JOE B. FITZWATER, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTRAUD U. FITZWATER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this dissolution of marriage case, the Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's division of marital property and mortgage payment obligations, but reversed the permanent alimony award. The court limited the alimony to rehabilitative support lasting five years rather than until the former spouse's remarriage or death.
The appellate court held that permanent alimony constituted an abuse of discretion. The $150 per month for one year and $100 per month thereafter was appropriate, but the duration should be limited to five years from inception rather than continuing until remarriage or death.
[1] An award of permanent alimony constitutes an abuse of discretion when the recipient spouse has the capacity for self-support and the award is not supported by applicable…
[2] Alimony awards should be sufficient for rehabilitative purposes in conjunction with the equitable division of marital assets.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The fortuitous circumstance created by recitation of the marriage vows neither diminishes her [the wife's] capacity for self-support nor does it give her a vested right in her husband's earnings for the remainder of her life.”
Establishes the court's fundamental principle that marriage does not create permanent spousal support rights and that former spouses retain capacity for self-support.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court ordered the appellant to pay one-half the mortgage payments on the marital home for two years, after which the home would be sold and …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Equitable Distribution Of Marital Assets cases and more on FLexlaw
JOHNSON, Judge.
The appellant herein seeks reversal of the alimony and mortgage payment provisions of a final judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties.
The trial court ordered, inter alia, appellant to pay one-half the mortgage payments on the marital home for a period of two years, after which time the home would be sold and the proceeds divided. Appellant was further ordered to 'pay alimony in -the amount of $150.00 per month for one year and $100.00 per month thereafter until appellee either remarried or died.
We have heard oral argument in this cause and the briefs and record on appeal have been read and given full consideration. It is our opinion that all portions of the judgment below should be affirmed with the exception of that provision which requires appellant to continue to pay the $100.00 per month alimony until appellee’s remarriage or death, whichever occurs first. We conclude that the $100.00 per month award should continue only five years from its date of inception, July 1, 1974.
Our courts have recognized that the marriage relationship places both parties on a basis of complete equality as partners sharing equal rights and obligations in the marriage relationship and sharing equal burdens in the event of dissolution. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla.App. 1st, 1973). As was stated in Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269, 272 (Fla.App. 1st, 1972):
“ . . . The fortuitous circumstance created by recitation of the marriage vows neither diminishes her [the wife’s] capacity for self-support nor does it give her a vested right in her husband’s earnings for the remainder of her life.”
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is our conclusion, and we so hold, that the award of permanent alimony made to appellee constitutes an abuse of discretion and cannot be supported by applicable principles of law. An award of $150.00 per month for one year and $100.00 per month for the succeeding five years is sufficient for rehabilitative purposes in conjunction with the equitable division of the marital assets as provided in the judgment entered below.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed herein is affirmed as to all provisions except that provision which requires alimony payments of $100.00 per month until appellee’s remarriage or death. That portion of the judgment is reversed with directions to order payments of $100.00 per month for a period of five years.
The petitions for attorneys’ fees in connection with this appeal are denied.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
RAWLS, C. J., and SPECTOR, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)…a proposition are Beard v. Beard, Fla.App. 1st 1972, 262 So. 2d 269, Thigpen v. Thigpen, Fla.App. 1st 1973, 277 So. 2d 583, Roberts v. Roberts, Fla.App. 1st 1973, 283 So. 2d 396 and, of more recent vintage, Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 296 So. 2d 74. [*64] It was not our intention that any of the above cited opinions (nor any of our other opinions on the subject) be construed as disapproving permanent alimony under appropriate circumstances. Indeed, Florida Statute 61.08 specifically allows ali…
-
Manning v. Manning, 353 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…uring the outset of the marriage as a cashier and store clerk. We are of the opinion the interests of the parties would be best served by the court considering an award of rehabilitative, as opposed to permanent, alimony. See Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 296 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS and ERVIN, JJ„ concur.…
-
Stoler v. Stoler, 376 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…tute by the Florida Legislature, the courts have recognized that upon dissolution of a marriage relationship each party thereto should share equal burdens in such event. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 296 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). As was stated in Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269, 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972): “. . . The fortuitous circumstance created by recitation of the marriage vows neither diminishes her [the wife’s] capacity for self-support nor does it g…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Manly W. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp. v. Armer E. White, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)