PAUL EUGENE OWENS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Paul Eugene Owens, convicted of capital rape of a child and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 25-year minimum before parole eligibility, appealed on the ground that the mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutionally usurps executive parole authority. The Florida appellate court affirmed, holding that the Legislature has constitutional authority to set reasonable criminal penalties and may impose lawful conditions on parole eligibility.
The statute is constitutional. The Legislature has constitutional authority under Article 4, Section 8(c) of the Florida Constitution to create the Parole and Probation Commission and to establish reasonable penalties and conditions on parole eligibility. The statute properly conditions parole eligibility without removing parole authority from the executive branch.
[1] The Legislature has the discretionary power to prescribe reasonable penalties and sanctions for criminal offenses.
[2] A statute establishing a minimum sentence before parole eligibility does not impermissibly usurp the powers of the Executive Branch.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Every person . . . shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be eligible for consideration by the commission for parole.”
Statutory language from Section 947.16 showing that the Legislature has authority to condition parole eligibility by law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOwens was charged with rape of a female under eleven years of age, a capital felony. He entered a guilty plea at arraignment that the trial judge foun…
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
The appellant, Paul Eugene Owens, was charged in a one count indictment with the commission of the crime of rape of a female under eleven years of age, a capital felony under Section 794.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. He entered a plea of guilty at his arraignment hearing. After the trial judge determined that his plea of guilty was intelligently, knowingly and understandingly entered, he was adjudged guilty as charged. Accordingly, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the remainder of his natural life and allowed credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial. This timely appeal followed the judgment and sentence.
Appellant’s sole point raised on appeal attacks for the first time the 25-year minimum sentence set forth in Section 775.-082(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which statute provides:
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than twenty-five (25) calendar years before becoming eligible for parole. . . .
It is the contention of appellant that the Legislative enactment requiring him to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole is an impermissible usurpation upon the powers and prerogatives of the Executive Branch of government, to wit: the Parole and Probation Commission of Florida.
We cannot agree. Article 4, § 8(c) of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., authorizes the creation by law of a parole and probation commission. The Legislature, pursuant to this constitutional authority, created and established the Parole and Probation Commission. See Chapters 947 and 948, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. According to Chapter 947, F.S.A., supra:
. . . Every person . . . shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be eligible for consideration by the commission for parole. . . .
(Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes, 'F. S.A.; emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the constitutional and statutory authority cited immediately above that the appellant’s attack leveled at the statute, supra, is not well founded.
The Legislature is vested with the discretionary power to prescribe reasonable penalties and sanctions upon persons convicted of criminal offenses committed in this state. If the statute which appellant was charged with violating is to be changed, it must be done by the Legislature as this court is not vested with legislative powers. We think it highly proper for the Legislature to establish standards under which the commission may act. The punishment prescribed by the Legislature in Section 775.082(1), F.S.A., supra, fits the crime of which appellant was convicted like a silk glove on a woman’s hand.
In view of the constitutional scheme as mentioned above, we believe that the appellant’s attack is upon the propriety or the advisability of the minimum sentence provision involved here, rather than upon its legality.
In light of our opinion, upholding the constitutionality of this statute, the appellee’s motion is denied. The judgment and sentence is
Affirmed.
McNULTY, Acting C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur.
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Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1975)…ENGLAND, Justice. This case is here on appeal from a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, reported at 294 So. 2d 693. Since the district court initially and directly passed on the validity of Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, we have jurisdiction for review.1 Appellant pled guilty to a charge that he had raped a female under eleven years old in violation of S…
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Rhynes v. State, 312 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…discharge of the judicial function of sentencing (see: 79 C.J.S. Sentence page 1042) is not controlling when that statute conflicts with a rule of procedure regulating sentencing. Compare: Johnson v. State, supra, with Owens v. State, Fla. App.1974, 294 So. 2d 693. For the foregoing reasons, the adjudication of guilt and the sentence under review are affirmed. WALDEN and DOWNEY, JJ., and SILVERTOOTH, LYNN N., Associate Judge, concur.…