HAROLD E. PARRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES ANTHONY GAVAGAN ET AL., APPELLEES; JAMES ANTHONY GAVAGAN ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. HAROLD E. PARRIS AND MARILYN K. PARRIS, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES
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In this appeal from a jury verdict in a rear-end automobile collision case, the court affirmed the jury's awards for the passenger (wife) but reversed the zero damage award for the driver (husband) for his personal injuries, finding it unreasonable that a jury could conclude he suffered no injury given the vehicle damage and his documented medical treatment.
The zero damage verdict for Harold E. Parris was inadequate and unreasonable; the court reversed and remanded for a new trial limited to the question of his damages alone. The court affirmed the awards of $15,700 for his wife's medical expenses and $100,000 for her injuries.
[1] A jury verdict awarding zero damages for personal injuries is inadequate when reasonable persons could not have concluded that the plaintiff did not suffer injuries.
[2] In a rear-end collision case, a jury's finding of no injury to the driver is unreasonable when the vehicle sustained significant damage and the passenger suffered severe…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The test to be applied in determining the adequacy of a verdict is whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned that verdict.”
Establishes the legal standard for reviewing verdict adequacy, cited from Griffis v. Hill
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarold E. Parris was the driver of a vehicle stopped at a red light when struck from behind by another vehicle. The impact caused significant damage t…
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This appeal and cross-appeal is from a final judgment following a jury verdict growing out of a rear-end automobile collision. We have carefully reviewed the briefs, heard oral argument, and studied the record, and have determined that the judgment should be affirmed in all respects except the zero damages awarded for the personal injuries suffered by appellant, Harold E. Parris.
The cases are voluminous in reversing and sustaining zero damage verdicts.1 But after a thorough study in comparison of them, it all seems to be set forth in Griffis v. Hill, Fla.1969, 230 So.2d 143. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the question of appellant’s damages alone based on Griffis v. Hill, infra, where the court said:
“The test to be applied in determining the adequacy of a verdict is whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned that verdict.”
*817We believe that from a careful reading of the record one must arrive at the inescapable conclusion that reasonable men could not have believed Mr. Parris did not suffer personal injuries.
Mr. Parris was the driver of an automobile stopped at a red light when he was struck from the rear with sufficient impact to damage the trunk lid, bumper and trailer hitch. The quarter panel was forced forward into the doors, jamming them. The rear cross member and the right wheel rail of the frame were bent. His wife, Marilyn K. Parris, was a passenger and her damages were so severe that surgery was required with continuing treatment and she was caused to cease working. The jury found her to be permanently disabled to such an extent that they awarded her a verdict of $100,000.
In view of such damages to the automobile and such injury to the passenger, we believe it unreasonable that the jury concluded that the driver sustained no injury. Mr. Parris testified that he suffered immediate pain in his left shoulder and neck and that the pain continued. He consulted, and was treated by, three doctors. He wore a collar that was prescribed and received therapy, including traction. He missed several days from work. Dr. Cordrey testified that he was peculiarly susceptible to neck injury because of a pre-existing posture abnormality, that his condition was permanent and that it could not be accounted for by pre-existing posture abnormality alone without an interposing trauma such as the one he suffered in the accident.
Medical bills for Mr. Parris’ treatment were also introduced into evidence. Although cross-appellants have attacked their sufficiency as proof of his damage on the grounds of lack of evidence as to their reasonableness or necessity, they made no such complaint or objection when they were introduced at the trial. Even so, medical expenses are but one element of damages for personal injury and a zero verdict would not be sustainable in this case even if the proof is insufficient in that respect.
For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to the award of $15,700 to Harold E. Par-ris for the injury of his wife and the award of $100,000 to Marilyn K. Parris for her injuries. It is reversed and remanded for a new trial for the personal injuries of Harold E. Parris.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial.
HOBSON, J., concurs.
MANN, J., concurs in part, ‘dissents in part with opinion.
(dissenting from reversal of judgment as to Harold E. Parris).
A reasonable jury could have concluded that Mr. Parris was not injured. His injuries were not objectively verifiable. His only medical witness was consulted over a year after the accident. He testified that he consulted a physician shortly after the accident, but that doctor did not testify.
Judge Liles’ opinion rests upon the unsound conclusion that injury to the driver must accompany substantial damage to the car and to the passenger. Indeed, our efforts at improvements in automotive engineering are directed at the substitution of property damage for personal injury to the extent possible. I cannot accept the conclusion as flowing inexorably from the premise.
I would affirm.
MANN, Judge
(dissenting from reversal of judgment as to Harold E. Parris).
A reasonable jury could have concluded that Mr. Parris was not injured. His injuries were not objectively verifiable. His only medical witness was consulted over a year after the accident. He testified that he consulted a physician shortly after the accident, but that doctor did not testify.
Judge Liles’ opinion rests upon the unsound conclusion that injury to the driver must accompany substantial damage to the car and to the passenger. Indeed, our efforts at improvements in automotive engineering are directed at the substitution of property damage for personal injury to the extent possible. I cannot accept the conclusion as flowing inexorably from the premise.
I would affirm.
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Flagship Bank OF Orlando v. Jackson Bryan, 384 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…he jury had no reasonable basis to determine there was no deficiency between the fair market value of the collateral on December 1977, and the judgment debt owed and unpaid to the bank. Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1969); Parris v. Gavagan, 271 So. 2d 816 (Fla.2d DCA 1972). Because the jury ignored the evidence or misconceived the merits of the case,4 we reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH, C. J. concurs. ORFINGER, J., dissents with opinion.…
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Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 452 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…’s awarding of an additional $26,-000.00 in damages on the breach of insurance policy contract claim. In any event, a jury of reasonable persons could not have returned the zero verdict. Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1970); Parris v. Gavagan, 271 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). As a final point, we vacate the particular awards of attorney’s fees and costs in favor of appellees in view of our holdings herein. However, we do not reverse appel-lees’ entitlement to such fees and costs pursuant to sect…
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Short v. Ehrler, 510 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…e it was undisputed that the plaintiff suffered some damages from the collision negligently caused by the defendants, the jury could not reasonably have returned a zero verdict. See Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1969), and Par-ris v. Gavagan, 271 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). Though not necessary to our conclusion, and only as a guide on retrial, we also find it was error not to admit the medical notes of Doctor Ford. See section 90.803(4), Florida Statutes (1985), albeit their contents were cumulati…
Authorities Cited
- Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1969)
- Shaw v. Puleo, 159 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1964)
- City OF Miami v. Smith, 165 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1964)
- Short v. Grossman, 245 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1971)
- Roberts v. Bushore, 182 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1966)
- Anastasio v. Summersett, 217 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Roberts v. Bushore, 183 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Boeck v. Diem, 245 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- Brigida Tejon and Victor Castro v. Mary R. Broome and her husband, 261 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Brick v. Nita Lois Denny and Darrell Duane Denny, 205 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)