MADALINE LODDING AND WOODROW C. LODDING, APPELLANTS,
v.
IRVING DUNN AND THOMAS C. JOHNSON, APPELLEES
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Appellants Madaline and Woodrow Lodding challenge a trial court's award of $100,000 in attorney's fees ($75,000 and $25,000 respectively) to appellees Dunn and Johnson based on quantum meruit and a contingent fee contract. The Third District Court of Appeal upholds the fee award, finding the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining reasonable compensation based on the complexity and time involved in the legal representation.
The trial court's fee award was affirmed as reasonable and not an abuse of judicial discretion. Although the fees were substantial, they were not so unreasonable as to constitute reversible error when evaluated against the factors of time expended, difficulty and complexity of the issues, eminence of opposing counsel, and results obtained.
[1] In the absence of a contract or statute fixing attorney compensation, a lawyer is entitled to recover the reasonable value of services rendered.
[2] A trial court's determination of attorney's fees must be supported by substantial, competent evidence, considering all relevant factors.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the general rule is that in the absence of contract or statute fixing the amount of compensation, the lawyer is entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services.”
Establishes the baseline principle governing attorney fee awards when no specific agreement exists
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe attorneys represented the Loddings in a complex matrimonial matter involving property valued at considerably more than $500,000, including a $500,…
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Appellant-plaintiff Madaline Lodding and appellant-respondent Woodrow Lod-ding, by this consolidated appeal, seek review of a final judgment awarding attorneys fees to appellees, Dunn and Johnson, entered after a non-jury hearing. The award was for $100,000.00 ($75,000.00 from Madaline Lodding and $25,000.00 from Woodrow Lodding) based upon quantum meruit as to both appellants and a contingent fee contract as to her. The attorneys had petitioned for fees and to impress a charging lien.
A related case concerning appellants’ marriage is Lodding v. Lodding, Fla.App.1971, 245 So.2d 150.
*561While many points are presented by both appellants for reversal, we need discuss only the question of the reasonableness of the fee.
The general rule is that in the absence of contract or statute fixing the amount of compensation, the lawyer is entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services.
This court has detailed the factors to be considered, and has held that not only must each factor be considered by the trial court, but the determination must be supported by substantial, competent evidence. Novack v. Novack, Fla.App.1966, 189 So.2d 513 and Adler v. Schekter, Fla.App.1967, 197 So.2d 46, same fee after remand, Fla.App.1968, 207 So.2d 78.
The trial judge here made a series of findings of fact underlying his consideration of the factors discussed in the cases cited. These findings of the trial court are clothed with a presumption of correctness.
In the instant case these findings were to the effect that the claims involved varied, complex and extremely time-consuming matters. Approximately six hundred hours were involved in the total representation. The property involved was considerably more than $500,000.00. Successful results were achieved respecting alimony and the recognition and transfer to her of personal property (particularly a $500,000.00 “debenture” or “note”). This was accomplished through a settlement and stipulation, at which time Mr. Lodding’s liability for attorney’s fees was established at $25,000.00, with Mrs. Lodding being responsible for the remainder.
The court referred to certain expert testimony relating to the factors or elements to be weighed in determining a reasonable fee. The testimony considered the time expended, difficulty of the issues, complexity of litigation, eminence of opposing counsel, and results obtained.
We recognize the duty of the trial court to reasonably exercise its discretion in setting attorneys’ fees. We also realize that while these fees are large, we cannot say they are so unreasonable as to constitute reversible error or an abuse of judicial discretion. Johnson v. Kruglak, Fla.App.1971, 246 So.2d 617 and cases cited. In the final analysis, the question of fees can only be resolved with reference to at-particular case. See also: Huntley v. Baya, Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 248, 251 as to the date from which interest is properly computed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Storer v. Storer, 353 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…of the award was within the bounds of the experts’ recommendations. It is apparent from the lengthy record that the case involved such difficulty and complexity, and required such skill of counsel as to make the fee reasonable. See Lodding v. Dunn, 251 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); and compare Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976). Two other questions were raised on appeal. In our opinion, they are without merit as they are matters which were previously raised and resolved in the interlocutory ap…
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Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…ile I realize that a fee such as the one before us is large, I cannot say that it is so unreasonable as to shock the judicial conscience or to constitute an abuse of judicial discretion requiring reversal or reduction. Lodding v. Dunn, Fla.App.1971, 251 So. 2d 560; Johnson v. Kruglak, Fla.App.1971, 246 So. 2d 617. Therefore, for the reasons stated and discussed, I would affirm the order of the trial court here under review. . Appellant’s original financial statements reflected a net worth of approximately $2…
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Travieso v. Travieso, 447 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…arties,” Desilets v. Desilets, 377 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see Kissinger v. Mason, 436 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1st DC/ 1983). The question of fees in the final analysis can only be resolved with reference to a particular case. Lodding v. Dunn, 251 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), cert. denied mem., 258 So. 2d 818 (Fla.1972). The award of attorney’s fees depends not upon who prevails but rather upon the relative financial resources of the parties. Kissinger; Hudgens v. Hudgens, 411 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Huntley v. Baya, 136 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Novack v. Novack, 189 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Adler v. Nathan Schekter et ux., 197 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Voyle C. Johnson v. Kruglak, 246 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Mac Dickman v. Jac-Lyn Homes, Inc., 207 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Diehl v. State, 207 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Scaglione v. Crompton-Richmond Co., Inc., 245 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- Helene Lodding v. Lodding, 245 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)