CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, A FLORIDA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
LIFLANS CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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In an eminent domain action where the City of Miami Beach condemned certain foreshore rights from Liflans Corporation for beach restoration purposes, the jury awarded zero compensation to the landowner. The trial court nevertheless awarded the defendant landowner costs and attorney fees, which the city appealed as improper and excessive.
A defendant landowner is entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees in an eminent domain action even when awarded zero compensation, as required by Florida Statute § 73.091, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amounts awarded.
[1] A condemning authority must pay all reasonable costs of eminent domain proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney's fee, even if the jury awards ze…
[2] A trial court's award of costs and attorney fees in an eminent domain case will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court.”
Florida Statute § 73.091 establishing the mandatory obligation to pay costs and fees in eminent domain cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 1, 1967, Miami Beach initiated an eminent domain action to condemn rights to foreshore property beyond the high water line owned by Lifla…
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On September 1, 1967, the City of Miami Beach filed an action in eminent domain against Liflans Corp., a landowner, and Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, a mortgagee.
The property involved fronted on the Atlantic Ocean. By its proceedings the city sought to condemn certain rights of the upland owner with reference to the foreshore lying beyond the high water line, in advance of proposed beach extension and restoration there. Following extensive discovery proceedings, and the trial of the cause, judgment was rendered in favor of the city, upon a verdict of a jury which found the owner was not entitled to any amount of compensation therefor. By a separate and subsequent order the trial court granted the owner’s motion for costs, including fee charges of its expert witness (appraisers and engineers), and awarded an amount for the services of the defendant owner’s attorneys. In said order the court reserved ruling on a motion of the mortgagee-insurance company to tax costs *516and allow attorney fees in its favor. Cf. Shavers v. Duval County, Fla.1954, 73 So. 2d 684, 687-688.
On appeal therefrom the city contends first that because the jury determined that the owner should not receive compensation for the rights which the city obtained by condemnation, the court should not have awarded such costs and attorney fees to the defendant owners, and second that the costs and fees allowed were excessive.
We hold neither contention has merit. The owner was made a defendant in the condemnation action. The question of the value of the property or rights therein which were taken by the city on condemnation- was the subject of extensive litigation in the cause. In Chapter 73 Fla. Stat., F.S.A., relating to eminent domain, § 73.091 provides: “The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court.” Allowance of such costs and attorney fees was proper and in accordance with the statute, notwithstanding the jury awarded zero compensation. Compare City of Hallendale v. Chatios, Fla.1970, 236 So.2d 761. Moreover, the right of the landowner to be awarded its costs and attorney fees was not objected to or questioned by the city in the trial court. See Nelson v. Selden Cypress Door Co., 78 Fla. 203, 83 So. 286. The costs allowed, while substantial in their amounts, were proper in consideration of the record and the findings made by the trial court in the allowance thereof, under authority of Dade County v. Brigham, Fla. 1950, 47 So.2d 602. The attorney fees allowed by the trial court were well within the range of the testimony, relating to reasonable fees for the attorneys’ services, of an expert witness produced by the landowner and one produced by the city. While the court was not bound by such testimony, we cannot fault the court for following it. We conclude that the appellant city has not shown that the amount of the costs and fees allowed were such as to constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Affirmed.
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Dade Cnty. v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…3; Dean v. State Road Department, Fla.App. 1966, 184 So. 2d 517; City of Miami Beach v. Cummings, Fla.App. 1970, 239 So. 2d 501; City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, Fla.App.1971, 253 So. 2d 910; City of Miami Beach v. Liflans Corporation, Fla.App. 1972, 259 So. 2d 515; City of Miami v. Culbertson, Fla. App.1973, 281 So. 2d 578. In City of Miami Beach v. Liflans Corporation, this court said: “. . . The attorney fees allowed by the trial court were well within the range of the testimony, relating to reasonable fe…
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Hodges v. Division OF Administration, 323 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…by the property owner. The purpose of this statute is to permit the owner to contest the value placed on his property by the condemning authority and at the same time come out whole. In City of Miami Beach v. Liflans Corporation, Fla.App. 3d, 1972, 259 So. 2d 515, the court held that the property owner in a condemnation action was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees even though the jury returned a verdict of zero compensation. Here, the question of business damages was close, and the issue was only resol…
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Jaruagua Enters., Inc. v. DOM, Inc., 339 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…d by the expert witnesses of both parties, relating to reasonable fees for the legal services performed. While the court was not bound by such testimony, we cannot fault the court for following it. Accord: City of Miami Beach v. Liflans Corporation, 259 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1972). We find that Jaruag- [*704] ua has not shown that the amount of fees allowed were such as to constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. In the interlocutory appeal, Jar-uagua contends that the trial court erred in de…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shavers v. Duval Cnty., 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954)
- Culbertson v. Seacoast Towers E., Inc., 236 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1970)
- City OF Hallandale v. Wiliam F. Chatlos, 236 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1970)
- The City of Arcadia v. Parker, 78 Fla. 394 (Fla. 1919)
- Nelson v. Selden Cypress Door Co., 78 Fla. 203 (Fla. 1919)