M. C. KENT
v.
TALLAHASSEE MOTOR COMPANY
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In this detinue action, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of a new trial in a case involving the repossession of an automobile under a conditional sales contract. The court held that the verdict was fatally defective because it failed to assess the value of the property sued for, a required element in detinue cases under common law.
The court affirmed the grant of a new trial because the verdict was fatally defective under common law detinue principles, as it failed to assess the value of the automobile. The court also held that while Rule 74 requires trial courts to state grounds for granting a motion for new trial, this requirement was not violated where the record showed the verdict was inherently defective and a new trial was imperative.
“Detinue in Florida is a pure common-law action and being so, when verdict is for the plaintiff, it is fatally defective if it fails to assess the value of the property sued for.”
Establishes the mandatory requirement in detinue actions that a plaintiff's verdict must include assessment of the property's value
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKent purchased a 1937 Ford sedan from Tallahassee Motor Company under a conditional sales contract with monthly payments. The initial payment was made…
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M. C. Kent brought an action of detinue against Tallahassee Motor Company claiming damages in the sum of $500 for the detention of one 1937 Tudor Ford sedan automobile. There were four pleas to declaration. The first and second pleas denied the detention, the third alleged that defendant was the owner of the automobile and had a right to take it and the fourth plea was one of set off. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $450; a motion for new trial was granted and writ of error was prosecuted.
The automobile brought in question was sold by defendant to plaintiff under conditional sales contract payments to be made monthly. The initial payment was made with Kent’s old car. The first monthly payment was made late but accepted. The second payment was tendered late and *791refused. Plaintiff left his automobile standing in front of defendant’s place of business and in his absence, defendant took charge of and recovered ti.
Plaintiff in error contends that the fact that one payment was accepted late, he was lulled into a sense of security and should not have had his car taken from him. .
There are some cases which apparently hold to this effect but the sales contract in this case provided in terms that in case of default, the seller could declare the whole amount due and repossess the property without legal process. The contract further provided that if the seller failed to promptly exercise any remedy in his favor, he should not in the future be precluded from-doing so. The contract in other words provided for every step that was taken by defendant so there is no merit to this contention.
It is next contended that the order granting the new trial should be reversed because the trial court failed to state the ground or grounds on which it was granted.
Rule 74 of the common-law rules as approved September 18, 1936, requires the trial court when granting a motion for new trial to state in his order the ground or grounds upon which he grants it. The requirement of this rule is mandatory and should be observed by the trial judge unless some good reason is apparent for not doing so. In this case, we do not hold him in error for failure to observe this requirement because the record shows on its face that the verdict was fatally defective so a new trial was imperative.
The verdict merely found for plaintiff and assessed his damages. There was a failure to find and assess the value of the automobile sued for. Detinue in Florida is a pure common-law action and being so, when verdict is for the plaintiff, it is fatally defective if it fails to assess the value *792of the property sued for. Crandall, Florida Common Laws Practice, 557-558.
We accordingly affirm the order granting the new trial.
Affirmed.
Terrell, C. J., Whitfield, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.
Buford, J., concurs in opinion and judgment.
Justices Chapman and Thomas not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
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Fulton v. Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc., 122 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)…rranged for preparation of a record on which other questions could be raised.5 On that state of the record, the appellants were in a position to insist on a reversal of the order granting the new trial, on authority of Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., 141 Fla. 789, 193 So. 821; Booker v. Saunders Realty Co., Fla.1951, 53 So. 2d 912; Ebersole v. Tepperman, Fla.1953, 65 So. 2d 564; Means v. Douglas, Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 88. However, almost a month after the appeal was taken, and more than two weeks after t…
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Means v. Douglas, 110 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)…§ 59.07(4) Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and Rules 2.6(d) and 2.8(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A. Booker v. Saunders Realty Co., Fla.1951, 53 So. 2d 912; Eber [*90] sole v. Tepperman, Fla. 1953, 65 So. 2d 564; cf. Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., 141 Fla. 789, 193 So. 821. For the reasons set forth the appeal of Spencer Means, Sr., defendant in the trial court, is dismissed, sua sponte, and upon the cross appeal of Leslie Eugene Douglas, plaintiff in the trial court, the order granting to the defendant…
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Hammett v. Lyte Lyne, Inc., 150 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1963)…rounds upon which the motion was granted. The decision under review affirmed the order granting a new trial which did not set out the grounds therefor, upon the theory of the exceptions supposedly made in the cases of Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., 141 Fla. 789, 193 So. 821 (1940) and Booker v. Saunders Realty Co., 53 So. 2d 912 (Fla.1961). We are of the opinion that the requirement that the trial judge indicate the particular grounds upon which a new trial is ordered is mandatory.'3 The record in this ca…
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