JOAQUIN ALBERTO MENDEZ AND OSCAR ALVAREZ, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1973-07-17
Nos. 73-183, 73-325
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.
280 So. 2d 525 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1973) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Appellants Mendez and Alvarez were convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and buying/receiving stolen property. On appeal, they challenged whether convictions under two related statutes constituted double conviction for a single crime. The court affirmed, holding that violation of two separate statutes constitutes two separate crimes even when arising from the same criminal transaction.


Holding

The court held that violation of two separate statutes constitutes two separate and distinct crimes, even when the offenses are related and arise from the same criminal transaction. Therefore, the trial court properly convicted appellants on both counts and imposed one sentence for each defendant.


Headnotes

[1] Where two separate statutes are violated, two separate and distinct crimes have occurred.

[2] Convictions for separate crimes arising out of the same criminal transaction are generally permissible, even if the sentences imposed are illegal.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“although we recognize that the offenses prescribed in §§ 814.03(2) and 811.16, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., are related, it is generally held that where two separate statues are violated two separate and distinct crimes have occurred”

Establishes the controlling legal principle that multiple statutes equal multiple crimes despite relatedness

Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellants Mendez and Alvarez were charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (§ 811.16) and buying, receiving, and concealing stolen property …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellants were charged by information with one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and one count of buying, receiving and concealing stolen property. They pleaded not guilty to both counts, waived jury and were tried and convicted of both charges in the Criminal Court of Record for Dade County, Florida. The court imposed one sentence on each defendant for both offenses: appellant Mendez was sentenced to three years in the State Penitentiary and appellant Alvarez was sentenced to one year in the County Jail.

On appeal appellants are contending, among other things, that the court erred in convicting them of the charges under both counts of the information. They contend that both felonies prescribed in §§ 811.16 and 814.03(2), Fla.Stat, F.S.A., are so related that conviction under both statutes amounts to two convictions for only one crime.

Since the sentence imposed upon each appellant was less than each could have received for either felony, we are not concerned with the propriety of the sentences, as was the case in Yost v. State, Fla.App.1971, 243 So.2d 469, wherein we held that if an information charges two crimes, but each is a facet or phase of the same criminal transaction, only one sentence could be imposed; and that sentence should be for the highest offense charged. However, we do note that in the Yost case, and in others dealing wtih the same point of law, the courts have uniformly upheld the separate convictions for crimes arising *527out of the same criminal transaction, even while finding the sentences rendered thereon to be illegal. See also, Caivano v. State, Fla.App.1973, 276 So.2d 245; Gonzalez v. State, Fla.App.1972, 268 So.2d 552; Hunt v. State, Fla.App.1972, 264 So.2d 855; Carr v. State, Fla.App.1972, 264 So.2d 871.

Moreover, although we recognize that the offenses prescribed in §§ 814.03(2) and 811.16, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., are related, it is generally held that where two separate statues are violated two separate and distinct crimes have occurred. See, Steele v. Mayo, Fla.1954, 72 So.2d 386; Kish v. State, Fla.App.1967, 198 So.2d 639; Turner v. State, Fla.App.1972, 267 So.2d 882; Cooper v. State, Fla.App.1972, 261 So.2d 859.

We are, therefore, of the view that the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty on both counts of the information and imposing one sentence upon each of them.

We have considered all other points on appeal and have concluded that no reversible error has been made to appear. Therefore, the judgments and sentences appealed from are hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Pedrera v. State, 401 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …508, 12 So. 2d 292 (1943); Shea v. State, 167 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Bertone v. State, 224 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Matire v. State, 232 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Mendez v. State, 280 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); State v. Mullin, 286 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Morgan v. State, 303 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Mathis v. State, 348 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); State v. Williams, 358 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State v. Sobel, 3…
  • Wilson v. State, 293 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
    …that there was no error in the adjudication that the appellant was guilty under both counts of the information; however, only one sentence can be imposed and the sentence should be for the highest offense charged. See Mendez v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 280 So. 2d 525. Therefore, we will amend the sentence by striking therefrom the sentence upon count two which was for the possession of heroin. Third, we conclude that the error urged by appellant relating to the comment of the prosecuting attorney does not presen…

Authorities Cited (11 total)

View all 11 cited authorities →

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw