trial because of alleged prejudicial testimony. The test…
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Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clonts, 248 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)…d 163 (Fla.1970). . Id. at 166. . Note 1, mpra, at p. 718. . See, also, Montano v. Wigfield, (Fla.App.1970) 239 So. 2d 609. . Note 2, supra, at p. 165. . Id. . (Fla.App.1970), 239 So. 2d 46, 48. . Of. Stecher, et al v. Pomeroy (Fla.App.1971), 244 So. 2d 488. . See Authors’ Comment to Rule 1.270, R.O.P., 30 F.S.A. 371. . See, also, Durrett v. Davidson, note 8, supra, at p. 48. . See, also, Judge Wigginton’s comments in Beta Eta (Fla.App.1970), 230 So. 2d 495, 500. . See both Shingleton and Beta Eta,…
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Anderson A. Medina, Sr. v. Peralta, 724 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1999)…96). In his concurrence, Judge Klein stated that Krawzak errors should be subject to harmless error analysis based on analogies to two Fourth District decisions, Brush v. Palm Beach County, 679 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and Stecher v. Pomeroy, 244 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 4th DCA), writ discharged, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1971). Miller, 688 So. 2d at 936. Judge Klein construed strong language in Brush, which describes the severance of a UM carrier as a “particularly egregious” deception, Brush, 679 So. 2d at 816, t…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Gulf Stream Motors, Inc. v. Christina Cook & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Beta ETA House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970)