BRIGIDA TEJON AND VICTOR CASTRO, APPELLANTS,
v.
MARY R. BROOME AND HER HUSBAND, JAMES P. BROOME, APPELLEES
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The appellate court reversed a trial judge's grant of a new trial, holding that a jury verdict awarding zero damages for a plaintiff's pain and suffering while compensating the husband for medical expenses was reasonable and not legally inadequate under Florida law.
A verdict awarding zero damages for pain and suffering is not necessarily inadequate, and where there is evidence supporting a reasonable jury conclusion that no compensable injury occurred, such a verdict must be upheld by the trial judge. The fact that medical expenses were incurred does not create a logical inconsistency requiring reversal.
[1] A jury verdict awarding a husband damages for his wife's medical expenses but denying the wife damages for pain and suffering is not necessarily inconsistent or unreasona…
[2] A jury verdict is not necessarily inadequate simply because it awards zero damages for pain and suffering.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We think the principle to be derived from Griffis v. Hill is that a verdict in excess of specifically provable items of damages is not necessarily an adequate verdict.”
Clarifies the proper interpretation of Griffis v. Hill regarding verdict adequacy
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMary Broome was injured in an accident but appeared unharmed at the scene. She complained of neck pain the following day and sought treatment from an …
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At the time of the accident, Mary Broome did not appear to have suffered injury. She complained the next day of a pain in the neck and consulted an ortho-paedic physician who treated her for pain for several months, but who did not testify at the trial. She then switched to a chiropractor, who did testify. The defendants had her examined by a second ortho-paedist, whose testimony would support a finding by the jury that she had not suffered injury as a consequence of the accident. The jury returned a verdict for Mr. Broome which compensated him almost exactly for property damage and doctor bills, and a verdict of zero dollars for Mrs. Broome’s pain and suffering. The trial judge granted a new trial “since a jury of reasonable men did not return a verdict consistent with the requirements of the Florida Supreme Court in Griffis v. Hill, Fla.1970, 230 So.2d 143.”
*198In Griffis v. Hill the Supreme Court held that the record in that particular case showed as a matter of law that the verdict was inadequate, and told us nothing about the record. We think the principle to be derived from Griffis v. Hill is that a verdict in excess of specifically provable items of damages is not necessarily an adequate verdict. There had developed in three cases1 noted by the Court a tendency to treat a verdict covering out-of-pocket expenses as implying by necessary implication that the jury had considered pain and suffering and accounted for it. But we do not think that the Court intended to say that a verdict for zero damages is necessarily an inadequate verdict, and so held in Boeck v. Diem, Fla.App.1971, 245 So.2d 687.
This case is conceptually identical to Boeck v. Diem except in that the husband was here awarded a recovery for the sums he had expended for his wife’s treatment. In both cases there was no apparent injury. Both plaintiffs left the scene of the accident apparently unharmed. There was evidence from which a jury of reasonble persons could conclude that the plaintiff had in fact endured no compensable pain and suffering.
The question is, then, whether the verdict for the husband shows an inconsistency which would prove the unreasonableness of the jury. We think not. If we were jurors, we would probably have associated pain and suffering with the treatment for which Mr. Broome was compensated. But we are not jurors. And we cannot say that reasonable jurors could not conclude that Mr. Broome was justified in having his wife treated although in the jury's view she had not suffered com-pensable injury in the accident. Such a verdict was in fact upheld by our Supreme Court in Higbee v. Dorigo, Fla.1953, 66 So.2d 684. Contrast Loftin v. Anderson, Fla.1953, 66 So.2d 470, in which the jury awarded damages for pain and suffering but denied the husband recovery for money he had indisputably expended for his wife’s care. That verdict was inconsistent and hence unreasonable, and was accordingly disapproved. The test, then, is whether a jury of reasonable persons could return the verdict. If reason and the record support the verdict, so should the trial judge. We think the trial judge should have entered judgment on this verdict. A failure to do so must be supported by either the record or specific findings that the verdict was improperly influenced.2
Reversed and remanded.
LILES, Acting C. J., and DURRANCE, CARL C., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…by the trial court only where the record affirmatively shows the impropriety of the verdict or the trial judge determines that the jury was influenced by considerations outside the record. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1970); Tejon v. Broome, 261 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 265 So. 2d 50 (Fla.1972). If evidence supports an award of damages, the award may not be disturbed. Hendel v. Rudnick, 78 So. 2d 709 (Fla.1955); Allied Chemical Corp. v. Eubanks Industries, Inc., 155 So. 2d 740 (Fla.…
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Cowart v. Kendall United Methodist Church & Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…necessarily or legally “inconsistent” between an award to the injured person and a finding of no damages in the derivative claim, which may be perfectly appropriate if the evidence on the point is insufficient or conflicting. E.g., Tejon v. Broome, 261 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972), cert. dismissed, 265 So. 2d 50 (Fla.1972). (Thus, any claim of inconsistency, whether made at trial or on appeal in Savoca or in this case, would probably have been rejected on the merits.) What the appellant Cowart does say — an…
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Parris v. Gavagan, 271 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)…l. HOBSON, J., concurs. MANN, J., concurs in part, ‘dissents in part with opinion. . Shaw v. Puleo, Fla.1964, 159 So. 2d 641; Short v. Grossman, Fla.1971, 245 So. 2d 217; Boeck v. Diem, Fla.App.1971, 245 So. 2d 687; Tejon v. Broome, Fla.App.1972, 261 So. 2d 197; Cf. City of Miami v. Smith, Fla.1964, 165 So. 2d 748; Roberts v. Bushore, Fla.1966, 182 So. 2d 401, on remand Fla.App., 183 So. 2d 708; Brick v. Denny, Fla.App.1967, 205 So. 2d 549; Anastasio v. Summersett, Fla.App.1969, 217 So. 2d 854.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1959)
- Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1969)
- Shaw v. Puleo, 159 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1964)
- Laskey v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1970)
- Higbee et ux. v. Dorigo, 66 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1953)
- Loftin v. Anderson, 66 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1953)
- Short v. Grossman, 245 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1971)
- Roberts v. Bushore, 182 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1966)
- Hayes v. Hatchell, 166 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1964)
- Gabriele Fejer and Stefan Fejer v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 182 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)