JENNY JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a second-degree grand theft conviction because the trial court erred in denying a mistrial motion when the state elicited testimony about the defendant's post-apprehension silence, violating her Fifth Amendment rights.
A trial court commits reversible error by denying a mistrial motion when the state elicits testimony regarding a defendant's silence after apprehension and accusation of shoplifting.
[1] Introduction of a defendant's silence following apprehension and accusation of a crime violates the Fifth Amendment and constitutes reversible error when a mistrial motio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJenny Jones was apprehended by a retail store detective for shoplifting and accused of the crime. During trial, the state elicited testimony in the ju…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction and sentence for second degree grand theft. The defendant Jenny Jones contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying her contemporaneous motion for a mistrial when the state elicited from a witness in the jury’s presence that the defendant Jones remained silent after she was apprehended by a retail store detective for shoplifting pursuant to Section 812.015(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) and accused of shoplifting by the said detective. We entirely agree, and, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial, based on the authorities and reasoning contained in Judge Rawls’ dissent in Williams v. State, 347 So. 2d 472, 473-74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. discharged, 376 So. 2d 846 (Fla.1979). We also rely on the subsequent authority of Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla.1978); Lee v. State, 422 So. 2d 928, 930-31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); and Brownlee v. State, 361 So. 2d 724, 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), which fully support Judge Rawl’s analysis herein. In so doing, we certify, pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, that' our decision herein is in direct conflict with the majority opinion in the above-stated Williams case.
We find no merit in the defendant’s remaining point on appeal. Thompson v. State, 249 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); § 812.015(1)(c), Fla.Stat. (1981).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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State v. Jones, 461 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1984)…EHRLICH, Justice. We have before us by petition for review Jones v. State, 434 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The district court certified its decision as being in direct conflict with Williams v. State, 347 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. discharged, 376 So. 2d 846 (Fla.1979). Our jurisdiction is pursuant to article V, section 3(b…
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Delana v. State, 448 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…he store manager did not constitute police custody under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The case sub judice is controlled by Williams. We recognize that our decision is in direct conflict with Jones v. State, 434 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983), and certify such conflict pursuant to Fla.App.R. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi). We have examined the other grounds asserted by the defendant and find them to be without merit. AFFIRMED. MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur. . There is no…
Authorities Cited
- Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978)
- Ulysses LEE v. State, 422 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Williams v. State, 347 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Williams v. State, 376 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1979)
- Thompson v. State, 249 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Reese, 249 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Berndt v. Planning Dev. Assoc., Inc., 361 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Leamon Brownlee v. State, 361 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)