DONALD WILLIAM DORAN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Petitioner Doran, acquitted of DUI charges, sought review of a circuit court order affirming the county court's refusal to tax certain costs against the county. The court held that bail bond premiums and towing fees are not taxable costs that must be reimbursed to an acquitted defendant, absent more specific legislative mandate.
The court held that neither bail bond premiums nor towing fees are taxable costs that must be reimbursed to an acquitted defendant. Only those costs reasonably within the scope of statutory authority are taxable, and absent more specific legislative mandate, the court was reluctant to impose upon the public the expense of reimbursing all bail bond premiums for acquitted defendants.
[1] A bail bond premium is not a taxable cost for an acquitted defendant.
[2] Towing fees incurred following an arrest are not taxable costs for an acquitted defendant.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There are many expenses which one may incur because he is charged with a crime. Yet, only those items reasonably within the scope of statutory authority are taxable.”
Establishes the governing principle that only statutory costs are taxable, not all expenses incurred due to charges.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDoran was charged in County Court with driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages and was subsequently acquitted. After his arrest, Doran had …
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GRIMES, Judge.
The petitioner seeks review by common law certiorari of a Circuit Court order affirming the refusal of the County Court to tax certain costs against the county. The petitioner had been charged in the County Court with driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages and was subsequently acquitted. The disputed items were the premium for a bail bond obtained prior to trial and a fee charged for towing petitioner’s automobile off the street following his arrest.
There is both constitutional1 and statutory 2 authority for the reimbursement of costs to an acquitted or discharged defendant. The determination of which costs may be taxed has been left to the courts.
The First District Court of Appeal has specifically held that a bail bond premium is not taxable.3 Our Supreme Court has not passed on the question.4 Petitioner argues by analogy that the Supreme Court in Lillibridge v. City of Miami, Fla.1973, 276 So. 2d 40, held that a supersedeas bond posted by a defendant pending appeal was taxable upon the reversal of his conviction. However, the crux of the court’s holding in Lillibridge was that this was an appeal from a municipal court in which the posting of a bond was a condition to the filing of the appeal.
There are many expenses which one may incur because he is charged with a crime. Yet, only those items reasonably within the scope of statutory authority are taxable. Absent more specific legislative mandate, we are reluctant to read into the law a necessity for the imposition upon the public of the staggering expense which would follow if reimbursement were required for all bail bond premiums of persons ultimately acquitted or discharged of the crime for which they were charged.5
There are no cases in which the taxability of the towing fees has been considered. This expense seems more remote than the bail bond premium. Moreover, the towing is as much for the benefit of the person arrested as it is for the public.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur. . Fla.Const. art. I, § 19, F.S.A. . § 939.06, F.S.A. . Wood v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.App.1st, 1971, 248 So. 2d 176.
. But see Warren v. Capuano, Fla.1973, 282 So. 2d 873.
.While not raised by either party, an argument could also be made that § 57.071(1) requires the reimbursement of the bail bond premium. However, in view of the legislative history of that section, we believe it was intended to relate to civil actions.
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Holton v. State, 311 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…we distinguish Lilli-bridge on its facts, since the ruling was based on the fact that on an appeal from a municipal court, the posting of a bond was a condition to the filing of the appeal. We agree with the holding in Doran v. State, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 86, 87, wherein it is stated that, “There are many expenses which one may incur because he is charged with a crime. Yet, only those items reasonably within the scope of statutory authority are taxable. Absent more specific legislative mandate, we are…
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Benitez v. State, 350 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…this court to hold that the term “taxable costs,” as used in Section 939.06, Florida Statutes (1975) means all reasonable and necessary costs.3 Such an interpretation would be contrary to the holding of the courts of this state. See Doran v. State, 296 So. 2d 86 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); Holton v. State, 311 So. 2d 711 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). See also 20 C.J.S. Costs § 457b (1940). While there is force to the argument that an innocent defendant who has been acquitted of the crime charged should be left as whole financ…
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Powell v. State, 314 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…ty, argues that the trial court erred in not assessing the witness fees and expenses of his expert witnesses, and the costs of deposing these and other witnesses, as taxable costs against the county. As we noted in Doran v. State, Fla.App. 2d 1974, 296 So. 2d 86: “There is both constitutional and statutory authority for the reimbursement of costs to an acquitted or discharged defendant. The determination of which costs may be taxed has been left to the courts.” ‡ # “There are many expenses which one may…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wood v. City OF Jacksonville, 248 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- George v. Warren, 282 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1973)
- Geri Lillibridge v. City OF Miami, 276 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1973)