SIDNEY J. TILLMAN, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida appellate court reversed its own prior opinion on rehearing, affirming the trial court's judgment. Although the appellant was entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule due to delay, his guilty plea to a lesser charge waived the right to assert nonjurisdictional defects, including the speedy trial violation.
A guilty plea to a lesser offense constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects, including speedy trial violations. The appellate court reversed its prior opinion and affirmed the conviction and sentence because the appellant's guilty plea precluded him from claiming a denial of speedy trial rights.
[1] A guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including claims of denial of a speedy trial.
[2] Pro se pleadings should be construed liberally.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“liberal construction should be given to pro se pleadings”
Principle from Thomas v. State that the court initially applied to construe the motion favorably to the pro se appellant
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was charged on October 19, 1971 with unlawfully buying, receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property. The offense allegedly occurre…
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
On petition for rehearing the appellee, State of Florida has timely filed a petition for rehearing and supplement to petition for rehearing of our opinion filed in this appeal on April 18, 1973. In that opinion we held that the appellant was entitled to be discharged for failure of the state to bring him to trial within the time prescribed in Rule 3.191(a)(1), RCrP, 33 F. S.A. The pertinent facts upon which we based our decision, briefly stated, were as follows :
On October 19, 1971, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 811.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. (unlawfully buying, receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen property). The offense was allegedly committed on September 3, 1971. On March 25, 1972, appellant in pro se filed a motion for writ of mandamus seeking discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule. The trial court denied the said motion. Whereupon, the appellant voluntarily, understandingly and knowingly pled guilty to what was characterized as a lesser charge of conspiracy to buy and receive stolen property. This plea was accepted by the court. Appellant was sentenced for this offense to a term of 18 months in the state penitentiary. This appeal followed.
We applied the principles of law enunciated in Thomas v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 164 So. 2d 857, in which case it was held that liberal construction should be given to pro se pleadings. Upon said authority, we construed the motion for writ of mandamus as a motion, for discharge under Rule 3.-191(d)(1), RCrP. Whereupon, we reversed and remanded the cause for discharge of appellant, notwithstanding the fact that the record discloses, as we stated in our original opinion, that the appellant had pled guilty to the lesser charge stated above.
On petition for rehearing, the state raised therein for the first time the contention that the appellant having pled guilty to the lesser offense waived all nonjuris-dictional defects and, as a consequence, was precluded from claiming that he was denied a speedy trial. We agree. See White v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 273 So. 2d 782, in which the Honorable William C. Pierce, now retired, wrote the majority opinion for this court; see, also, the federal cases of Fowler v. United States, 5th Cir. 1968, 391 F. 2d 276, and Becker v. State of Nebraska, 8th Cir. 1970, 435 F. 2d 157.
For the foregoing reasons and, upon further reading and study of the record, we readily acknowledge that we committed error in rendering our original opinion. We overlooked the legal significance and consequences of the appellant’s plea of guilty. We should not have done so. Rehearing is granted and our original opinion withdrawn. .
In view of our present holding, it is not necessary that we discuss the other points raised by appellant on appeal.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence appealed should be and they are hereby
Affirmed.
MANN, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
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Stokes v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 948 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…Generally speaking, pleadings are to be construed favorably to the pleader. See Krantzler v. Board of County Comm’rs, 354 So. 2d 126, 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Furthermore, “liberal construction should be given to pro se pleadings.” Tillman v. State, 287 So. 2d 693, 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); Thomas v. State, 164 So. 2d 857, 857 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Martinez v. Frazedas, 678 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Eichelberger v. Brueckheimer, 613 So. 2d 1372, 1373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Chancey v. Chancey, 880 So.…
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Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fowler v. United States, 391 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1968)
- Levine Thomas v. State, 164 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Becker v. The State OF Neb., 435 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1970)
- White v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Kirkland v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)