WILLIAM LEWIS LAWLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Lewis Lawley was convicted by jury of two counts of possession of controlled substances. A judge other than the trial judge imposed sentence without any emergency or necessity justifying the departure from the standard practice of sentencing by the trial judge. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing by the trial judge.
A judge other than the trial judge should not exercise discretion as to sentencing absent an emergency that necessitates such a variance from the normal practice. Mere convenience does not justify a departure from the well-recognized assumption that sentencing is an individualized procedure.
[1] A judge other than the trial judge should not impose sentence absent an emergency or necessity justifying such a departure from the normal practice.
[2] Mere convenience does not justify a judge other than the trial judge imposing sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there was no justification for anyone other than the trial judge to impose a sentence”
Establishes the core holding that only the trial judge should impose sentence absent emergency
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was found guilty by jury on two counts of possession of controlled substances. The trial judge heard and denied appellant's motion for a new…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on two counts of possession of controlled substances. At 10 a. m. on December 15, 1978, the trial judge heard and denied appellant’s motion for a new trial. Appellant appeared at 2 p. m. the same day for sentencing but a judge other than the trial judge pronounced sentence. The sentencing judge stated she had read the presentence investigation report and had discussed the case with the trial judge. Her reason for passing sentence was that she was going to sentence appellant the same day for other convictions. The trial judge was not unavailable to pass sentence.
The sentencing judge did not act improperly insofar as the basis she used in determining a proper sentence. Castor v. State, 351 So. 2d 375 (Fla.1st DCA 1977). Nevertheless, there was no justification for anyone other than the trial judge to impose a sentence.
Rule 3.700(c), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides for sentencing by a judge other than the one who heard the trial “[i]n those eases where it is necessary [*CMV] that sentence be pronounced by a judge other than the judge who presided at trial (Emphasis supplied.) The committee states that the rule “makes provision for emergency situations where [the trial] judge is unavailable.” (Emphasis supplied.) No emergency or necessity was shown in this case. Mere convenience does not justify a practice that departs from the well recognized assumption that sentencing is an individualized procedure.
Section 5.1(a) of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures states that “the judge who presided at trial should impose the sentence unless there are compelling reasons in a specific case to provide otherwise.” Commentary to the subsection delineates its rationale:
The reason for such a provision should be obvious. A sentencing decision by the same man will avoid the need to familiarize another with the events of the trial. In addition, the opportunity to observe the defendant, particularly if he chose to take the stand in his defense, can often provide useful insights into an appropriate disposition.
There is no evidence that appellant was prejudiced by the procedure followed, but that is not the point. A judge other than the trial judge should not exercise discretion as to sentencing absent an emergency that necessitates such a variance from the normal practice.
We reverse and remand for resentencing by the trial judge.
McCORD, LARRY G. SMITH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Clemons v. State, 816 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…e a defendant where the record does not show that the substitution of judges is “necessary” or dictated by an “emergency.” Campbell v. State, 622 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Madrigal v. State, 683 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Lawley v. State, 377 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Mere convenience cannot justify sentencing by a successor judge. Campbell, 622 So. 2d at 603; Madrigal, 683 So. 2d at 1097; Lawley, 377 So. 2d at 825. While there may be circumstances where reassignment of a judge will necessit…
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Aleño Santana Madrigal v. State, 683 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…stor v. State, 351 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (sufficient for substitute sentencing judge to consider jury’s verdict of guilt, PSI report, and prosecutor’s description of offense), affd, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 n. 4 (Fla.1978), and Law-ley v. State, 377 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (sufficient for substitute sentencing judge to read PSI and discuss case with judge who presided at trial), with Caplinger v. State, 271 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (insufficient where successor sentencing judge did not use PSI…
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Campbell v. State, 622 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…d by a judge other than the judge who presided at trial_” No such showing was made here. “Mere convenience does not justify a practice that departs from the well recognized assumption that sentencing is an individualized procedure.” Lawley v. State, 377 So. 2d 824, 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). We therefore reverse and remand for resentencing. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. PARKER and BLUE, JJ., concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Castor v. State, 351 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)