PAULINE CAMPBELL SIMS AND REEDY L. SIMS, HER HUSBAND, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
MATTHEW BARNES ET AL., APPELLEES; PAULINE CAMPBELL SIMS AND REEDY L. SIMS, HER HUSBAND, ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. JOHN F. LOWERY ET AL., APPELLEES
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Appellants appealed post-judgment orders awarding costs to plaintiffs-appellees in quiet title suits. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to itemize costs and provide reasoned justification for its awards, violating principles requiring a basis for the exercise of judicial discretion in cost awards.
The trial court's cost awards must be reversed and remanded because the trial court did not itemize the costs it found taxable or provide a reasoned basis for its discretionary award of costs. When awarding costs in equity, the trial court must have some reason or basis on which to predicate its discretion.
[1] A trial court's discretion in awarding costs must be based on a discernible reason or predicate.
[2] Orders awarding costs must itemize the sums found to be taxable.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Plaintiffs-appellees made peace with the primary defendants to the original causes who had vigorously contested the matters, namely Humble Oil and Refining, J. F. Jackson, Francine Warren Dills, the Youngs of Marshall R. Young Oil Company, and the Moncriefs and Moncrief Oil Company.”
Establishes that plaintiffs settled with primary defendants while pursuing costs against the later-added appellants
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo similar quiet title suits involved more than one hundred defendants. Appellants were not original parties but were subsequently made party defenda…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants bring these appeals from post-judgment orders awarding costs to plaintiffs-appellees.
These cases arise from two similar quiet title suits involving more than one hundred defendants. Appellants were not parties to the original actions. Subsequently, appellants were made party defendants, and they contested the actions. Prior to final judgments, as stated by appellants, “Plaintiffs-appellees made peace with the primary defendants to the original causes who had vigorously contested the matters, namely Humble Oil and Refining, J. F. Jackson, Francine Warren Dills, the Youngs of Marshall R. Young Oil Company, and the Moncriefs and Moncrief Oil Company.” Appellants primarily contend that the orders appealed from do not attempt to apportion costs among various defendants or groups of defendants with the same interests.
The subject orders were apparently entered pursuant to motions by plaintiffs entitled “Application for Costs”. Numer ous items submitted are highly questionable as to whether same constituted proper costs to be assessed against appellants. In Case No. U-77 (Trial Court’s Case # 71-C-500), the aggregate amount sought to be assessed was $674.37 and the amount assessed was $665.42. The trial court did not itemize the sums it found to be taxable in either cause; the respective orders simply granted the sums recited therein.
As stated in Moore v. Hunter, 153 Fla. 158, 13 So. 2d 909 (1943):
“We are not unmindful of the rule that costs in equity may be awarded in the sound discretion of the Chancellor; at the same time there must be a basis on which to predicate the Chancellor’s discretion. It must have some reason or something on which to stand.”
Reversed and remanded for reconsideration by the trial court of the costs assessed.
RAWLS, C. J., JOHNSON, J., and SMITH, LARRY G., Associate Judge, concur.
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Kirkland v. Thurmond, 519 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…others, and merely entered an order awarding a certain amount without itemizing such costs. Appellant contends that the trial court was required to issue an itemized order allowing or disallowing each item of cost requested, citing Sims v. Barnes, 289 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), and Alwais v. McLane, 384 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (trial court’s failure to itemize costs was reversible error). Appellant further argues that the court’s failure to do so has made it impossible to obtain proper appellate…
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Sydney Alwais v. McLANE, 384 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…PER CURIAM. We find no error by the trial court except in its failure to itemize the costs allowed in its order taxing costs. See Sims v. Barnes, 289 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Upon remand the trial court is directed to reconsider the motion to tax costs taking into consideration this court’s decision in County of St. Lucie v. Browning, 358 So. 2d 253 (Fla.4th DCA 1978) and to enter an order specifical…
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William A. Baker, M.D. v. Varela, 416 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…ors touched upon at the attorney’s fees hearing. In their second point, appellants seek reversal of the cost award because of the trial judge’s failure to itemize the costs allowed. See, Mac Neill v. Marks, 61 So. 2d 648 (Fla.1952); Sims v. Barnes, 289 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). The only written order mentioning costs is the final judgment, which awards lump sum costs in the amount of $5,785.79. Plaintiff’s motion to tax costs contains an itemization of costs totalling $7,174.49. Appellants filed object…
Authorities Cited
- Moore v. Hunter, 153 Fla. 158 (Fla. 1943)