STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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This is the second appeal in an inverse condemnation case where the State of Florida Department of Transportation took property owned by Florida East Coast Railway Company for public highway purposes. The court affirmed the trial court's determination of the property value at $400,000 as of the taking date and the assessed damages and attorney's fees.
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects. Issues regarding dedication, laches, estoppel, and the date of taking had been previously decided and were not reconsidered under the doctrine of law of the case. The exclusion of the setback line from appraisals and the attorney's fee award were upheld as having merit.
[1] The doctrine of "law of the case" precludes reconsideration of issues that were decided in a prior appeal.
[2] A trial court's determination of the date of taking in an inverse condemnation action may be affirmed if supported by substantial competent evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The sole issue left for trial after our prior review dealt with a determination of the amount to be paid to appellee for the taking of its property for public highway purposes.”
Establishes the limited scope of issues remaining after the first appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State took an easement under which a street had been constructed and used by the public. The trial court determined the date of taking to be Decem…
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This is the second appearance here of this action for inverse condemnation. The facts of the instant case are fully set out in this court’s prior opinion and need not be repeated here. See: State Dept, of Transport, v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., *290Fla.App.1970, 230 So.2d 726, cert. denied Fla., 239 So.2d 587. The sole issue left for trial after our prior review dealt with a determination of the amount to be paid to appellee for the taking of its property for public highway purposes. In those proceedings the trial judge determined the date of the taking to be December 1, 1966. This was the time when the appellee can-celled the easement under which the street involved had been constructed and used by the public. In addition, the trial court ordered that in assessing the value of the property the appraisers should not consider a City of Miami building set back line (zoned street width line) that had been adopted on the “eve” of the controversy. The parties, thereafter, stipulated the value of the land to have been $400,000.00 on December 1, 1966. The final judgment of the court found the value of the property to be that amount with interest thereon in the amount of $132,000.00 and costs of $14,934.40. Attorney’s fees were set at $75,000.00.
The appellant presents three points for our consideration. Point one is subdivided into the following contentions:
“(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT WITHOUT ALLOWING IT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE UPON THE ISSUES OF DEDICATION BY PUBLIC USER (COMMON LAW DEDICATION), LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS.”
“(B) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY SETTING DECEMBER 1, 1966 AS THE DATE OF TAKING WITHOUT HEARING EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SAME, AND DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE ONLY COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF RECORD.”
We have carefully considered these points of appellant and are of the opinion that they are, in sum and substance, matters which were before this court or assigned as error in the prior appeal. Thus, under the doctrine of “law of the case” we have previously ruled on the points and choose not to reconsider the matters. See: Utley v. City of St. Petersburg, 121 Fla. 268, 163 So. 523; McGregor v. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 119 Fla. 718, 162 So. 323; Cf., Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Moore, Fla.App. 1969, 220 So.2d 20. Moreover, we are of the opinion that there was substantial competent evidence before the trial judge to substantiate its finding that the day of taking was December 1, 1966. Thus, no reversible error has been made to appear in this regard.
Appellant’s remaining points on appeal deal with the action of the trial judge in ordering the appraisers to disregard a City of Miami set back line in making their appraisals, and in the amount set as an attorney’s fee. We have considered the record, briefs and arguments of counsel on these points and have concluded that these points are likewise without merit.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Cnty. OF Volusia v. W.R. Pickens & Cont'l Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…r the inverse condemnation remedy in light of the waiver of sovereign immunity. We approved this proceeding in our prior ruling and we decline to reconsider that issue in this appeal. See, e.g., State Dep’t. of Transp. v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 275 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). . Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const. . See §§ 73.041 and 73.071(2), Fla.Stat. (1981). . Counsel stipulated in this case that an MAI appraiser would testify that as of 1976, the fair market value of Pickens’ property was $35,750, and…
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Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Nat Ratner, 497 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)….1984); Air-vac, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co., 330 So. 2d 467 (Fla.1976); 3-M Electric Corp. v. Vigoa, 443 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) review denied, 447 So. 2d 888 (Fla.1984); Department of Transportation v. Florida [*675] East Coast Railway Co., 275 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). FAS and the District contend that the trial court’s judgment is unsupported by the record. Where a judgment, based upon the trial court’s findings, is attacked for insufficiency of evidence, our task is to determine if there is…
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Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McGregor v. Provident Tr. Co. of Philadelphia, 119 Fla. 718 (Fla. 1935)
- Utley v. City of St. Petersburg, 121 Fla. 268 (Fla. 1935)
- Rose Constr. Co. v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 230 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc. v. James E. Moore and wife, 220 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- State v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 239 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1970)