THEODORE LYNN FRAZIER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1974-05-07
No. U-9
BOYER, Acting C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
294 So. 2d 691 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1974) Positive Treatment
Cited by 30 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Frazier was convicted of using a firearm during the commission of a felony but the jury did not return a guilty verdict on the underlying robbery charge. On appeal, Frazier argued the verdict was illegal because the jury failed to convict on the paramount offense of robbery. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a jury has the right to convict on a lesser included offense.


Holding

A jury verdict convicting on a lesser included offense is legal and valid. The jury has the perfect right to convict on a lesser offense rather than the paramount charge, and there is no authority holding such a verdict illegal.


Headnotes

[1] A jury may convict a defendant of a lesser included offense without explicitly finding the defendant not guilty of the greater offense.

[2] A jury instruction regarding the weight of fingerprint evidence is not erroneous if it fairly presents the law to the jury, even if it deviates from standardized phrasing…

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The jury has, from our view of the evidence and obviously the trial court's, decided to convict on the lesser offense which they had the perfect right to do.”

Establishes that juries have the right to convict on lesser included offenses rather than the paramount charge.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Frazier was charged with robbery and with displaying, using, threatening, or attempting to use a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a fe…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
DREW (Ret.), Associate Judge.

DREW (Ret.), Associate Judge.

This appellant was informed against for robbery as condemned by Section 813.011, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in the first count and for the “display, use, threaten and attempt to use a firearm, to wit, a pistol while committing or attempting to commit a felony”, as condemned by Section 790.-07(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The jury’s verdict was: “We the Jury find the defendant guilty of the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony”. The jury’s verdict made no specific finding on the first count of robbery.

It is asserted here that the verdict is illegal because the jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the paramount offense of robbery. No authority is cited for such a contention. In fact, appellant says: “. . . [Tjhere is no analogous authority.” The most persuasive argument that the verdict is illegal (therefore the consequent sentence), says appellant, “is that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” If the weight of the evidence here is contrary to the verdict, the scales incline to the defendant’s side — not the state’s.

The jury has, from our view of the evidence and obviously the.trial court’s, decided to convict on the lesser offense which they had the perfect right to do. That there is no “analogous authority” holding such verdict illegal is because, unquestionably, of the harmless nature of the error (from appellant’s point of view) if, in fact, error appears. See Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla.App.2d 1968), 399 U.S. 927, 90 S.Ct. 2242, 26 L.Ed.2d 794 (cert. denied).

We have carefully examined the whole record concerning appellant’s argument relating to the trial judge’s instruction on the weight to be given fingerprints. While we again suggest an adherence to the literal phraseology of the Standard Jury Instructions by the trial judges, instead of attempting to mold each instruction to fit exactly the pattern of the particular situation in the case being tried, the instruction was not erroneous or harmful. The defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a fair trial not a perfect one. The whole case, from beginning to end, including all the charges, was fairly and correctly tried. The charges, read each in relation to the others, and considered in the light of the evidence were not erroneous.

The other error assigned relates to the conduct of the state’s attorney. The defense in this case had the opening and closing arguments. Much of the conduct on each side was brought on and extended, quite extensively, by the conduct and remarks of the other.

The record presented does not reflect particular credit to either. The state’s attorney is not an attorney of record for the state striving at all events to win a verdict of guilty. He is a quasi judicial officer whose main objective should always be to serve justice and see that every defendant received a fair trial.1 Nor should defense counsel engage in personalities, play to the jury or use the courtroom as a place to parade his forensic agility. Such conduct is completely out of place and should not be tolerated by the trial judge.

However, on the whole record and the conclusiveness of the evidence in this case, it does not appear that any fundamental rights of the defendant were prejudiced.

Affirmed.

BOYER, Acting C. J., and McCORD, J., concur. . Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605, 609 (1924).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …s technically inconsistent with the battery conviction, such inconsistency can form no basis for upsetting either conviction herein as the jury under our system of law is entitled to return inconsistent verdicts in a criminal case. Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). For the reasons already developed, however, it is our view that the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury, as requested, on the law of self defense with reference to the duty to retreat. As self defense was assert…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Lozano, 616 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
    …the rights of the public.” The prosecutor acts as a servant of the law. Goddard v. State, 143 Fla. 28, 196 So. 596, 600 (1940), quot [*76] ing from Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). See also Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).…
  • Wooten v. State, 404 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …e — the “legally inconsistent verdict” theory of Mahaun likewise requires that a guilty verdict for possession be set aside. Contra, Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review granted, Fla. Case no. 59,302 (1981); Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1975); but cf., Reeder v. State, 399 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Thus, notwithstanding the clearly-expressed contrary intent of the legislature, and, in many cases, of the jury as well, § 7…
    1 / 2

Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw