LAWRENCE A. NEALY, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES ROSS AND FINCHER MOTORS, INC., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Nealy appeals a summary judgment dismissing his vicarious liability claim against Fincher Motors for injuries caused by an accident involving employee James Ross. The court affirmed, holding that Ross's unauthorized use of a company vehicle without permission and with explicit standing instructions never to take cars off premises could not support an inference of implied consent or conversion sufficient to impose employer liability.
The court held that Ross's unauthorized appropriation of the vehicle without express or implied consent and contrary to longstanding instructions constituted unauthorized use that could not support an inference of implied permission, and therefore the employer could not be held vicariously liable.
[1] An employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's tortious use of a vehicle when the employee had express instructions not to take the vehicle off the premises and…
[2] Unauthorized use of a vehicle, for purposes of employer liability, can include a temporary appropriation of possession without the owner's express or implied consent.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the term "implied permission" can only be negated upon a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft”
Articulates the legal standard from Thomas v. Atlantic Associates regarding when implied permission may be found
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames Ross was employed as a porter by Fincher Motors, Inc., with duties including moving loaner automobiles on and around the premises. On a Saturday…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Unauthorized Use Of A Motor Vehicle cases and more on FLexlaw
This is an appeal by the plaintiff in the court below from a final summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Fincher Motors, Inc.
The complaint sought to charge Fincher Motors, Inc., with vicarious liability, as the owner of the automobile driven by the co-defendant James Ross, one of its employees, resulting in an accident, causing injury to the plaintiff.
The facts as disclosed by the uncontra-dicted deposition of Ross, show that Ross was employed by Fincher Motors, Inc., as a porter, although one of his duties was moving loaner automobiles in and about the premises of Fincher Motors, Inc., or from the street on to such premises. On the Saturday morning of the day in question, Ross showed up for work to perform his duties as porter at 8:00 a. m., but the shop was not open for business. Someone brought in a loaner vehicle, leaving the keys in the car and Ross proceeded to take the car to pick up a sandwich, becoming involved in the accident on his return to the Fincher premises. Ross had no permission from anyone to use the car this particular morning, and in fact had long standing instructions over a period of ten years, never to take a car off the premises. Moreover, he had lost his driver’s license many years before, and it had not been restored.
Appellant contends that, notwithstanding, a jury could infer that Ross had implied consent within the meaning of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in Thomas v. Atlantic Associates, Inc., (1969), 226 So.2d 100, holding that the term “implied permission” can only be negated upon a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft. However, a “species of conversion” does not necessarily require a total deprivation of ownership or possession, but would include a temporary appropriation of possession without the express or implied consent of the owner. On its facts this case is controlled by Sykes v. Babijuice Corp., 63 So.2d 65, (Supreme Court of Florida, 1963), and our holding in Ivey v. National Fisheries, Inc., (1968), 215 So.2d 74, where we said:
“Unauthorized use of an auto has been held to include those situations wherein the employer’s permission to use the vehicle extended only to the immediate business premises and the tort occurred outside this boundary. Therefore, that fact served to preclude the employer’s liability. Sykes v. Babijuice Corp., Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 65; Keller v. Florida Power & Light Co., Fla.App.1963, 156 So.2d 775.”
*524We agree with the trial judge that a jury could not infer implied permission or a species of conversion from the facts in this case.
The remaining assignments of error have been examined and found to be without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp. v. Dunn, 438 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…e of the employee’s employment so as to render Xerox liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. Appellant submits that the Dinkins case is consistent with the Florida rule that going for meals, food or drinks is a deviation from employment. Nealy v. Ross, 249 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1971); Maroney v. Edward A. Kelly & Sons, Inc., 195 So. 2d 208 (Fla.1967); Morgan v. Collier County Motors, Inc., 193 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); and Ball v. I.C. Helmly Furniture Company, 132 Fla. 882, 182 So. 435 (Fla.1938). The r…
-
Warshall v. Price, 629 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…list has no actual value. The trial judge agreed with this argument when Price asserted it below. It is not necessary for a person to deprive another of exclusive possession of their property in order to be liable for conversion. See Nealy v. Ross, 249 So. 2d 522, 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) (stating that conversion “does not necessarily require a total deprivation of ownership or possession_”). Similarly, the definition does not require property to have any specific value whatsoever in order to be subject to con…
Authorities Cited
- Almond H. Thomas and Irene Thomas v. Atl. Assocs., Inc., 226 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1969)
- Hart v. France, 156 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Braxton v. State, 215 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Elmore Ivey v. Nat'l Fisheries, Inc., 215 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Shaw v. Perlmutter, 63 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1953)
- Sykes v. Babijuice Corp., 63 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1953)