VERDELL MCCRAY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the appellant's statements, as she knowingly and intelligently waived her Miranda rights.
The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder. She argued that her statements to police should have been suppressed because they were not volunt…
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HENDRY, Judge.
Appellant was indicted for first degree murder of one Minnie Barnes. A jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of second degree murder, and she was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment.
The evidence adduced at trial against appellant was overwhelming. Appellant seeks reversal and a new trial on the grounds that two statements she made to police officers following her arrest were not obtained voluntarily, and should have been suppressed.
The record demonstrates that three police officers testified they read the Miranda rights to appellant. The appellant indicated that she understood her rights. The officers did note, however, that appellant was under the influence of alcohol and was “upset”. One officer testified the appellant “wasn’t rational, but it wasn’t due to alcohol.”
Further testimony revealed that appellant’s behavior was at times very serious and sober and at times highly emotional. We have determined that the trial court’s findings of fact under the circumstances of this case should not be disturbed. See Lindsey v. State, 1913, 66 Fla. 341, 63 So. 832; Dempsey v. State, Fla.App.1970, 238 So. 2d 446.
The officers clearly informed the appellant of her right to consult with counsel and to have counsel present during interrogation, and the record reflects that appellant knowingly and intelligently waived her rights and volunteered statements — one o' which was exculpatory in nature — to the police. See James v. State, Fla.App.1969, 223 So. 2d 52; Woods v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 211 So. 2d 248; Rodriguez v. State, Fla.App., 287 So. 2d 395, opinion filed December 21, 1973.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by omitting to instruct the jury on how they should weigh and consider the appellant’s statements. This point lacks substantial merit. See Brunke v. State, 1948, 160 Fla. 43, 33 So. 2d 226.
Therefore, for the reasons stated and upon the authorities cited, the judgment appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1984)…fession, but may affect its weight and credibility with the jury.” Lindsey v. State, 66 Fla. 341, 343, 63 So. 832, 833 (1913). See generally Deconingh v. State, 433 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1983); Reddish v. State, 167 So. 2d 858 (Fla.1964); McCray v. State, 289 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). The trial judge found that the state had carried its burden of showing that appellant’s confessions were freely and voluntarily given. Appellant has failed to show that the trial judge’s determination was erroneous. Appellant co…
Authorities Cited
- James v. State, 223 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Arch Lindsey v. State, 66 Fla. 341 (Fla. 1913)
- Brunke v. State, 160 Fla. 43 (Fla. 1948)
- Woods v. State, 211 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Dempsey v. State, 238 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Rodriguez v. State, 287 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)