FLOYD OSCAR CRAINE, APPELLANT,
v.
MADDIE VIRGINIA GEE ET AL., APPELLEES
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Floyd Craine appealed a jury verdict denying insurance coverage under a State Farm policy issued to Maddie Virginia Gee. The court affirmed, holding that the policy's exclusionary language for non-owned automobiles used in automobile business was unambiguous and plainly did not extend coverage to the vehicle that injured Craine.
The exclusionary language was not ambiguous as a matter of law. Under ordinary rules of English grammar, the phrase 'except a private passenger automobile' applies only to subparagraph (2) and not to paragraph (1), which addressed automobiles used in an automobile business. When policy language is clear and unambiguous, the rule of strict construction against exclusions does not apply.
[1] An exclusionary provision in an insurance policy is not subject to strict construction against the insurer when its language is clear, plain, and unambiguous.
[2] The phrase "except a private passenger automobile" in an insurance policy exclusion applies only to the immediately preceding subparagraph when the exclusion is structure…
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Establishes the court's grammatical analysis of the policy language and rejects the appellant's argument that the exception applies to both subparagraphs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCraine was injured on a parking lot when a Hertz automobile driven by part-time employee Maddie Virginia Gee, with its engine running, rolled backward…
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Appellant Floyd Oscar Craine appeals a final judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
Appellant instituted an action against Maddie Virginia Gee and her insurance carriers, appellee State Farm, and Royal Indemnity Company. Pursuant to State Farm’s motion, a separate jury trial was had on the question of insurance coverage, resulting in a verdict in favor of State Farm.
Mrs. Gee and appellant were part-time employees of Hertz Corporation. On the day of the accident Mrs. Gee transported drivers from Tampa to McCoy Airport near Orlando to return Hertz cars to Tampa. Appellant was injured on the parking lot when Mrs. Gee got out of one of the Hertz cars, leaving the engine running, and the car rolled backwards, pinning appellant between the car and another car.
Appellant first urges that the trial court erred in not holding as a matter of law that the exclusionary provisions of the policy were ambiguous and coverage was afforded.
The pertinent portions of the insurance contract on Mrs. Gee’s private passenger automobile are:
“EXCLUSIONS — SECTION I
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER:
(A) Coverages A, B, C and M, to a NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE
(1) While maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in an automobile business of the insured or any other person or organization, or
(2) While used in any other business or occupation, except a private passenger automobile operated or occupied by the first person named in the declarations or, if residents of the same household, his spouse or any relative of either;”
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“Automobile Business — means the business or occupation of selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing or parking of land motor vehicles or trailers.”
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“Private Passenger Automobile — means an automobile of the private passenger type designed solely for the transportation of persons and their personal luggage, and includes stationwagons.”
Appellant contends that paragraphs (1) and (2) are one uninterrupted sentence coupled by a comma and the disjunctive “or,” which clearly reflects the writer’s intent that the language of paragraph (2) is a continuation of paragraph (1), and that it follows that the phrase “except a private passenger automobile” applies to both paragraphs. Therefore, the automobile that injured appellant is an exception to the exclusion involved. In the alternative, appellant contends that the provision is ambiguous and should be construed against the company and in favor of coverage.
We agree with the trial judge that this interpretation is not reasonable, and that under the ordinary rules of English the phrase “except a private passenger automobile” applies only to subparagraph 2. Where the meaning of a contract is clear under the ordinary rules of English, this clear meaning may not be changed by the court; Shaw v. Bankers Life Company, Fla.App.1968, 213 So.2d 514. See Griffin v. Speidel, Fla.1965, 179 So.2d 569.
*523The rule of strict construction applicable to exclusionary provisions of an insurance policy is not applicable when the language of the policy is so clear, plain and unambiguous as to leave no room for construction; Oren v. General Accident Fire and Life Assur. Corp., Fla.App.1965, 175 So.2d 581; Kickliter v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., Fla.App.1966, 188 So.2d 872; Ringenberger v. General Accident F. & L. Assur. Corp., Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 376; American Liberty Insurance Company v. Gaffney, Fla.App.1970, 230 So.2d 720.
We have considered appellant’s other point on appeal and found it to be without merit.
The judgment appealed is
Affirmed.
MANN, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.
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Coleman v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 432 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…ves to limit or diminish the scope of coverage [*1371] otherwise provided in the policy. If exclusions are clearly stated, they should be upheld. Denman Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. World Tire Corp., 396 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Craine v. Gee, 276 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). The only reasonable construction of the policy as a whole indicates that Valley Forge provided liability coverage for a temporary substitute automobile but did not intend to provide collision coverage on that automobile. The vari…
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Oren v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd., 175 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Griffin v. Speidel, 179 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1965)
- Willie LEE alias Slingshot Lee v. State, 188 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Therese Shaw v. Bankers Life Co., 213 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Ringenberger v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd., 214 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- Am. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Gaffney, 230 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)