MORRICE JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jones was arrested in a parking lot after detectives observed him allegedly with his hands in another man's pockets. The trial court erred by preventing defense counsel from impeaching detective testimony with an inconsistent prior report about whether the gun was in Jones' hand or on the ground, a fact critical to the case.
The trial court erred in prohibiting the impeachment testimony. Florida law clearly allows introduction of inconsistent statements by way of impeachment after the proper predicate has been established, and the crucial nature of the disputed fact regarding the gun's location requires a new trial.
[1] A trial court errs by refusing to allow defense counsel to impeach a witness's testimony with a prior inconsistent statement when the proper predicate has been laid.
[2] A defendant is entitled to a new trial when the trial court improperly restricts the introduction of evidence crucial to a contested issue.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This was error. The lawyer adequately, if not perfectly, followed the statute which prescribes the predicate for impeachment testimony. The decisions of our Supreme Court plainly allow introduction, after this predicate, of inconsistent statements by way of impeachment.”
Establishes the court's holding that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow impeachment testimony where proper statutory predicate was established.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was one of three men in a Ybor City parking lot. Detectives observed Jones with his hands in the pockets of a man lying on the ground. When dete…
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Jones was one of three men in a parking lot in Ybor City early one evening. He is *399said to be the one who had his hands in the pockets of a second man lying on the ground. A third man was standing near Jones. Two detectives rounded the block and pulled into the parking lot. The man who had been lying down was gone. The third man was never apprehended, or pursued, either, for that matter. Jones was apprehended, say the detectives, and raised his shirt to reveal a pistol, which the detective nearest him knocked to the ground. The detectives admit that Jones continually protested that it wasn’t his gun, and the crucial question at the trial was whether the gun was in Jones’ hand or on the ground at the time they approached him. Defense counsel sought to impeach the testimony of the detective by referring to a report filed in connection with the case. The trial judge refused to allow the testimony, and told the defendant’s lawyer that he could introduce the report after the State had rested its case.
This was error. The lawyer adequately, if not perfectly, followed the statute which prescribes the predicate for impeachment testimony.1 The decisions of our Supreme Court plainly allow introduction, after this predicate, of inconsistent statements by way of impeachment.2 The record is not as complete as we would like, because of the prosecutor’s objections before the nature of the allegedly inconsistent statement was established. Nevertheless, the crucial nature of the question whether the gun was left on the ground by another or was in Jones’ hand requires a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
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Nowlin v. State, 346 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1977)…, 46 Fla. 159, 35 So. 82 (1903); Rowe v. State, 128 Fla. 394, 174 So. 820 (1937); Bright v. State, 250 So. 2d 10 (Fla.3d DCA 1971); Whitley v. State, 265 So. 2d 99 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Walter v. State, 272 So. 2d 180 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); Jones v. State, 281 So. 2d 398 (Fla.2d DCA 1973); see Florida Evidence Code, Section 90.614(2) (effective July 1, 1977); Berger et al., Evidence, 30 U. Miami L.Rev. 561, 594 (1976). As required in the majority opinion, the defendant must be given an opportunity to present testim…
Authorities Cited
- Lindberg v. State, 134 Fla. 786 (Fla. 1938)
- Smith v. State, 95 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1957)
- Brown v. State, 46 Fla. 159 (Fla. 1903)
- Diamante Urga v. State, 104 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Epps v. Great S. Truck Co., 104 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- Kilgore v. State, 69 Fla. 397 (Fla. 1915)
- Bright v. State, 250 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)