JAMES WHITE ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1973-03-02
No. 72-457
LILES, A. C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
273 So. 2d 782 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1973) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Three defendants convicted of rape appealed their convictions, arguing that delay in trial violated the speedy trial rule. The court affirmed, holding that continuances requested by defendants tolled the running of the 180-day speedy trial period, placing the trial within the required timeframe.


Holding

The speedy trial rule was not violated. Continuances requested by the defendants tolled the running of the 180-day period, placing the actual trial within the statutory timeframe. Scott lacks standing to raise the issue as he pleaded guilty and waived non-jurisdictional defects. White and Mack's speedy trial contention is without merit because their requested continuances extended the tolled period.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant who pleads guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including speedy trial claims.

[2] A defendant's request for a continuance tolls the running of the speedy trial period.

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Key Quotes

“Every person charged with a crime . . . shall without demand be brought to trial . . . within 180 days if the crime charged be a felony . and if not brought to trial within such time shall upon motion timely filed be forever discharged from the crime.”

The governing speedy trial rule that establishes the 180-day requirement for felony trials.

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Facts & Procedural History

James White, Willie Mack, and Alonzo Scott were arrested on September 19, 1971 for rape. Scott pleaded guilty and received a 10-year sentence. White a…

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Opinion of the Court
PIERCE, Justice (Ret.).

PIERCE, Justice (Ret.).

In this case, appellants James White, Willie Mack, and Alonzo Scott appeal jointly to this Court from respective judgments of conviction and sentences to imprisonment in the State Prison for the offense of rape. Scott pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 10 years. White and Mack stood trial, suffered adverse verdicts, and were sentenced to 30 years and 20 years respectively. The only point urged here for reversal is that the application of the “Speedy trial” rule should operate to discharge appellants. We disagree with such contention and affirm.

The alleged rape occurred the night of September 19, 1971. All three defendants were arrested that night and lodged in the Lake County jail. They were indicted for rape on October 21, 1971. They were arraigned in the Lake County Circuit Court on November 23rd, 1971. During the arraignment their joint counsel in open Court requested a 30 day extension of time within which to file motions.

Counsel for the State called attention to the possible tolling of the time during any extension, whereupon the Court stated that “my understanding of the law is, that if defense requests time, that that tolls the running of the rule”, to which both counsel indicated assent. Both counsel for the State and defense agreed that “that is the law”, the Court adding that the request for extension was “granted with the understanding that the request made by and for the defendants tolls the running of the rule”. This proceeding on arraignment was on November 23, 1971. On January 24, 1972 in open Court the three attorneys for the defendants requested continuance with respect to disposition of a motion to suppress evidence made on behalf of defendants. Such request for continuance without objection was granted by the Court, who thereupon stated in open Court that “this tolls the running of a speedy trial provision”. As before stated, Scott pleaded guilty. On April 21, 1972, upon trial of the issues, White and Mack were found guilty by separate verdicts and in due course were sentenced to imprisonment.

R.Cr.P. 3.191, 33 F.S.A., provides inter alia that “Every person charged with a crime . . . shall without demand be brought to trial . . . within 180 days if the crime charged be a felony . and if not brought to trial within such time shall upon motion timely filed be forever discharged from the crime. . .".

Defendants contend that, assuming the foregoing extensions of time were granted within which they could file motions prior to trial lengthened the time under the rules to beyond the usual 180 day period, yet when the trial began on the 211th day it was one day too late and therefore defendants should be discharged under the Rule.

As to defendant Scott, such argument is strictly not applicable because he pleaded guilty during or before trial, thereby waiving all non-jurisdictional defects. He has no standing here to urge the point. See Streets v. Wainwright, CCA 5, 1968, 402 F.2d 87; Thomas v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So.2d 834; Hield v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So.2d 235; Steinhauser v. State, Fla.App.1969, 228 So.2d 446.

*784As to defendants White and Mack, the speedy trial contention is equally unavailing. There were two continuances prior to trial, both at the instance of defendants. On November 8, 1971, at time of arraignment, they were granted a continuance for trial, and on the second arraignment on November 15, 1971, upon their motion, they were granted additional continuance. These postponements amounted to sufficient days to put the trial, allowing for the time tolled because of motions of defendants, within the 180 period specified by the rule. See Kniffin v. Hall, Fla.1972, 262 So.2d 900, a case squarely in point.

The contention as to the speedy trial rule barring trial of appellants is without merit, and the judgment appealed is therefore—

Affirmed.

LILES, A. C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Tillman v. State, 287 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
    …time the contention that the appellant having pled guilty to the lesser offense waived all nonjuris-dictional defects and, as a consequence, was precluded from claiming that he was denied a speedy trial. We agree. See White v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 273 So. 2d 782, in which the Honorable William C. Pierce, now retired, wrote the majority opinion for this court; see, also, the federal cases of Fowler v. United States, 5th Cir. 1968, 391 F. 2d 276, and Becker v. State of Nebraska, 8th Cir. 1970, 435 F. 2d 157.…
  • Monge v. State, 286 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
    …he was convicted. A guilty plea made voluntarily in a criminal case constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects. Hield v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 201 So. 2d 235; Williams v. State, Fla.App.1972, 259 So. 2d 753; White v. State, Fla.App.1973, 273 So. 2d 782. Appellant’s third point on appeal attacks the guilty plea itself, because appellant alleges that he was induced by the prosecutor during plea bargaining negotiations to withdraw his not guilty plea by a false promise on the part of the state attor…
  • Grisham v. State, 319 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
    …It next asserts that assuming appellant was denied a speedy trial, such denial is a nonjurisdictional defect that is waived by the entry of an otherwise valid guilty plea citing Fowler v. United States, 391 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1968); White v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla.App. 2nd 1973); and Wells v. State, 297 So. 2d 647 (Fla.App. 1st 1974). It last concludes that since the “nolo contendere” plea was equivalent to a guilty plea that the speedy trial claim was waived when that plea was tendered and accepted by t…

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