JAMES FERGUSON, APPELLANT,
v.
ELIZABETH LEE LITTLE, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, JANE T. PHILLIPS, APPELLEE
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In this interlocutory appeal of a bastardy action, the court addressed whether venue in such proceedings is governed by the general civil venue statute or the bastardy-specific statute. The court held that the bastardy statute controls, permitting the mother to bring suit in the county of her residence rather than requiring venue in the defendant's county.
The bastardy statute (F.S. § 742.021) controls venue in bastardy proceedings, and the mother may properly bring the action in the county of her residence. The general civil venue statute (F.S. § 47.011) is not applicable to bastardy actions.
[1] A bastardy proceeding may be brought in the county where the woman resides.
[2] A specific venue statute for bastardy proceedings controls over the general venue statute for civil actions.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The proceedings shall be by verified complaint filed in the circuit court of the county in which the woman resides or of the county in which the alleged father resides.”
The bastardy statute explicitly permitting venue in either the woman's or alleged father's county of residence, establishing the statutory basis for allowing the mother to choose venue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames Ferguson, the alleged father, sought to transfer a bastardy action from Putnam County (where the plaintiff-mother, Jane T. Phillips, and her min…
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This interlocutory appeal submits for our review an order of the trial court denying appellant’s motion to transfer this cause *364from Putnam County where it is instituted and where appellee-plaintiff resides to Palm Beach County where appellant-defendant resides. The sole question involved herein is one of venue.
This action is one in bastardy brought by the woman whose complaint alleges that appellant is the father of her unborn child. The action is brought in Putnam County pursuant to that provision of our statutes relating to bastardy proceedings which is as follows:
“The proceedings shall be by verified complaint filed in the circuit court of the county in which the woman resides or of the county in which the alleged father resides. The complaint shall aver sufficient facts charging the paternity of the child. Process directed to the defendant shall issue forthwith requiring the defendant to file his written defenses to the complaint in the same manner as suits in chancery. Upon application and proof under oath, the court may issue a writ of ne exeat against the defendant on such terms and conditions and conditioned upon bond in such amount as the court may determine.” 1
The foregoing statute was construed by the Second District Court of Appeal in Paulet v. Hickey2 where the identical question as that raised in the case sub jud-ice was decided. In its interpretation of the statute, the court held:
“ . . . The appellant contends that this being a transitory action, Section 46.01, Florida Statutes 1965, F.S.A., controls, and he has a right to have the action brought in the county where he resides.
“On the other hand, the appellee contends that under Chapter 742, Florida Statutes 1965, F.S.A., she may bring this action in the county of her residence, she having the choice within the confines of said statute where said action should be brought. Greyhound Corp. v. Rosart, Fla.App.1960, 124 So.2d 708; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Ganey, Fla.App.1961, 125 So.2d 576. . . .
“It is the holding of this Court that Section 742.021, Florida Statutes 1965, F.S.A., controls and the institution of the suit by the mother in the county of her residence is proper. . . . ”
We agree with the Second District Court of Appeal that the provision of the bastardy statute relating to venue controls in actions of this kind, and the action may be brought by the woman in the county of her residence if she elects to do so. F.S. Section 47.011, F.S.A., the general venue statute applicable to civil actions, is not pertinent to this type of proceeding. The order appealed herein which denies appellant’s motion to transfer this cause to Palm Beach County, the place of his residence, is affirmed.
SPECTOR, C. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
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Janies Ferguson v. Little, 273 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1973)…Certiorari denied. 266 So. 2d 363. CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.…
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Corio v. Lopez, 190 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…ction lies in the circuit court for the county in which either the plaintiff or defendant resides. § 742.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). This specific venue statute controls over the general venue statute in paternity proceedings. See Ferguson v. Little, 266 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Paulet v. Hickey, 206 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d- DCA 1968). Corio’s initial selection of venue was proper under section 742.021 since he resides in Orange County. When venue is proper in more than one county, a .plaintiff may choose to…
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Beckford v. Drogan, 198 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…ction lies in the circuit court for the county in which either the plaintiff or defendant resides. § 742.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). This specific venue statute controls over the general venue statute in paternity proceedings. See Ferguson v. Little, 266 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Paulet v. Hickey, 206 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). Corio’s initial selection of venue was proper under section 742.021 since he resides in Orange County. When venue is proper in more than one county, a plaintiff may choose to"…
Authorities Cited
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Ganey, 125 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Greyhound Corp. v. Rosart, 124 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)