JUDITH A. LIPPINCOTT, APPELLANT,

v.

CHARLES M. LIPPINCOTT, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1973-12-18

No. 73-1162

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

287 So. 2d 144 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1973) Positive Treatment

Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Holding

A successor judge can change a prior custody order, and the court has broad discretion in making custody determinations.

Headnotes

[1] A successor judge may reconsider and modify a final judgment regarding child custody entered by a predecessor judge.

[2] A court's final determination of child custody is not bound by the recommendations of a Family Services report, though such reports may be considered.

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Facts & Procedural History

Following a dissolution judgment awarding temporary custody to the ex-husband pending a report, a successor judge, after considering the report, parti…

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Topics

Child Custody Determination Discretion Of The Court Final Judgment Interlocutory Appeal

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, ex-wife, by interlocutory appeal seeks review of the court’s order awarding custody of the six minor children to appellee, ex-husband.

On November 22, 1972, Judge Huttoe entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties and awarding custody of the six minor children to appellee, ex-husband, “pending receipt by the court of the report from Family Services, State Welfare Department, the final award of custody to abide the recommendation therein set forth.” Nine months later the report of the Family Services investigator was presented to Judge Huttoe’s successor, Judge Grossman, along with the testimony of the parties. The report recommended that the two older children remain in the custody of the appellee and the remaining four children be remanded to the custody of the appellant. After a full hearing and interview with the six children, Judge Grossman awarded custody of all the children to appellee. This interlocutory appeal ensued.

Appellant contends that a successor judge may not change the terms of a final judgment entered by her predecessor judge and therefore it was error to have awarded custody of the six children to the appellee.

In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, it is the court which makes the final determination of custody of the minor children. Fla.Stat. § 61.13(2), F.S.A. Further, in making this determination the chancellor has a very large discretion. Gunter v. Gunter, Fla.App.1969, 219 So. 2d 743.

Turning to the case sub judice, we find that Judge Grossman was not bound to follow her predecessor’s decision to make a final award of custody as recommended in the Family Services report, which is not binding upon the court although it may be taken into consideration. Judge Grossman heard the testimony of the parties, considered the report, interviewed the six children and then based upon all of the above made her final award of custody. There being no abuse of discretion demonstrated, we hereby affirm the order awarding custody of the six children to appellee.

Affirmed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976)

…nter a judgment dissolving the marriage and to reserve jurisdiction to [*474] determine the severable issues of alimony, child custody and support pending further investigation into these matters. See, e. g., Lippincott v. Lippincott, Fla. App.1973, 287 So. 2d 144. “Second, Fla.Stat. § 61.052(2), F.S.A. clearly states that ‘if, at anytime, the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of the marriage.’ [Emphasis supplied]” Accordingly, we would aff…
Roslyn Klarish v. Klarish, 296 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)

…lor to enter a judgment dissolving the marriage and to reserve jurisdiction to determine the severable issues of alimony, child custody and support pending further investigation into these matters. See, e. g., Lippincott v. Lippincott, Fla.App.1973, 287 So. 2d 144. Second, Fla.Stat. § 61.052(2), F.S.A. clearly states that “if, at anytime, the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of the marriage.” [Emphasis supplied] Thus, we find this argument…
Shepardson v. Shepardson, 820 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)

…jurisdiction to address such other matters as alimony, child support, and the equitable distribution of property. See Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Klarish v. Klarish, 296 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Lippincott v. Lippincott, 287 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). In Rivera [*362] v. Rivera, 562 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), we- reviewed an order that dissolved the marriage and reserved jurisdiction to divide the property as a “partial judgment of dissolution.” We cited Galbut, in which…

Authorities Cited

Gunter v. Gunter, 219 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)

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