WALTER N. BONEY ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In an eminent domain case involving the taking of property for Interstate Highway 1-295, the court reversed a trial court's remittitur that reduced a jury verdict from $5,500 to $525, holding that the property owners were entitled to compensation for severance damages resulting from the destruction of their previously-existing right of access to an undedicated street bordering their property.
Property owners abutting property taken in an eminent domain proceeding are entitled to compensation for the destruction of their previously-existing right of access, and the destruction of such a right constitutes severance damage to the remaining land. The remittitur improperly eliminated the jury's ability to award such severance damages.
[1] Abutting property owners are entitled to compensation for the destruction of their previously-existing right of access when a limited access road is taken.
[2] A remittitur entered based on the erroneous belief that no severance damages exist is improper.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[W]here a limited access is taken, the abutting property owners are entitled to compensation for the destruction of their previously-existing right of access.”
This quote establishes the controlling legal rule that property owners must be compensated for loss of access rights in eminent domain cases, even if those rights were previously unused.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe state sought to acquire appellants' property through eminent domain proceedings to build Interstate Highway 1-295, a limited-access road. The taki…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Right Of Access cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellants seek reversal of a final judgment in condemnation, entered subsequent to denial of their motion for new trial and granting appellee’s motion for remittitur. A jury verdict of $5,500 was reduced to an award of $525 upon entry of the remittitur. Appellee sought appellants’ property in the eminent domain proceeding below to acquire land for Interstate Highway 1-295, a limited-access road.
Appellants persuasively argue that severance damages — damages to their remaining land as a result of the taking — are present in this case. Although the taking has deprived them of a right to use one direction of an unopen, undedicated street bordering their property, nevertheless, some right of access, albeit previously unused, has been destroyed. We feel the facts below require application of the rule of law recognized in Benerofe v. State Road Department, 210 So.2d 28, 30 (Fla.App.1968):
“ * * * [WJhere a limited access is taken, the abutting property owners are entitled to compensation for the destruction of their previously-existing right of access. Anhoco Corporation v. Dade County, 144 So.2d 793, (Fla.1962).”
See also Glessner v. Duval County, 203 So.2d 330 (Fla.App.1967). ,
It is apparent from the argumentation reflected in the briefs that the entry of the remittitur about which appellant complains was predicated upon the trial court’s belief that there was no severance damage to the remainder of appellants’ land after the taking; and, hence, the jury verdict before us was required to be limited to the actual value of the land taken. Application of the rule cited above from the Benerofe case impels the contrary conclusion. Thus, the entry of the remittitur effectively took away the jury’s right to award appellants severance damages resulting from the destruction of the previously existing right of access. When viewed in this light, entry of the remittitur was error.
Therefore, the final judgment in condemnation and the order of remittitur must be reversed and this cause remanded with directions to reinstate the jury verdict of $5,500. In all other respects, the final judgment is affirmed. We have considered appellants’ remaining points and find them to be without merit.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.
CARROLL, DONALD K., and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp. v. Stubbs, 285 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973)…mages as a result of destruction of two or more of its rights of access prior to the establishment of the new frontage service road. It is entitled to compensation for this damage.” Id. at 797, 798. Cf. Boney v. State, Department of Transportation, 250 So. 2d 650 (Fla.App.1971); State Road Department of Florida v. McCaffrey, 229 So. 2d 668 (Fla.App.1969); and Benerofe v. State Road Department, 210 So. 2d 28 (Fla.App.1968), 217 So. 2d 838 (Fla.1969). Petitioner has argued orally and in briefs that the case p…
-
Stubbs v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp., 265 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)…6 So. 2d 870, 872. . Wofford v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, (1965) 263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E. 2d 376. . Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 34 Fla. 346, 16 So. 282. . Boney v. State, Department of Transportation, (Fla.App.1971) 250 So. 2d 650. . Glessner v. Duval County, (Fla.App.1967) 203 So. 2d 330. . Anhoco Corporation v. Dade County, (Fla.1962) 144 So. 2d 793.…1 / 2
-
Cap. Plaza, Inc. v. Division OF Administration, 381 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…tation v. Stubbs, supra, that the key factor in these cases is the actual loss of “access”, incident to the construction of a limited access highway, not mere regulation or interference with traffic flow. Boney v. State Department of Transportation, 250 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relied upon by this court in its Stubbs decision (265 So. 2d 425) was a case dealing with destruction of a pre-existing right of access, that is, the right to use one direction of an unopened and undedicated street bordering the…
Authorities Cited
- Anhoco Corp. v. Dade Cnty., 144 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1962)
- Glessner v. Duval Cnty., 203 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)
- Benerofe v. State Rd. Dep't of Fla., 210 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)
- Herminia Jimenez v. Lary Fred von Zamft & Coin Meter Co., 210 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)