BILLE L. FLOYD, APPELLANT,
v.
SHIRLEY FLOYD, APPELLEE
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In this interlocutory appeal from a divorce judgment modification, the court held that while a successor judge may modify a divorce judgment pursuant to the applicable statute (F.S. 61.14), the judge cannot make substantial changes to the parties' obligations except through the grounds and procedures established by statute.
A successor judge may modify a divorce judgment pursuant to F.S. 61.14, but may not make substantial changes to the parties' obligations except on the grounds and under the procedures set forth in the statute. The order imposing additional pre- and post-judgment medical obligations was improperly entered without complying with statutory modification requirements.
[1] A successor judge may modify a final judgment dissolving a marriage pursuant to F.S. …
[2] A motion to "clarify" a final judgment may not be used to make substantial changes to the obligations of the parties that relate back to the time of the original judgment…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the successor judge may modify a judgment pursuant to F.S. 61.14, F.S.A., but that he may not make substantial changes in the obligations of the parties other than upon the grounds and under the procedure set forth in the statute”
Statement of the controlling legal principle regarding a successor judge's authority to modify divorce judgments
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA final judgment dissolving the marriage was entered on December 13, 1971, requiring the husband (respondent) to pay $135 per month child support and …
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The question presented by this interlocutory appeal is whether a successor judge may upon motion “clarify” a final judgment dissolving a marriage so that the additional obligations will relate back to the time of the entry of the final judg*64ment. We hold that the successor judge may modify a judgment pursuant to F.S. 61.14, F.S.A., but that he may not make substantial changes in the obligations of the parties other than upon the grounds and under the procedure set forth in the statute. See Lawyers Co-Operative Pub. Co. v. Williams, 149 Fla. 390, 5 So.2d 871 (1942); Mintz v. Ellison, Fla.App.1970, 233 So.2d 156.
The final judgment was entered on December 13, 1971. It provided:
* * * * * *
“5. That the Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the sum of $135.00 per month as child support for the two minor children, payable on the 15th day of each and every month, beginning December 15, 1971; and the Respondent is required to pay the medical bills for the minor children for which he is reimbursed by medical insurance and the Respondent shall maintain in effect the present hospitalization insurance for the benefit of the minor children.”
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Appellee-wife’s motion recites only that “a difference of opinion has arisen between herself and the Respondent, with regard to the interpretation of Paragraph 5 of said Final Judgment”. The successor judge found the “intent” of the prior judge and ordered:
“1. That the Respondent is to pay the medical bills incurred prior to December 13, 1971, in the sum of $365.22, and that he shall also pay the medical bills for the minor children incurred subsequent to December 13, 1971, in the sum of $602.-23, and shall also be required to pay the medical bills for said minor children henceforth.”
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The order appealed must be reversed without prejudice to the appellee to proceed under the statute.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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McBRIDE v. McBRIDE, 352 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…while a successor judge could modify prospectively pursuant to Section 61.14, he could not “clarify” a final judgment of dissolution so that additional obligations would relate back to the time of the entry of the original judgment. Floyd v. Floyd, 281 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973). Thus, that portion of the trial court’s order making the four-year period of rehabilitative alimony effective the date of the original decree was error because of its retroactive nature. As to the form of alimony, rehabilitativ…
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De Baun v. Michael, 333 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…, R. R. Ricou & Sons Co. v. Merwin (1927), 94 Fla. 86, 113 So. 745; Florida Development Co. v. Polk County National Bank (1919), 76 Fla. 629, 80 So. 560; Becker v. King (Fla.App. 4th, 3975), 307 So. 2d 855. . See Floyd v. Floyd (Fla.App. 3d, 1973), 281 So. 2d 63; McKendree v. McKendree (Fla.App. 1st, 1962), 139 So. 2d 173. . See Hyman v. Hyman (Fla.App. 2d, 1975), 310 So. 2d 378.…
Authorities Cited
- Lawyers Co-Operative Publ'g Co. v. Bradford G. Williams, 149 Fla. 390 (Fla. 1942)
- Mintz v. Ellison, 233 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Schutt v. Schutt (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)