FORD ALLEN CARR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's conviction for possession and delivery of LSD was affirmed, but the trial court's imposition of two concurrent sentences was reversed because both crimes constituted a single transaction under Florida law, requiring only one sentence.
Where possession and delivery of a controlled substance constitute facets of the same transaction, only one sentence may be imposed despite multiple counts.
[1] When possession and delivery of a controlled substance arise from the same transaction, only one sentence may be imposed despite multiple counts of conviction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of possession and delivery of LSD at a recreation center in Pensacola, Florida, and the trial court imposed two concurrent sen…
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Appellant was convicted of possession and delivery of an hallucinogenic drug known as LSD. The conviction followed a jury verdict of guilty on both counts. The crimes occurred at the Ninth Avenue Recreation Center in Pensacola, Florida.
Pursuant to the jury verdicts, the trial court imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment on each count to run concurrently.
As his first point on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously imposed two separate sentences on him because both crimes charged to him in the information are a facet or phase of the same transaction, and therefore only one sentence may be imposed. The State concedes that appellant is correct in this regard and that under the decisions of this jurisdiction, only one sentence may be imposed where each count is a facet of the same transaction. Accordingly, under the authority of our decision in Johnson v. State, 260 So.2d 212, we reverse the sentence on the first (possession) count and affirm the sentence on the second (delivery of an hallucinogenic drug, LSD) count, without the necessity of bringing the appellant before the trial court for resentencing.
We have considered the remaining points raised by appellant in this appeal and find them to be without merit.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
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Andrews v. State, 309 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…grees, confessing error, but suggests that the sentence for five years for aggravated assault should be eliminated without the necessity of bringing the defendant back before the trial judge for resentencing, citing Carr v. State, Fla.App. 1st 1972, 264 So. 2d 871. We have considered the other points raised by appellant and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, as to the sentence of five years for aggravated assault, same is hereby vacated and set aside: As to the other sentences, they too are vacated…
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Temperance Wright v. State, 348 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…2d 277 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Caivano v. State, 276 So. 2d 245 (Fla.2d DCA 1973); Jackson v. State, 270 So. 2d 30 (Fla.4th DCA 1972); Gonzalez v. State, 268 So. 2d 552 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Jones v. State, 265 So. 2d 514 (Fla.4th DCA 1972); Carr v. State, 264 So. 2d 871 (Fla.1st DCA 1972); Hunt v. State, 264 So. 2d 855 (Fla.lst DCA 1972); Shaw v. State, 264 So. 2d 95 (Fla.lst DCA 1972). Affirmed as to the judgments of conviction; affirmed as to sentence and fine on the sale of cocaine count; reversed as to the sen…
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Mendez v. State, 280 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…on, even while finding the sentences rendered thereon to be illegal. See also, Caivano v. State, Fla.App.1973, 276 So. 2d 245; Gonzalez v. State, Fla.App.1972, 268 So. 2d 552; Hunt v. State, Fla.App.1972, 264 So. 2d 855; Carr v. State, Fla.App.1972, 264 So. 2d 871. Moreover, although we recognize that the offenses prescribed in §§ 814.03(2) and 811.16, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., are related, it is generally held that where two separate statues are violated two separate and distinct crimes have occurred. See, Steele…
Authorities Cited
- Sinclair Johnson v. State, 260 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)