FRANKLIN KAYMORE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Franklin Kaymore appealed his robbery conviction, challenging whether law enforcement had probable cause to arrest him and search his vehicle. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that officers had probable cause based on a radio dispatch describing robbery suspects and suspicious circumstances during the traffic stop.
The court held that a reasonably prudent and intelligent person under the circumstances of this record had good cause to believe that a felony had been committed and that probable cause existed for the apprehension of the vehicle and its occupants.
[1] Law enforcement officers have probable cause to stop a vehicle when a radio dispatch describes a vehicle and its occupants as suspects in an armed robbery, and the office…
[2] The observation of firearms in plain view inside a vehicle after a lawful stop provides probable cause to arrest the occupants.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that a reasonably prudent and intelligent person under the circumstances reflected in this record had good cause to believe that a felony had been committed and that probable cause existed for the apprehension of the instant vehicle and its occupants.”
States the standard and holding on the probable cause issue, the core legal question on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice received a radio dispatch to be on the lookout for a 1959 or 1957 Plymouth or DeSoto automobile (white or white and red) occupied by three Blac…
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The sole question by appellant on this appeal from a judgment of conviction of robbery is that the law enforcement officers did not have probable cause to arrest him and search the vehicle in which he was riding.
The Crescent City Chief of Police received a radio call advising all law enforcement officers to be on the lookout for a 1959 or 1957 Plymouth or DeSoto automobile of white or white and red color, occupied by three negro males who' were suspects in an armed robbery. The radio message further advised that these suspects were considered to be armed and dangerous. Shortly thereafter, around 10:45 p. m., the Chief of Police observed a 1960 blue and white Chrysler automobile, occupied by three negro males, traveling down the highway. As the vehicle approached, he saw a negro male in the back seat lie down. After following the car through Crescent City, the Chief of Police decided to stop the automobile but prior to doing so radioed for assistance in apprehending the suspects as he realized they might be armed and dangerous. In response to his radio call, a Constable came to his aid and forced the vehicle to stop. Upon peering inside the vehicle the Constable observed one or more revolvers in open sight on the front seat. After placing the driver under arrest and handcuffing him, the Constable ordered the other two occupants out of the car. Kaymore, the passenger in the rear seat, refused to get out of the automobile and had to be forcibly withdrawn. The three were placed under arrest for “suspicion of a robbery.” The fruits of the robbery, described to the officers by radio, were discovered by a search of the vehicle.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the incriminating evidence found in the automobile. We observe that the actions of the Chief of Police and the Constable under the circumstances of this case are to be commended rather than condemned. This type of law enforcement is a positive step towards making the law-abiding citizens of this State feel safe and secure in their lives and property.
We hold that a reasonably prudent and intelligent person under the circumstances reflected in this record had good cause to believe that a felony had been committed and that probable cause existed for the apprehension of the instant vehicle and its occupants. Donar v. State, 236 So.2d 145 (1 Fla.DCA 1970); State v. Outten, 206 So.2d 392 (Fla.1968); State v. Gustafson, 258 So.2d 1, opinion filed by the Supreme Court of Florida on January 26, 1972; and Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 389 F.2d 305 (1967).
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
*853SPECTOR, C. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
By petition for rehearing appellant correctly recites that the following factual statement in the opinion of this Court is incorrect: “Upon peering inside the vehicle the Constable observed one or more revolvers in open sight on the front seat.” Appellant further contends that if the above referred to sentence is removed from the opinion that the Constable did not have, on the remaining facts, probable cause to believe the defendant and his two companions had committed a robbery and therefore the arrest and search incidental thereto was illegal and contrary to the Constitutions of the State of Florida and the United States of America.
We agree that the controverted factual statement is erroneous. A three-cornered handkerchief, a white one that had been tied in a triangular fashion, was on the front seat of the car and the subject revolvers apparently were under the front seat. The Constable who searched the vehicle testified:
“A. Well, after I received the information that the subjects fitted the description, what to look for, a gun, I walked up to the automobile, I found a three-cornered handkerchief, a white one that had been tied in a triangular fashion, the knot was still tied in the back of it. I looked under the passenger’s side of the car and the bank bag and two pistols were there. I did not touch them; I did not remove them.”
We are still of the view that the officer under the overall facts of this case had probable cause to stop and search the subject vehicle and adhere to the judgment of affirmance.
The opinion herein is amended by striking the sentence which reads: “Upon peering inside the vehicle the Constable observed one or more revolvers in open sight on the front seat.”
The petition for rehearing is denied and the judgment is affirmed.
SPECTOR, C. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
RAWLS, Judge.
By petition for rehearing appellant correctly recites that the following factual statement in the opinion of this Court is incorrect: “Upon peering inside the vehicle the Constable observed one or more revolvers in open sight on the front seat.” Appellant further contends that if the above referred to sentence is removed from the opinion that the Constable did not have, on the remaining facts, probable cause to believe the defendant and his two companions had committed a robbery and therefore the arrest and search incidental thereto was illegal and contrary to the Constitutions of the State of Florida and the United States of America.
We agree that the controverted factual statement is erroneous. A three-cornered handkerchief, a white one that had been tied in a triangular fashion, was on the front seat of the car and the subject revolvers apparently were under the front seat. The Constable who searched the vehicle testified:
“A. Well, after I received the information that the subjects fitted the description, what to look for, a gun, I walked up to the automobile, I found a three-cornered handkerchief, a white one that had been tied in a triangular fashion, the knot was still tied in the back of it. I looked under the passenger’s side of the car and the bank bag and two pistols were there. I did not touch them; I did not remove them.”
We are still of the view that the officer under the overall facts of this case had probable cause to stop and search the subject vehicle and adhere to the judgment of affirmance.
The opinion herein is amended by striking the sentence which reads: “Upon peering inside the vehicle the Constable observed one or more revolvers in open sight on the front seat.”
The petition for rehearing is denied and the judgment is affirmed.
SPECTOR, C. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
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ST. John v. State, 363 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…at there were other circumstances observed or otherwise known by the police which created the founded suspicion justifying the stop. The state relies upon several cases such as McRae v. State, 245 So. 2d 133 (Fla.1st DCA 1971), and Kaymore v. State, 260 So. 2d 851 (Fla.1st DCA 1972), to support the contention that the mere receipt of a bolo gives an officer the right to stop and detain an individual. A cursory reading of those cases would indicate that the question was never raised. Therefore, they can hardly…
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Anderson v. State, 311 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Kaymore v. State, 260 So. 2d 851 (Fla.App.1972). RAWLS, C. J., and JOHNSON and MILLS, JJ., concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
- State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972)
- Williams v. Barron Roofing Co., 206 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1968)
- State v. Outten, 206 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1968)
- Cleveland John Donar v. State, 236 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)