CHARLES HAMMETT, PETITIONER
v.
LYTE LYNE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that trial courts must specify the grounds for granting a new trial motion in the order itself, rejecting the District Court of Appeal's affirmance of an order that failed to state any grounds.
A trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial must specify the particular grounds upon which it is granted. This requirement is mandatory under Florida Statute § 59.07(4) and Florida Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 2.6(d), and there are no exceptions that excuse compliance in this case.
“Florida Statute, Section 59.07(4), F.S.A. and Rule 2.6(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A., require that when the trial court enters an order granting the motion for a new trial he shall indicate in the order the particular ground or grounds upon which the motion was granted.”
Establishes the statutory and rule-based mandate for specifying grounds in new trial orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner Hammett sought certiorari review of a District Court of Appeal decision affirming a trial court's order granting a new trial. The trial cou…
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Petitioner by writ of certiorari seeks review of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, which affirmed the lower court’s granting a new trial without specifying the grounds therefor. The facts of the case appear in the District Court’s opinion.1
Conflict is alleged with the decisions of other district courts of appeal and with pri- or decisions of this Court to the effect that a new trial order must specify the particular grounds upon which it is granted. We find jurisdiction under Fla.Const., Art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A.
Florida Statute, Section 59.07(4), F.S.A. and Rule 2.6(d),2 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A., require that when the trial court enters an order granting the motion for a new trial he shall indicate in the order the particular ground or grounds upon which the motion was granted.
The decision under review affirmed the order granting a new trial which did not set out the grounds therefor, upon the theory of the exceptions supposedly made in the cases of Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., 141 Fla. 789, 193 So. 821 (1940) and Booker v. Saunders Realty Co., 53 So.2d 912 (Fla.1961).
We are of the opinion that the requirement that the trial judge indicate the particular grounds upon which a new trial is ordered is mandatory.'3 The record in this cause furnished no basis upon which noncompliance may be excused.
Petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, is quashed and the cause remanded for entry of an order in accordance with this opinion.
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur.
DREW, J., concurs specially with opinion.
(concurring specially).
In addition to what is said in the foregoing decision, I think it appropriate to observe that the statute authorizing an appeal from an order granting a new trial * and the statute supplementing it and prescribing the scope of review in such cases ** are, by the express provision of Florida Appellate Rules, made rules of this Court *** and so, whether such should be done by statute or rule, the requirement that the trial judge shall specify the grounds upon which he grants a new trial is a salutary and essential one. If he fails to do so, there is nothing which the lawyers may argue in the appellate court or the appellate court may decide because the law is that “no other grounds than those specified by the trial judge, as a basis for the order granting the new trial, *237shall be considered as arguable upon said appeal.” For this, as well as the reasons expressed by CALDWELL, J., I concur.
THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur.
DREW, Justice
(concurring specially).
In addition to what is said in the foregoing decision, I think it appropriate to observe that the statute authorizing an appeal from an order granting a new trial * and the statute supplementing it and prescribing the scope of review in such cases ** are, by the express provision of Florida Appellate Rules, made rules of this Court *** and so, whether such should be done by statute or rule, the requirement that the trial judge shall specify the grounds upon which he grants a new trial is a salutary and essential one. If he fails to do so, there is nothing which the lawyers may argue in the appellate court or the appellate court may decide because the law is that “no other grounds than those specified by the trial judge, as a basis for the order granting the new trial, shall be considered as arguable upon said appeal.” For this, as well as the reasons expressed by CALDWELL, J., I concur. THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur. *
Section 59.04 F.S.1961, F.S.A. **
Section 59.07(4), F.S.1961, F.S.A. ***
Florida Appellate Rules 1962 Revision, Rule 1.4, 31 F.S.A. provides “All statutes not superseded hereby or in conflict herewith shall remain in effect as rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965)…to be basis for reversing such orders. Means v. Douglas, Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 88; Fulton v. Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc., Fla.App.1960, 122 So. 2d 240; Morton v. Staples, et al., Fla.App.1962, 141 So. 2d 806; Hammett v. Lyte Line, Inc., Fla. 1963, 150 So. 2d 235. Certainly, if the omission of the required ground for new trial was only a clerical error subject to correction under Rule 1.38(a) some mention of and resort to it would have been made in our cases reversing orders for this reason. Whether the gro…
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Hall v. Am. Distrib. Corp., 181 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…we consider the order as being made pursuant to Rule 2.8, it would be necessary to reverse it because the order fails to recite the ground upon which the new trial is granted. See, Fla.Stat., § 59.07(4), F.S.A., Hammett v. Lyte Lyne, Inc., Fla.1963, 150 So. 2d 235. [*713] We turn then to an examination of the defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 1.38 (b) to determine whether the ground set forth in said motion was sufficient to afford a basis for the trial judge to enter an order setting aside the judgment and…
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State Rd. Dep't of Fla. v. Mutillo, 155 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)…at literal compliance with the statute is unnecessary. In support of this point the appellees rely upon Hammett v. Lyte Lyne, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 142 So. 2d 745, but the decision in that case was quashed in Hammett v. Lyte Lyne, Inc., Fla.App. 1963, 150 So. 2d 235, wherein the Supreme Court’s opinion states at page 236: “The decision under review affirmed the order granting a new trial which did not set out the grounds therefor ^ ‡ “We are of the opinion that the requirement that the trial judge indicate th…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fulton v. Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc., 122 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Means v. Douglas, 110 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Gaskill v. Montague, 128 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Simpson, 128 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., 141 Fla. 789 (Fla. 1940)
- State ex rel. Peterman v. Adams, 65 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1953)
- Morton v. Elmo Staples, 141 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)
- In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1962)
- Webb's City, Inc. v. Lugerner, 138 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Hammett v. Lyte Lyne, Inc., 142 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)