STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
MILDRED MANCE AND LANIER MANCE, HER HUSBAND, APPELLEES
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State Farm appeals a trial court's decision limiting its reimbursement of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to $150 when the insured settled a tort claim for $4,750. The court holds that under Florida's no-fault insurance statute, the PIP carrier is entitled to 100% reimbursement of benefits paid when sufficient settlement funds remain after deducting reasonable expenses.
The court holds that under § 627.736(3)(a) and (3)(b) of the Florida Statutes, if sufficient funds exist above the reasonable costs of settling without suit, the PIP carrier is entitled to 100% reimbursement of benefits paid. Full reimbursement is required here because the settlement proceeds of $4,750 exceeded the $1,372.04 in benefits owed plus reasonable expenses.
[1] A personal injury protection (PIP) insurer is entitled to 100% reimbursement of benefits paid when the insured recovers sufficient funds from a tort claim settlement, aft…
[2] The right to reimbursement for PIP benefits paid is established by statute, allowing the insurer a lien on the recovery from a tort claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if there were sufficient funds above the cost of arriving at a settlement without suit, the PIP carrier is entitled to 100% reimbursement”
Establishes the holding that PIP carriers receive full reimbursement when settlement proceeds exceed benefits plus reasonable expenses
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMrs. Mance was injured in an automobile accident and held a State Farm insurance policy providing PIP benefits. State Farm paid $1,372.04 in PIP benef…
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PER CURIAM.
This appeal involves the construction of § 627.736, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., or the so-called “no fault” insurance law.
The appellee, Mrs. Manee, was involved in an automobile accident and sustained personal injuries. At the time of the accident, Mrs. Manee was insured by the appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, whose policy provided personal injury protection (PIP) benefits without regard to fault. State Farm paid $1,372.04 in PIP benefits to Mrs. Manee. Thereafter, Mrs. Manee settled her tort claim for $4,750.00 without filing suit. Mrs. Manee then filed the instant petition for equitable distribution, alleging that such distribution was authorized where settlement without suit accomplished the recovery of the full amount of the PIP benefits paid. State Farm requested full reimbursement of all PIP benefits paid. The trial court entered an order awarding State Farm $150.00 from the settlement proceeds received by Mrs. Manee. State Farm now appeals that order for equitable distribution.
An examination of § 627.736(3) (a) and (3)(b), Fla.Stat.,1 F.S.A., leads us to the conclusion that if there were sufficient funds above the cost of arriving at a settlement without suit, the PIP carrier is entitled to 100% reimbursement. This was alluded to in a prior opinion of this court in State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Hauser, Fla.App.1973, 281 So. 2d 563 [by Judge Charles A. Carroll], wherein the following is found:
“Paragraphs (a) and (b) of § 627.-736(3), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. resist reconciliation. Under the former, which does not refer to a suit or to prosecution of a suit by the claimant against a third-party tortfeasor, a claimant’s insurer who has paid personal protection benefits to the claimant is stated to be entitled to be reimbursed in full therefor, provided the net amount of the ‘recovery’ by the claimant from the tortfeasor is sufficient.”
Therefore, this record demonstrating that there were more than adequate funds to make a 100% reimbursement after deducting allowable expenses, the final judgment here under review be and the same is hereby reversed, with directions to award the appellant [on its petition as filed below] $1,372.04 from the settlement proceeds received by the appellees.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
. “(3) Insurer’s rights of reimbursement and indemnity.—
(a) No subtraction from personal protection insurance benefits will be made because of the value of a claim in tort based on the same bodily injury, but after recovery is realized upon such a tort claim, a subtraction will be made to the extent of the recovery, exclusive of reasonable attorneys’ fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in effecting the recovery, but only to the extent that the injured person has recovered said benefits from the tortfeasor or Ms insurer or insurers. If personal protection insurance benefits have already been received, the claimant shall repay to the insurer or insurers, out of the recovery, a sum equal to the benefits received, but not more than the recovery, exclusive of reasonable attorneys’ fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in effecting the recovery, but only to the extent that the injured person has recovered said benefits from the tortfeasor or his insurers or insurer. The insurer or insurers shall have a lien on the recovery to this extent. No recovery by an injured person or his estate for loss suffered by him will be subtracted in calculating benefits due a dependent after the death, and no recovery by a dependent for loss suffered by the dependent after the death will be subtracted in calculating benefits due the injured person except as provided in paragraph (1) (c).
(b) The insurer shall be entitled to reimbursement of any payments made under the provisions of this subsection, based upon such equitable distribution of the amount recovered as the court may determine, less the pro rata share of all court costs expended by the plaintiff in the prosecution of the suit to recover such amount against a third-party tortfeasor, including a reasonable attorney’s fee for the plaintiff’s attorney. The proration of the reimbursement shall be made by the judge of a trial court handling the suit to recover damages in the third-party action against the tortfeasor upon application therefor and notice to the carrier.”
BARKDULL, Chief Judge
(specially concurring).
I concur with the majority opinion because I believe Judge Carroll, in State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Hauser, supra, and the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal by Judge Spencer C. Cross in Reyes v. Banks, Fla. App.1974, 292 So. 2d 39, have correctly interpreted the statutory enactment. However, I believe that the Legislature should revisit this subject. It seems that the statute should not encourage litigation, yet the only way a claimant can have equitable distribution under the precise wording of subsections (3) (a) and (3) (b) of § 627.736, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., is to institute a law suit. This should not be the statutory requirements of this State. The policy of the law should be to encourage settlements; not to encourage litigation. National Surety Company v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 103 Fla. 738, 138 So. 24; DeWitt v. Miami Transit Company, Fla. 1957, 95 So. 2d 898; Russell v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company, Fla.App.1961, 128 So. 2d 161; Coe v. Diener, Fla.App. 1964, 159 So. 2d 269; 6 Fla.Jur., Compromise and Settlement, § 4.
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John M. Purdy and his wife v. Gulf Breeze Enters., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1981)…nied, [*1329] 308 So. 2d 103 (Fla.1975); Reyes v. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). One district court judge suggested the legislature revisit the statute because it encouraged litigation. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mance, 292 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (Barkdull, J., concurring). We held that paragraphs (a) and (b) were repugnant to each other. Williams v. Gateway Insurance Co., 331 So. 2d 301 (Fla.1976). In 1976 the legislature revamped this subsection to take care of these pr…
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White v. Reserve Ins. Co., 299 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)…BOYER, Judge. Appellee .has filed a timely petition for rehearing suggesting that we have overlooked the decision of our sister court of the Third District in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Mance, Fla.App. (3d) 1974, 292 So. 2d 52. The opinion in that case was filed on March 26, 1974, after we heard oral arguments in the case sub ju-dice but before we rendered our opinion. Indeed appellee is correct in his contention that we failed to consider that case. We have now carefully…
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Williams v. Gateway Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1976)…the Fourth District in Reyes v. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (Fla.App.4th 1974). In turn Reyes conflicts with the Third District’s decisions in Gateway Insurance Co. v. Lymus, 295 So. 2d 326 (Fla.App.3d 1974), State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Manee, 292 So. 2d 52 (Fla.App.3d 1974) and State Farm Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hauser, 281 So. 2d 563 (Fla.App.3d 1973). Additionally, both Williams and Reyes are in conflict with the First District’s decisión in White v. Reserve Insurance Co., 299 So. 2d 661 (Fla.App.1st…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nat'l Sur. Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 103 Fla. 738 (Fla. 1931)
- DE Witt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1957)
- Florentine Reyes v. Leonard L. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hauser, 281 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Russell v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- COE v. Diener, 159 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)