RAYMOND WESTON, APPELLANT,
v.
RUTH WESTON, APPELLEE
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A husband appeals a divorce judgment, challenging the alimony award of $50 per week and attorneys' fees granted to his wife. The appellate court reversed the periodic alimony award as an abuse of discretion, finding it created a patently unjust financial disparity, but affirmed the award of exclusive use of the marital home and attorneys' fees.
The court held that the $50 weekly alimony award constituted an abuse of discretion as it created a patently unjust result leaving the husband with $5,800 annually and the wife with $10,800 plus exclusive use of the home. The award of exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence, combined with the wife's superior current earnings, adequately met her needs. The attorneys' fees award was proper and affirmed.
[1] The determination of alimony and attorneys' fees in divorce actions lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate review is limited to determining wh…
[2] An award of alimony is an abuse of discretion when it leaves one party with insufficient funds for their own support while providing the other party with substantially mo…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The determination of alimony and other matters connected with divorce actions lies within the sound discretion of the chancellor, and the function of the appellate court simply is to determine whether such discretion was abused under the circumstances reflected by the record.”
Establishes the standard of review for alimony awards, giving trial courts broad discretion subject to abuse review
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe 54-year-old husband earned $6,000 annually plus $2,400 from disability benefits, with prior earning capacity of $12,000 when working in Vietnam. T…
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The defendant husband appeals a final judgment of divorce complaining of the award made to the plaintiff wife for alimony and attorneys’ fees.
The determination of alimony and other matters connected with divorce actions lies within the sound discretion of the chancellor, and the function of the appellate court simply is to determine whether such discretion was abused under the circumstances reflected by the record. Sommers v. Sommers, Fla.App.1966, 183 So.2d 744.
Turning to the record, we find the financial circumstances of the parties as reflected therein (using round figures) to be as follows: The 54-year old husband is currently earning $6,000 per year in his employment, and in addition he receives $2,-400 per year from the federal government for a service connected disability rating. Two years ago, by serving in a civilian capacity in the Vietnam War Zone, he was able to earn $12,000 per year, and hence under certain limited circumstances he does have a greater earning capacity than is reflected by his current earnings. The 50-year old wife is currently employed in a responsible position with the Martin County Board of Education and earns approximately $8,200 per year. The wife’s needs, exclusive of such sums as she *316voluntarily expends in support of her 26-year old able-bodied son, are approximately $7,000 per year.
The final judgment granted the wife alimony of $50 per week, plus exclusive use and occupancy of the jointly owned and unencumbered marital residence, and awarded her $350 for attorneys’ fees.
The net effect of the alimony award, upon the basis of the parties’ current earnings and income, is to leave the husband with $5,800 per year for his own support, and the wife with $10,800 per year (plus the exclusive use of the former jointly owned home) for her support. With due regard to the recognized limitation on appellate review in cases of this type, we conclude that such a result is patently unjust, and that the court abused its discretion to the extent of requiring appellant to make periodic weekly payments of alimony. By eliminating this portion of the final judgment, the wife will still have some alimony (by virtue of the award of exclusive use and occupancy of the former jointly owned marital dwelling) and this, plus her own present income (which is substantially equal to the appellant’s present income), will more than adequately meet her established needs for her support. Our decision does not preclude the trial court from entering any future modification of the alimony award as may be justified by a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties.
Appellant’s complaint as to the award of an attorney’s fee to appellee’s attorney is without merit. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 592; Arrington v. Arrington, Fla.App.1963, 150 So.2d 473; and, Turney v. Turney, Fla.App.1963, 149 So.2d 83.
The final judgment is modified by eliminating therefrom paragraph 2 requiring appellant to pay alimony at $50 per week, and as thus modified is affirmed.
Affirmed, as modified.
CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.
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Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)…t to be without substantial merit. Reversed. RAWLS and CARROLL, DONALD K., JJ., concur. SPECTOR, C. J., dissents. . Kahn v. Kahn, (Fla.1955) 78 So. 2d 367, 368. . Gordon v. Gordon (Fla.App.1966) 192 So. 2d 514. .Weston v. Weston (Fla.App.1971) 251 So. 2d 315, 316. . Martin v. Martin, 261 So. 2d 179, opinion filed April 20, 1972.…
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Kuntz v. Tove G. Kuntz, 370 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…, there is no showing of a spouse’s willful failure to exert himself to discharge his family obligations. See, e. g., DeHart v. DeHart, 360 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Wolfman v. Wolfman, 344 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); and Weston v. Weston, 251 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). A trial court has broad discretion in awarding alimony; however, under the facts of this case, even though it may be desirable to fully compensate appellee, it cannot be done at the expense of appellant’s present ability to main…
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Kindred v. Kermit G. Kindred, 284 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See: Zuidhof v. Zuidhof, Fla.App.1971, 242 So. 2d 739; Weston v. Weston, Fla.App.1971, 251 So. 2d 315; Landsberg v. Landsberg, Fla.App.1972, 259 So. 2d 727; Cooper v. Cooper, Fla.App.1972, 260 So. 2d 272.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 179 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Wendall P. Arrington v. Arrington, 150 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Turney v. Turney, 149 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Melvyne Wahnish Sommers v. Sommers, 183 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)