ROBERT WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Robert Williams appealed his probation revocation and resulting two-year state prison sentence. The Florida District Court of Appeal found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose probation after Williams completed his one-year county jail sentence, the maximum permissible under law, because probation under Florida statute requires the court to withhold a portion of the sentence.
The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose probation because Florida statute section 948.01(4) requires the court to withhold a portion of the sentence imposed to impose valid probation, but Williams had already served the maximum sentence permissible by law with no portion withheld.
[1] A trial court cannot impose a valid term of probation after a defendant has served the maximum sentence permissible by law in county jail, where no portion of the sentenc…
[2] When a defendant has served the maximum sentence allowed by law in county jail, any subsequent order of probation and revocation thereof is a nullity.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There appears to be a fundamental jurisdictional problem on the face of this record i. e., the power of the trial judge to impose probation upon the appellant subsequent to the completion of serving the maximum term allowable by law in the County jail.”
Establishes the fundamental jurisdictional defect that was reviewable sua sponte by the court
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling and was sentenced to one year in county jail followed by two years of probation. After ser…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Withholding Imposition Of Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellant herein pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling, resulting in an adjudication of guilty, a sentence to one year in the County jail and thereafter to be placed on probation for a period of two years. On November 2, 1972, subsequent to serving his jail time but within the probationary period, the appellant was charged with violation of conditions of probation. A hearing thereon resulted in the appellant being adjudged guilty of violating his probation; probation was revoked and the appellant was sentenced to two years in the State penitentiary.
There appears to be a fundamental jurisdictional problem on the face of this record i. e., the power of the trial judge to impose probation upon the appellant subsequent to the completion of serving the maximum term allowable by law in the County jail. As this is fundamental error apparent on the record, it is reviewable by this court sua sponte, notwithstanding the failure of the appellant to raise the issue in the trial court or before this court. Florio v. State ex rel. Epperson, Fla.App.1960, 119 So.2d 305; Ware v. State, Fla.App.1970, 231 So.2d 872.
It is apparent from the record that the trial court, having adjudicated the appellant guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the State penitentiary, elected to sentence the appellant to the County jail pursuant to the provisions of § 922.051, Fla.Stat.1, F.S.A., which provides for a maximum sentence of one year. Dade County v. Baker, Fla.1972, 265 So.2d 700 see also J. Carroll’s dissent in Dade County v. Baker, Fla.App.1972, 258 So.2d 511, 512. Thereupon, the trial court placed the appellant on probation pursuant to the authority of § 948.01(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., which reads as follows:
tfc jfí Jfc ‡ s|<
“(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may at the time of sentencing direct the defendant to be [placed upon probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence. In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.” [emphasis added]
The probation portion is a nullity and is void. The language of § 948.01(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., makes it clear that in order to impose a valid term of probation the trial court must withhold imposition of a portion of the sentence imposed upon the defendant. In the case sub judice, the trial court sentenced the appellant to [and he has served] the maximum sentence permissible by law. Dade County v. Baker, Fla.1972, 265 So.2d 700; § 922.051, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. There is no time left for the appellant to serve and there has been no portion of the sentence withheld. Therefore, no time remains on the sentence which is necessary to permit probation to be imposed, and the order of probation is null and void.
Inasmuch as the probationary portion of the sentence is a nullity, all acts taken pur*520suant thereto, including the order of revocation of probation appealed herein, are nullities and of no force and effect.
Therefore, the order appealed is hereby reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court, with directions to discharge the appellant.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (36 total)
-
State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976)…ed by various methods in the trial courts. The District Courts have both approved and restricted these orders to the extent that it is difficult for the trial court to determine the proper procedure to use. The Third District, in Williams v. State, 280 So. 2d 518 (Fla.App.3d 1973), had before it a defendant who had pleaded guilty to a felony and had been sentenced to one year in the county jail followed by two years probation. During the probationary period, subsequent to serving the one year in the county j…
-
Murrell Streeter v. State, 416 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…illegal because in excess of the maximum allowed, there exists fundamental error, Ex parte Bosso, 41 So. 2d 322 (Fla.1949); Robbins v. State, 413 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Gonzalez v. State, 392 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Williams v. State, 280 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), which is subject to our review ex mero motu, Lewis v. State, 154 Fla. 825, 19 So. 2d 199 (1944), and which if patent on the record before us can be corrected on this appeal. Robbins v. State, supra; Gonzalez v. State, supra. Und…
-
Gonzalez v. State, 392 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…or time spent before conviction in hospital as mentally disturbed sex offender); Skinner v. State, 366 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), and Butler v. State, 343 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sentence in excess of statutory maximum); Williams v. State, 280 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (probationary term after completion of maximum jail term). Such an error can be corrected on appeal or by a trial court in collateral attack proceedings. Skinner v. State, supra. The State urges us to require Gonzalez to seek reli…
Previewing 3 of 36 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Florio v. State of Fla. ex rel. A. L. Epperson, 119 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Dade Cnty. v. Honorable Paul Baker, 265 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1972)
- Ware v. State, 231 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Dade Cnty. v. Honorable Paul Baker, 258 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)