GERI LILLIBRIDGE, PETITIONER,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1973-04-11
No. 42535
ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
276 So. 2d 40 Florida Supreme Court (1973) Negative Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between district courts regarding whether bond premiums for supersedeas bonds are taxable costs in municipal court appeals under Fla.Stat. § 924.41. The Court held that bond premiums are included in taxable costs that must be paid by the municipality if the appeal decision is adverse to it.


Holding

Bond premiums for supersedeas bonds are included in the taxable costs under Fla.Stat. § 924.41(6) and must be paid by the municipality if the appeal decision is adverse to it, consistent with the Legislature's general policy that persons acquitted or discharged shall not be liable for costs in criminal prosecutions.


Headnotes

[1] A premium for a supersedeas bond posted by a defendant appealing a municipal court conviction is a taxable cost against the municipality when the appellate decision is ad…

[2] Florida Statutes § 924.41(6) mandates that costs shall be taxed by the circuit court on final disposition of an appeal from a municipal court conviction, and paid by the…

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Key Quotes

“The costs shall be taxed by the circuit court on final disposition of the appeal and shall be paid by the municipality if the decision is adverse to it.”

Establishes the statutory basis for taxing costs against the municipality upon adverse appeal decisions

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Facts & Procedural History

Lillibridge was convicted of violating a Miami municipal ordinance. The Circuit Court reversed the conviction and the District Court of Appeal affirme…

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Opinion of the Court
CARLTON, Chief Justice:

CARLTON, Chief Justice:

This case is before us on petition for writ of certiorari because of conflicting interpretations of Fla.Stat. § 924.41, F.S.A., in this case (reported at 262 So.2d 719) and in Wood v. City of Jacksonville, 248 So.2d 176 (1st DCA Fla.1971). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.

Petitioner was convicted of violating a Miami municipal ordinance, but the convic*41tion was reversed by the Circuit Court and the reversal affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. On petitioner’s motion, the Circuit Court then entered an Order taxing costs against the city, including an $85.00 bond premium for the supersedeas bond petitioner had been required to post. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, granted certiorari review and quashed the order taxing the bond premium as a cost. The latter decision is directly contrary to that of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Wood v. City of Jacksonville, supra.

Fla.Stat. § 924.41, F.S.A., governs appeals from convictions in municipal courts, and provides in part:

“(5) Appellant shall enter into a bond in double the amount of the fine and costs assessed, or, if judgment is for imprisonment, the bond shall be in an amount sufficient to cover all costs taxed in the trial court on appeal plus not less than $10 or more than $200, to be set at the discretion of the municipal judge. The bond shall be conditioned on the appellant’s prosecuting the appeal with dispatch and abiding the judgment of the court. The bond shall have one or more sureties approved by the clerk of the circuit court. When the bond is filed with the clerk of the circuit court it shall operate as a supersedeas. The clerk of the circuit court shall receive a service charge as provided in § 28.24 for approving the appeal bond payable when the bond is filed with him by the appellant.
“(6) The costs shall be taxed by the circuit court on final disposition of the appeal and shall be paid by the municipality if the decision is adverse to it.”

The sole question involved here, then, is whether “the costs” which “shall be taxed” under subsection (6) above include the premium for the bond required by subsection (5). We hold that this premium was intended by the Legislature to be included in the taxable costs.

We agree with the District Court of Appeal, First District, that Fla.Stat. § 939.06, F.S.A., expresses a general policy of the Legislature that persons acquitted or discharged shall not be liable for costs incurred in connection with a criminal prosecution. Wood v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 177. Fla.Stat. § 924.41, F.S.A., must be interpreted in light of this general policy.

The decision of the District Court in this case is, therefore, quashed with directions to reinstate the order of the Circuit Court.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • George v. Warren, 282 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1973)
    …d against him. In passing, we note that we do not undertake to pass upon the validity [*874] of these two disallowances since they are not cross-appealed here. However, reference for comparison purposes is made to Lillibridge v. City of Miami, Fla., 276 So. 2d 40, and Wood v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.App.1st, 248 So. 2d 176. As will appear from its opinion, the District Court in affirming the judgment of the trial court discussed and interpreted Section 19, Article I of the 1968 revision of the Florida Con…
  • Doran v. State, 296 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
    …ts. The First District Court of Appeal has specifically held that a bail bond premium is not taxable.3 Our Supreme Court has not passed on the question.4 Petitioner argues by analogy that the Supreme Court in Lillibridge v. City of Miami, Fla.1973, 276 So. 2d 40, held that a supersedeas bond posted by a defendant pending appeal was taxable upon the reversal of his conviction. However, the crux of the court’s holding in Lillibridge was that this was an appeal from a municipal court in which the posting of a…
  • Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs v. Sawyer, 620 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1993)
    …attorney’s fees and court costs if the claim is without support); § 895.07(8), Fla.Stat. (1989) (State may recover investigative costs and attorney’s fees for RICO lien notice proceedings). . To the extent language in Lillibridge v. City of Miami, 276 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla.1973) ("[Section 939.06] expresses a general policy of the Legislature that persons acquitted or discharged shall not be liable for costs....”), and Warren v. Capuano, 282 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla.1973) (“The courts have historically ... held t…

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