SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT EARL REESE, JR., A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ROBERT EARL REESE, SR., AND ROBERT EARL REESE, SR., INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1971-06-01
No. M-468
CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and MELVIN, WOODROW M., Associate Judge, concur.
249 So. 2d 51 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1971) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

In this personal injury case, an 18-year-old plaintiff was struck by a train while standing between two parallel railroad tracks throwing rocks at boxcars. The Florida appellate court reversed a jury verdict of over $25,000 for the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, which bars recovery under Florida law in the absence of comparative negligence statutes.


Holding

The court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and therefore barred from recovery. Under Florida law, when a person's own negligence proximately contributes to his injury, he cannot recover damages from another's negligence.


Headnotes

[1] In Florida, in the absence of a valid comparative negligence statute applicable to railroads, the common law doctrine of contributory negligence governs negligence action…

[2] A plaintiff's own negligence that proximately contributes to their injuries will preclude any recovery for damages resulting from those injuries.

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Key Quotes

“There can be no recovery of damages resulting from injuries negligently inflicted on one person by another if the injured person, by his own negligence or by the negligence of another legally imputable to him, proximately contributed to the injury.”

Establishes the common law contributory negligence rule that bars recovery when plaintiff's negligence contributes to injury.

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Facts & Procedural History

On May 9, 1968, plaintiff, an 18-year-old boy, attempted to cross two parallel railroad tracks between a housing project and a school. After crossing …

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Opinion of the Court
RAWLS, Justice.

RAWLS, Justice.

Defendant Railroad appeals from an adverse jury verdict awarding more than $25,000 in a personal injury case.

The injury in this case occurred as follows: On May 9, 1968, plaintiff, an 18 year old boy, was going to play basketball with some friends. He was attempting to cross two parallel railroad tracks which ran between a housing project and a school where the basketball courts were located. He succeeded in crossing the first track which was clear. However, a train was approaching on the second track traveling in a westerly direction. Plaintiff remained between the two tracks facing east toward the approaching train. He picked up some rocks and, as the train was passing by him, began throwing rocks into the open boxcars.

Another train approached on the second track heading east. The engineer of this train saw plaintiff between the tracks approximately 200 feet away and began blowing the train whistle. When plaintiff did not move, the engineer began ringing the bell and applying the emergency brakes but was unable to stop in time. Plaintiff apparently never saw the train which struck him from behind causing severe physical injuries and permanent brain damage.

Plaintiff has contended that the train which struck him was traveling at an excessive speed and that the engineer had failed to keep a proper lookout. He showed that the passing train was equipped with a two-way radio, was aware of his presence between the tracks, and could have communicated a warning to the other train in time. The Railroad’s primary defense, was that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and should be precluded from recovering. We agree.

Although we are in sympathy with plaintiff’s plight, we can arrive at no other conclusion from the facts in this case. In 1965 the Florida Supreme Court declared the “comparative negligence” statute (F.S. § 768.06, F.S.A.) unconstitutional because it imposed on railroad companies an unreasonable burden and deprived them of the equal protection of the law. Georgia Southern and Florida Ry. Co. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So.2d 39 (Fla.1965). Since that time all negligence actions against railroads are governed by common law, and the doctrine of contributory negligence is applicable. Seaboard Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Scudder, 215 So.2d 760 (Fla.App.2d 1968). It has long been the law in this state that “There can be no recovery of damages resulting from injuries negligently inflicted on one person by another if the injured person, by his own negligence or by the negligence of another legally imputable to him, proximately contrib*53uted to the injury.” 23 Fla.Jur., Negligence, § 71 (and cited cases).

The uncontroverted facts show that plaintiff stood between two parallel railroad tracks in broad daylight, turned his. back on the first track and proceeded to throw rocks at an approaching train on the second track. The inescapable conclusion is that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and the trial judge should have directed a verdict for the defendant.

Reversed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and MELVIN, WOODROW M., Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …as manufactured, the price being paid for similar merchandise in the vicinity — in addition to the other factors mentioned herein. This question has been considered, however, by the Third District Court of Appeal in Thompson v. State (Fla.App.1971), 249 So. 2d 51, where the defendant-appellant was convicted of grand larceny of 28 pairs of pants and 8 shirts from a retail store. An employee of the store testified to a retail value of more than $400 and a wholesale value of 'more than $100. This conviction was…
  • Cardinal Scott v. State, 519 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
    …roper to instruct jury in grand theft case that value of goods sold at retail is “the sale price of the merchandise at the time it was stolen”), aff’g, 443 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1974); Thompson v. State, 249 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). Although there is no case which so holds, and although the defendants do not suggest what the nature of that evidence might be, they contend that the state must also introduce some independent testimony that the merchandise was “…
  • Jones v. State, 434 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …e [*338] V, Section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, that' our decision herein is in direct conflict with the majority opinion in the above-stated Williams case. We find no merit in the defendant’s remaining point on appeal. Thompson v. State, 249 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); § 812.015(1)(c), Fla.Stat. (1981). Reversed and remanded for a new trial.…

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