STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CLIFFORD VINSON, APPELLEE
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The State appeals an order dismissing an information and seeks an extension of the speedy trial deadline pending the appeal's resolution. The court denies the State's motion to extend the trial time but without prejudice, allowing the State to file a new motion in the trial court.
The appellate court denies the State's motion to extend the speedy trial time without prejudice, but declines to enter such an order at the appellate level. The court remands the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the extension motion, noting that Rule 3.191(g) may encompass reversals of orders dismissing informations, though the rule's language requires clarification.
[1] A trial court's denial of a motion to extend speedy trial time pending an appeal is not an appealable order.
[2] A defendant's failure to petition for certiorari does not waive any error committed regarding speedy trial rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the question were squarely presented to us, we would construe the rule to encompass the reversal of an order dismissing an information.”
The court's position on how Rule 3.191(g) should be interpreted regarding automatic extensions upon reversal of dismissal orders.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State filed an appeal from an order dismissing an information. The speedy trial period was set to expire on May 30, 1974. The State moved the tria…
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GRIMES, Judge.
The State has filed an appeal from an order dismissing an information. Apprehensive that the time for speedy trial will have expired before this appeal has been decided, the State moved the trial court to extend the trial time for a period equal to the instant appeal, but this motion was denied. Absent an extension, the speedy trial period will expire on May 30, 1974. The State has now filed a motion asking this court to extend the time for trial to include ninety days following the final determination of the appeal.
In analogous situations, Rule 3.-191(g), CrPR, 33 F.S.A., provides for an automatic ninety-day extension. If the question were squarely presented to us, we would construe the rule to encompass the reversal of an order dismissing an information. Cf. State ex rel. Sheppard v. Duval, Fla.App.3d, 1973, 287 So. 2d 370. In State v. Williams, Fla.App.2d, 1973, 287 So. 2d 415, we suggested that until such time as the wording of the rule was settled, prosecutors might wish to move for an extension of time pending the outcome of the appeal. The State pursued such an approach in this instance without success.
There was no way in which the State could now appeal from the denial of its motion. State v. Smith, Fla.1972, 260 So. 2d 489. Moreover, the failure to petition for certiorari could not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any error which may have been committed. Cf. Gulf Cities Gas Corporation v. Cihak, Fla.App.2d, 1967, 201 So. 2d 250. Nevertheless, we are reluctant to take it upon ourselves upon an original motion to enter an order extending the time because the rule contemplates that this is a matter to be handled at the trial level. Therefore, the State’s motion is denied without prejudice to the filing of a new motion for extension of time to be considered pending this appeal by the trial court in the light of this opinion. If the motion is once again denied, the State will have done about all it can do. Then, if the order dismissing the information is ultimately reversed and the appellee obtains a discharge by reason of the failure to have a speedy trial, the State will have preserved its position and can appeal the order of discharge.
MANN, C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Tucker v. State, 357 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1978)…nstrument was overturned on appeal. The court there cautioned prosecutors, however, to move for extensions under subsection (d)(2) “[ujntil such time as the wording of the Rule is modified or a definitive court ruling is made.”10 In State v. Vinson, 294 So. 2d 418 (Fla.2d DCA 1974), the court took a stronger position, stating that “If the question were squarely presented to us, we would construe [subsection (g)] to encompass the reversal of an order dismissing an information.”11 Again, however, the court wa…
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State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
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State v. Williams, 350 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1977)…Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2),2 which provides that the trial court may extend the time [*83] periods established by the rule for a period of reasonable and necessary delay to accommodate certain specified events. Petitioner relies upon State v. Vinson, 294 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), in which the district court observed in dictum, that the automatic 90-day extension under Fla.R.Crim.P. 8.191(g) would apply to the reversal of an order dismissing an information. As explained in footnote 2, such an appeal, after…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1972)
- Gulf Cities GAS Corp. v. Cihak, 201 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- State v. Williams, 287 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- State v. Honorable Harvie S. Duval, 287 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)