WILLIAM JAMES CORIO, APPELLANT,
v.
BRENDA LOPEZ, APPELLEE
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William Corio filed a paternity action against Brenda Lopez in Orange County, where he resided. Lopez moved to transfer venue to Polk County under the general venue statute. The trial court granted the motion without a hearing. The appellate court reversed, holding that the specific paternity venue statute controls and that Corio properly selected Orange County as venue.
The trial court's order transferring venue was reversed. The specific paternity venue statute (section 742.021) controls over the general venue statute in paternity actions, allowing venue in the county where either party resides. Corio properly selected Orange County as venue because he resides there, and the defendant bears the burden of proving the plaintiff's venue selection is improper.
[1] A trial court deprives a party of due process when it enters an order without affording that party an opportunity to be heard on a motion.
[2] A specific venue statute controls over a general venue statute in paternity proceedings.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A paternity action lies in the circuit court for the county in which either the plaintiff or defendant resides. § 742.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). This specific venue statute controls over the general venue statute in paternity proceedings.”
Establishes that the specific paternity venue statute takes precedence over the general venue statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCorio, Lopez, and their children initially lived in Orange County. Lopez relocated with the children to Polk County. Corio filed a paternity action in…
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William J. Corio filed a paternity action against Brenda Lopez in Orange County Circuit Court. Corio alleged that he, Lopez and their children lived in Orange County until Lopez relocated with the children to Polk County. In response to Co-rio’s lawsuit, Lopez filed a motion to change venue pursuant to the general venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2015), which provides that “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or wfiere the property in litigation is located,” Without a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and transferred the action to Polk County. We reverse.
Corio was deprived of due process when the trial' court entered the order without affording him the opportunity to be heard on the motion. E.g., Sims v. Holloway, 135 So.3d 360, 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); J.L.S. v. R.J.L., 708 So.2d 293, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).' Notwithstanding, we review the trial court’s legal conclusion that venue was proper in Polk County de novo and conclude that it was incorrect. See Hall v. Animals.com, L.L.C., 171 So.3d 216, 217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Cedar Res., Inc., 761 So.2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
A paternity action lies in the circuit court for the county in which either the plaintiff or defendant resides. § 742.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). This specific venue statute controls over the general venue statute in paternity proceedings. See Ferguson v. Little, 266 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Paulet v. Hickey, 206 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d- DCA 1968). Corio’s initial selection of venue was proper under section 742.021 since he resides in Orange County. When venue is proper in more than one county, a .plaintiff may choose to institute suit in any proper place and the trial court must honor that choice. Symbol Mattress of Fla., Inc. v. Royal Sleep Prods., Inc., 832 So.2d 233, 235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). In seeking a change of venue, the defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiffs venue selection is improper; it is insufficient to merely establish that venue is proper elsewhere. Id. In this matter, Lopez, the party contesting venue, has not demonstrated the impropriety of Corio’s selection since section 742.021 controls, and therefore, Corio properly instituted the lawsuit in Orange County, the county of his residence.1
For these reasons, we reverse the order transferring venue to, Polk County.
REVERSED.
ORFINGER, EVÁNDER and COHEN, JJ.,' concur.
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Destefanis v. HAN Ming TAN, 231 So. 3d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…ecific forum non conve-niens provision, section 61.520. Because the UCCJEA contains a specific forum non conveniens' provision,'' that provision' controls, rather than the common law forum non conveniens on which Kinney is based. See Corio v. Lopez, 190 So. 3d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (holding that the specific venue statute for paternity, actions displaces the more general statute). However, even if we were to review DeStefanis’ motion under the Kinney factors, we would conclude that the trial court abu…
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Beckford v. Drogan, 198 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…before the filing of the paternity action in Palm Beach County. At a non- [*1002] evidentiary. hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding venue proper pursuant to section 742.021(1), Florida Statutes, This appeal follows. In Cono v. Lopez, 190 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), the court explained that pursuant to section 742.021(1), Florida Statutes, the plaintiff has a choice of venue for a paternity action, and the defendant must prove that the venue selection is improper: ' A paternity action lies…
Authorities Cited
- Paulet v. Hickey, 206 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Parks v. Provence Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 761 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Pricewaterhousecoopers LLP v. Cedar Res., Inc., 761 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- J.L.S. v. R.J.L. & State of Fla., 708 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Symbol Mattress OF Fla., Inc. v. Royal Sleep Prods., Inc., 832 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Hall v. Animals.com, L.L.C., 171 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)
- Lindsay v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 266 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Ferguson v. Little, 266 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Sims v. Holloway, 135 So. 3d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)
- Srzedzinski v. Latisha Burgess, 135 So. 3d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)