ROSLYN KLARISH, APPELLANT,
v.
ARTHUR C. KLARISH, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment dissolving the marriage between Roslyn and Arthur Klarish while reserving jurisdiction over alimony and child support issues. The court rejected the ex-wife's challenges to both the timing of the dissolution judgment and the trial court's finding of jurisdiction over the ex-husband.
The trial court did not err. The court properly entered a judgment of dissolution once it found the marriage irretrievably broken while reserving jurisdiction over alimony and child support as severable issues, which is consistent with Florida law and common domestic relations practice. The court's finding that the ex-husband was a Florida resident was supported by substantial competent evidence and will not be disturbed.
[1] A trial court may dissolve a marriage and reserve jurisdiction to determine severable issues such as alimony and child support.
[2] A court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage when it finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if, at anytime, the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of the marriage.”
This statutory mandate from Fla.Stat. § 61.052(2) supports the trial court's authority to enter a dissolution judgment immediately upon finding the marriage irretrievably broken, regardless of whether other issues remain unresolved.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRoslyn and Arthur Klarish were married on March 30, 1958 in New York. One child was born of the marriage. On April 18, 1973, Arthur filed for dissolut…
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PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant seeks review of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
The parties to this action were married on March 30, 1958 in New York, New York. One child was born of their marriage. Petitioner, ex-husband, on April 18, 1973 filed in the circuit court of Dade County the instant petition for dissolution of marriage. In response thereto, appellant, ex-wife, filed an answer and counterclaim wherein she (1) alleged that petitioner-appellee was a resident of New York and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdic tion, and (2) requested modification of a September 1967 New York separation decree providing for alimony and child support. The cause came on for trial at which testimony was heard concerning the issues of jurisdiction and whether the marriage was irretrievably broken. There being insufficient time at this initial hearing to consider the severable issues of alimony and child support, the trial judge informed counsel for the respective parties that he would rule on the final dissolution of marriage at that time and reserve jurisdiction to hear testimony on these two severable matters. Neither party objected thereto. The trial court then entered its judgment finding jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties and thereupon dissolved the marriage between the parties, awarded custody of the minor child to the appellant and reserved jurisdiction for the purpose of considering the award of child support and/or alimony for respondent. The court then entered a separate order requiring petitioner to provide respondent with alimony and support in accordance with the provisions of New York separation decree. Respondent, ex-wife, appeals therefrom.
Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in entering a final judgment of dissolution of marriage prior to the time when disposition had been made of the entire case. We cannot agree.
First, in the area of domestic relations, it is common practice for a chancellor to enter a judgment dissolving the marriage and to reserve jurisdiction to determine the severable issues of alimony, child custody and support pending further investigation into these matters. See, e. g., Lippincott v. Lippincott, Fla.App.1973, 287 So. 2d 144.
Second, Fla.Stat. § 61.052(2), F.S.A. clearly states that “if, at anytime, the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of the marriage.” [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, we find this argument of appellant is without merit.
Respondent-appellant also argues that the trial court erred in finding petitioner-appellee was a bonafide resident of the State of Florida.
After an examination of the record on appeal, we conclude there is substantial competent evidence contained therein to support the determination of the chancellor that appellee, ex-husband, is a resident of Florida and, therefore, we will not disturb this finding. See Pecker v. Pecker, Fla. App.1970, 240 So. 2d 528.
No reversible error having been made to appear, the judgment herein appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Becker v. King, 307 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…complex cases where it is in the interest of the litigants. In domestic relation cases it is not uncommon or unauthorized practice to enter a judgment dissolving the marriage and to later determine the other ancillary issues. See Klarish v. Klarish, 296 So. 2d 497 (3 D.C.A.Fla.1974). As security for the support of his minor children the trial judge is empowered to require a divorced father maintain life insurance on his life for the benefit of his children at least for such time as he is responsible for thei…
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Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976)…99 (Fla.1976); Kipnis v. Kipnis, 330 So. 2d 67 (Fla.3d DCA, 1976); Becker v. King, 307 So. 2d 855 (Fla.4th DCA, 1975), certiorari dismissed 317 So. 2d 76 (Fla.1975); In re the Marriage of Golub, 310 So. 2d 380 (Fla.2d DCA, 1975); Klarish v. Klarish, 296 So. 2d 497 (Fla.3d DCA, 1974). Section 61.052, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: “If, at any time, the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of the marriage. . . .” We find that th…
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Seale v. Lottie Jean Seale, 350 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…risdiction does not exist. We believe the good to be accomplished outweighs any uncertainty created.” 310 So. 2d at 380. A trial court may also reserve jurisdiction over matters other than those pertaining to property rights. In Klarish v. Klarish, 296 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974), the court observed that it is proper for the trial court to enter a judgment dissolving marriage and to reserve jurisdiction to determine issues such as alimony, child custody and support pending further investigation. We have…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lippincott v. Lippincott, 287 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Sessoms v. State, 240 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)