GORDON T. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
RUSSELL A. BANNING AND ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this insurance coverage dispute, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's post-verdict order limiting an insurance company's liability to its policy limits. The court held that proper procedure requires filing a cross-claim rather than a motion, ensuring the insured receives adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on coverage issues.
The court held that a post-verdict motion to limit judgment based on policy limits must be filed as a cross-claim under Rule 1.170(g) FRCP with proper service on all parties, not as a simple motion, to ensure the insured receives adequate notice and opportunity to respond.
[1] A motion to limit a judgment against an insurer to policy limits, filed after a jury verdict, requires a pleading in the nature of a cross-claim under Rule 1.170(g) FRCP.
[2] Proper procedure for an insurer seeking to limit post-verdict judgment to policy limits necessitates service of a cross-claim upon all parties.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Something more than a mere allegation in a motion to limit liability is necessary for the insured to have his day in court.”
Establishes the standard that procedural due process requires more than a motion for limiting coverage liability.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRussell A. Banning sued Gordon T. Williams and Allstate Insurance Company. A jury returned a verdict against both defendants in the amount of $30,000.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Policy Limits cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant, Gordon T. Williams, was a defendant along with Allstate Insurance Company in the trial court. Russell A. Banning brought suit against Williams and Allstate and the jury returned a verdict against Williams and Allstate in the amount of $30,000.
Subsequently, Allstate filed its motion to limit judgment to $10,000. The trial court granted the motion limiting Allstate’s liability to $10,000, and in its order held that this should not be res judicata in any proceedings brought by the plaintiff or defendant Williams, charging Allstate with bad faith in its settlement negotiations which took place prior to trial.
The question posed for this court is: What constitutes proper procedure by the trial court after verdict where the verdict exceeds the limits of liability of the policy of insurance issued by the liability insurance carrier. This is one of the questions which is an adjunct growing out of Shingleton v. Bussey, Fla. 1969, 223 So.2d 713, and that line of cases where insurance companies are not severed for trial.
In this instance the motion to limit judgment was filed after the verdict was rendered and upon one day’s notice to Gordon T. Williams’ attorney. In passing, Williams was represented by the same attorney who represented Allstate Insurance Company during the trial and their interests were the same until the rendition of the verdict at which time Allstate filed its motion to limit liability. No adversary hearing was held on this motion nor was the policy itself ever introduced into evidence. However, on depositions and in defendant’s answer there was an allegation that Allstate was liable, if liable at all, only under the terms of the policy.
This question has not been directly answered in Florida which is understandable since Shingleton is of rather recent origin.
In the instant case the insurance policy was not introduced into evidence during the trial, nor was any mention made that Allstate would rely on the limitation of its policy; however, a specimen policy was introduced at the hearing on limitation.
It is indicated to us that something more than a mere allegation in a motion to limit liability is necessary for the insured to have his day in court. We believe that the proper procedure to follow in a post-trial action to limit judgment in the same action where the judgment was rendered, under such circumstances as exist here, is to file a pleading in the nature of a cross-claim as provided in Rule 1.170(g) FRCP, 30 F.S. A., with service thereof upon all parties as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure and thereafter proceed treating such cross-claim as an initial pleading with the right to respond thereto in the parties against whom the claim is made.
Reversed and remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Quinn v. Truman Alan Millard, 358 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…and, the trial court shall verify the policy limits and incorporate its finding on this point to govern a modification of the judgment against Allstate and Quinn. See Stella v. Craine, 281 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). And cf. Williams v. Banning, 259 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) (where an insured contests his policy limits and no proof of those limits is in evidence, the filing of a cross claim is the proper procedure). The court shall then confine Allstate’s liability to the limits of its policy coverage…
-
Ward W. Kelly v. Williams, 411 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…question, the Second District Court of Appeal requires the insurance company to raise the issue of limitation by pleading in the nature of a cross-claim served on the other parties (the insured and plaintiff/judgment creditor). Williams v. Banning, 259 So. 2d 725 (Fla.2d DCA 1972). This procedure has also been used to raise the issue of bad faith settlement negotiating on an insurance company’s part. State ex rel. Unigard Ins. Co. v. Durrance, 276 So. 2d 112 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 505 (Fla.19…
-
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shilling, 374 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)…Counsel for appellee in the brief urges affirmance of the trial court’s denial from the somewhat anomalous posture of seeking to protect the interests of the other defendants below, Dawn and Patricia Horen, as the insureds. See Williams v. Banning, 259 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). Although appellants’ argument is commendable for its chivalry, it is insufficient legally to sustain the trial court’s ruling. Absent some compelling reason in the record to support entry of judgment against an insurer in excess…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Gulf Stream Motors, Inc. v. Christina Cook & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)