FRANCES A. RISTEEN, APPELLANT,
v.
DONALD E. RISTEEN, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the appellant challenges the trial court's rejection of a separation agreement's alimony provision in favor of a reduced, step-down alimony schedule. The Florida appellate court affirmed, holding that trial courts are not bound by alimony provisions in separation agreements and may modify them based on equitable considerations and statutory provisions.
A trial court is not bound by alimony provisions in separation agreements and may modify or reject such provisions in the exercise of its discretion based on the equities and law of the case. The trial court's reduction of alimony, though appellee's income had increased, was within the court's discretionary authority under then-existing law.
[1] A trial court is not bound by alimony provisions in a separation agreement and may modify them as equity and law require.
[2] A trial court may accept a portion of a separation agreement and reject another portion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court is not bound by alimony provisions in separation agreements entered into by husband and wife”
Establishes the fundamental principle that courts have discretion regarding alimony provisions despite agreement between parties
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties executed a separation agreement providing for $725 monthly support ($525 alimony, $200 child support). When the dissolution action was fil…
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Appellant seeks review of a final judgment in a dissolution of marriage action. The only portion of the final judgment which is challenged is that dealing with alimony.
Following their separation, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement whereby appellee agreed to pay appellant $725.00 per month support for her and their two minor children. The agreement also contained provisions relative to division of marital property which is not involved in this action. At the time, appel-lee was earning about $1,100.00 per month.
Some two years later, appellee instituted this action. The trial court entered its judgment dissolving the marriage. The separation agreement was adopted except as to the support provision. The judgment followed the agreement to the extent of the awarding the appellant $725 for six months, $525 of which was alimony and *489$200 child support. For the second six months the judgment provided for payment of $550 per month, $350 being for alimony and $200 for child support, and provided for payment thereafter of $400 per month, being $200 for alimony and $200 for child support. Those provisions for payment of periodic amounts which were less than previously agreed upon by the parties were made notwithstanding a showing in evidence that the appellee’s income had increased to $1,800 per month.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to adopt and incorporate the entire separation agreement, including periodic alimony payment provision, into the final judgment. Appellee contends, however, that the trial court is not bound by alimony provisions of a separation agreement and that the court is empowered to modify such provisions as the equities and the law of the case may require. We agree with appellee and affirm.
It seems quite clear that the trial court is not bound by alimony provisions in separation agreements entered into by husband and wife. As held by our sister court in Spencer v. Spencer, Fla.App., 242 So.2d 786, 788:
“There is also ample case authority to support the theory that the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, is not bound by the provisions of a written agreement of the parties relative to alimony, and is not bound to accept the agreement in its entirety, but that the court may accept a portion of such agreement and reject a portion of it. Dawkins v. Dawkins, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 633; . . .”
In the case at bar, it is obvious that the trial court invoked in part the recently enacted provisions of Section 61.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which permit award of rehabilitative alimony which is court approved in Melin v. Melin, Fla.App., 265 So.2d 414.
The issue raised by appellant concerns primarily the correctness of the trial court’s rejection of the alimony provision found in the separation agreement of the parties. That question has been resolved against appellant on the authority cited above. However, no issue seems to have been raised concerning the sufficiency of the sum for child support awarded by the trial court. Accordingly, we wish to make it clear that our affirmance of the alimony award herein is without prejudice to appellant’s right to seek revision of the child support award if the same should. be deemed inadequate to meet the needs of the children.
Affirmed.
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Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)…not determine or award alimony support but merely approved a property settlement agreement, on appeal the bare authority and jurisdiction of the circuit court to modify such support provision has been conceded. See Risteen v. Risteen, Fla.App. 1973, 280 So. 2d 488. The appellant argues that the income of the wife alone is such a change of circumstances as to not only justify a modification of alimony but to render a denial of modification an abuse of judicial discretion. The appellee argues the agreed reduct…
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Hahn v. Hahn, 465 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…e Maas v. Maas, 440 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla.1984); O’Conner v. O’Conner, 435 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), (Ervin, J., dissenting); Fleming v. Fleming, 408 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Risteen v. Risteen, 280 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 283 So. 2d 563 (Fla.1973). [*1357] In addition, there was also testimony that the wife did not know what her husband’s income was, and that she did not understand that she was entitled to one-half the proceeds from the s…
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Huff v. Norilyn K. Huff, 556 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…at the trial court’s modification of a support provision violated any other aspects of the agreements involved. See, e.g., Spencer v. Spencer, 242 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Hams v. Harris, 291 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Risteen v. Risteen, 280 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). While we do not intend to restrict the trial court’s discretion to reject alimony or child support provisions contained in settlement agreements, in the interest of giving effect to amicable and equitable settlements by the part…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dawkins v. Dawkins, 172 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Spencer v. Spencer, 242 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Peggie Melin v. Melin, 265 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)