PEDRO RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Pedro Rivera Rodriguez was convicted of manslaughter after a bench trial on a first-degree murder charge and sentenced to seven years. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial judge should have suppressed two statements Rodriguez made to police because he was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights to counsel.
The court held that the Miranda warnings given to Rodriguez were legally insufficient. The state failed to meet its heavy burden to demonstrate that Rodriguez was clearly informed of his right to counsel and that he knowingly and intelligently waived that right, requiring suppression of the statements.
[1] A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that they be clearly informed of their right to consult with a lawyer and have the lawyer present during interroga…
[2] The state bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived their right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination during c…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today.”
The Miranda standard requiring clear informing of the right to counsel, which the court found was not met in this case.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRodriguez, a Spanish-speaking man with poor literacy skills who attended school only through second grade, was arrested for a fatal shooting at a labo…
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HENDRY, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a non-jury trial upon an information charging him with first degree murder. He was sentenced to seven years in the state penitentiary. This appeal is treated as a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction through the procedural device of habeas corpus. Baggett v. Wainwright, Fla.1969, 229 So. 2d 239.
The appellant argues that two statements which he made to the police following his arrest should have been suppressed by the trial judge. He contends that he was not adequately advised of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under guidelines enunciated by the U. S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), nor did he knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. We concur. The record demonstrates that appellant, who is Spanish-speaking and reads poorly, having attended school only through the second grade, was arrested following the fatal shooting of a laborer at the Camp Beals Labor Camp.
The officer who arrested the appellant also spoke Spanish. The prosecutor at trial asked the officer what language was employed in reciting to appellant his “Miranda” rights. The following colloquy occurred :
“A. I first of all gave it in English. I asked him after each sentence, and he looked kind of dazed. I asked him if he was — I think I gave it in Spanish. (Emphasis ours.)
“Q. How many times in Spanish?
“A. I had read it to him twice.”
The officer also testified that appellant “smelled of alcohol,” and a second officer, who also spoke Spanish and who later took a written statement from appellant at the police station, likewise noted that he “reeked” of alcohol.
Both officers prior to questioning appellant also asked him if he wanted an attorney “at this time” and if he would “talk without the presence of a lawyer.” We do not feel that these “Miranda” warnings were legally sufficient.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court mandated that when a custodial interrogation is undertaken without the presence of an attorney, the state bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that a defendant knowingly and intelligently has waived his right to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination. The court stated:
“Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today.” (384 U.S. at p. 471, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1626, 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 722; see also Woods v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 211 So. 2d 248; Statewright v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 278 So. 2d 652.) [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the state has met its heavy burden to establish that the appellant was clearly informed of his right to counsel and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right thereto.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the conviction and sentence is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Verdell McCRAY v. State, 289 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…intelligently waived her rights and volunteered statements — one o' which was exculpatory in nature — to the police. See James v. State, Fla.App.1969, [*766] 223 So. 2d 52; Woods v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 211 So. 2d 248; Rodriguez v. State, Fla.App., 287 So. 2d 395, opinion filed December 21, 1973. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by omitting to instruct the jury on how they should weigh and consider the appellant’s statements. This point lacks substantial merit. See Brunke v. State, 1948, 1…
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Benoit Balthazar v. State, 533 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…ving voluntariness is a heavy one in such circumstances, the standard of proof does not change from a preponderance of the evidence standard to a clear and convincing one. See DeCo-ningh v. State, 433 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1983); Rodriguez v. State, 287 So. 2d 395, 396-97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). GLICKSTEIN, WALDEN and STONE, JJ., concur.…
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State v. Rodriguez, 293 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1974)…Certiorari dismissed. 287 So. 2d 395.…
Authorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Baggett v. Louie L. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1969)
- Woods v. State, 211 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- ST. JOE Paper Co. v. Johnson, 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Statewright v. State, 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)