JAMES WESTBROOK ACKERLY, APPELLANT,
v.
DEE GLANCE ACKERLY, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1974-06-21
No. 73-1004
MANN, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
296 So. 2d 66 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1974) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Holding

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying modification of alimony and child support, and finding no merit in the contention regarding attorney fees.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant sought to modify a final divorce judgment, arguing that his ex-wife was employed and capable of self-support, and that their children over 1…

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Opinion of the Court
HOBSON, Judge.

HOBSON, Judge.

Appellant filed a petition to modify final judgment of divorce awarding child support and alimony on the ground that appel-lee, since the final judgment, has become employed and is capable of supporting herself. Appellant also contends that the children of the parties are now over 18 years of age, employed full time and are self-supporting.

The trial court ordered appellant to continue making child support payments for the 18 year old son for a period of nine months and to continue making the alimony payments. Appellant also contests the awarding of attorney fees to appellee’s attorney.

As to the continuation of alimony payments, the trial court correctly considered all of the factors set forth in Scott v. Scott, Fla.App.2d 1973, 285 So. 2d 423. Therefore, we cannot-say that the lower court abused its discretion in denying the motion to modify the alimony.

As to child support, the testimony revealed that the 18 year old child, though employed, was terminating his employment to further his education. As was held in Field v. Field, Fla.App.2d 1974, 291 So. 2d 654, the mere fact that the child has reached the age of majority of 18 is not retroactive and does not terminate the pre-existing rights of the child.

We have considered the question as to the granting of attorney fees and find appellant’s contention to be without merit.

Affirmed.

MANN, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975)
    …te, a support order in a judgment by changing the termination date of payments from age 21, as provided in the judgment of divorce, to age 18. The court observed the prospective operation of Chapter 73-21. In Ackerly v. Ackerly, Fla.App., DCA (2nd), 296 So. 2d 66, the same court held that an 18 year old, who, though employed but was terminating his employment to further his education would nevertheless be entitled to receive support beyond age 18 as the mere fact of his reaching the age of majority of 18 is…
  • Dalton v. Dalton, 304 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
    …have the benefit of them at the time of the entry of his order under attack here. Those cases are in the chronological order of their appearances in the advance sheets: White v. White, Fla.App. 1974, 296 So. 2d 619; Ackerly v. Ackerly, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 66; Daugherty v. Daugherty, Fla.App.1974, 293 So. 2d 394; Finn v. Finn, Fla.App.1974, 294 So. 2d 57; Field v. Field, Fla.App.1974, 291 So. 2d 654. In Field, supra, the lower court, while considering a petition of the husband filed in November, 1972, f…
  • Freeman J. Nevins v. Nevins, 305 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
    …on obligations existing prior to the effective date thereon, the chancellor was correct in awarding child support for the 18 year old son in the case sub judice. See Finn v. Finn, Fla.App.1974, 294 So. 2d 57; Ackerly [*65] v. Ackerly, Fla.App.1974, 296 So. 2d 66. However, we believe that $200 per month for child support is somewhat excessive in that appellant’s take home pay being approximately only $1,000 a month, the $300 monthly alimony of appellee ex-wife who was awarded the marital residence added to t…

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