TRAVIS W. ROBERTS, APPELLANT,
v.
NONA LEE ROBERTS, APPELLEE
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In this 1973 Florida dissolution of marriage case, the court upheld the division of marital assets but reversed the award of permanent alimony and the requirement to maintain life insurance, finding that under Florida's new "no-fault" divorce statute, alimony was not warranted where both spouses had equal earning capacity and ability to support themselves.
The court affirmed the distribution of the home's equity as an equitable division of marital assets (not alimony) since it approximated the funds appellee had contributed. However, the court reversed the monthly alimony award and the life insurance requirement, holding that under Florida's new no-fault divorce statute, alimony is not warranted when the spouse has the capacity to support herself and is not in need of rehabilitation.
[1] An award of equity in the marital home may be considered a division of assets based on equitable principles, rather than lump sum alimony, when it approximates funds prov…
[2] Alimony is not warranted when both spouses have the capacity to provide for their own needs and there is no evidence that one spouse cannot fulfill their own needs.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In absence of evidence that the appellee cannot fulfill her own needs, there does not appear any basis for an award of alimony at this time under the new "no fault—no responsibility" divorce law recently enacted by the state legislature.”
Establishes the court's interpretation that under Florida's new divorce statute, alimony requires showing the recipient cannot support themselves
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married since 1946 with two grown children. Appellant is a retired naval officer. Appellee borrowed $1,500 from her credit union empl…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SPECTOR, Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of a final judgment in a dissolution of marriage suit awarding his equity in the marital home to appellee, permanent alimony in the amount of $100.00 per month, and requiring him to retain her as beneficiary of his life insurance.
The facts revealed by this record show that the parties have been married since 1946. Two children are grown and gone. Appellant is a retired navy man. He acquired a small business with $1,500 borrowed by his wife from the credit union where she had worked for thirteen years earning $7,500.00 annually.
Several errors are urged as grounds for reversal. First, appellant contends it was error to award his equity in the marital home to appellee as lump sum alimony. No error is shown in that regard. The final judgment does not denominate the award of equity as lump sum alimony. Rather, the evidence in this record reveals that such award more likely amounts to a division of assets based upon equitable principles, since the equity in the home approximated the amount appellee borrowed from her credit union and furnished to appellant so that he could invest in the small business which the trial court awarded entirely to him.
The two remaining points raised by appellant have merit and require reversal in part. The first of these contends it was error to award the appellee wife $100.00 per month alimony when the record shows that appellant’s ability to make such payments are no greater than appellee’s ability to provide for herself. Appellant’s earnings from his business and navy retirement pay combined are no greater than appel-lee’s own earnings from her well established employment of thirteen years standing. In absence of evidence that the appellee cannot fulfill her own needs, there does not appear any basis for an award of alimony at this time under the new “no fault—no responsibility” divorce law recently enacted by the state legislature.
The public policy under the new law which the legislature passed and which therefore we must apply seems to be that if the spouse has the capacity to make her own way through the remainder of her life unassisted by the former husband, then the courts cannot require him to pay alimony other than for rehabilitative purposes.
While this new public policy does not conform to the “old fashioned” thinking that once prevailed in Florida, the only remedy available to those affronted by it is to seek relief from our “new fashioned” legislature.
Accordingly, we reverse the monthly alimony award with directions that the trial court retain jurisdiction for future award of alimony in the event future circumstances dictate such an award. See Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla.App.1972); and Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla.App.1973). The remaining issue deals with the lower court’s order requiring appellant to retain appellee as beneficiary of his life insurance policy to secure the payment of alimony. Inasmuch as we hold that alimony is not warranted at this time, it follows that provisions contained in the judgment for securing the payment thereof are likewise unnecessary. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment is also reversed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
WIGGINTON, Acting C J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Tedford J. Cann v. Margery M. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…f the spouse has the capacity to make her own way through the remainder of her life unassisted by the former husband, then the courts cannot require him to pay alimony other than for rehabilitative purposes.” (Roberts v. Roberts, Fla. App. 1st 1973, 283 So. 2d 396, 397; see also Beard v. Beard, Fla.App. 1st 1972, 262 So. 2d 269; and Thigpen v. Thigpen, Fla.App. 1st 1973, 277 So. 2d 583) The public policy of the State would be utterly frustrated by an award of permanent alimony where it affirmatively appears t…
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Campbell v. Chalermsri V. Campbell, 432 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…former wife has the capacity to make her own way unassisted by her former husband, then courts cannot require the husband to pay alimony other than for rehabilitative purposes. Crees v. Crees, 342 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Roberts v. Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Thus, each case must be examined carefully to determine whether, as a matter of law, the alimony needs of the wife fall into one category or the other. We held in G’Sell that where the prior. education, skills or training of th…
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Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)…ent alimony. Such is not the case. The cases most often cited to us in support of such a proposition are Beard v. Beard, Fla.App. 1st 1972, 262 So. 2d 269, Thigpen v. Thigpen, Fla.App. 1st 1973, 277 So. 2d 583, Roberts v. Roberts, Fla.App. 1st 1973, 283 So. 2d 396 and, of more recent vintage, Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 296 So. 2d 74. [*64] It was not our intention that any of the above cited opinions (nor any of our other opinions on the subject) be construed as disapproving permanent alimony…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Manly W. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp. v. Armer E. White, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)