JEROME SCHNEIDER, APPELLANT,
v.
PHYLLIS SCHNEIDER, APPELLEE
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Jerome Schneider appeals a final judgment dissolving his marriage to Phyllis Schneider, challenging the trial court's authority to modify property division and alimony provisions in subsequent judgments after an initial final judgment. The court held that once property rights are settled in a final dissolution judgment, the trial court lacks authority to redetermine those rights in later orders.
The court held that the trial court lacked authority to enter the judgments of July 25, 1973 and September 19, 1973 because property rights in a dissolution of marriage, once settled by final judgment, cannot be subsequently redetermined by the chancellor. Additionally, the September 19, 1973 judgment was invalid because filing a notice of appeal vested jurisdiction absolutely in the appellate court, divesting the trial court of further authority.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction over a cause once a notice of appeal is filed.
[2] A trial court cannot redetermine property rights previously settled in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well established that once the property rights of the parties have been settled by the court in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the chancellor may not subsequently enter post judgment orders redetermining those rights.”
Establishes the core legal principle that prevents trial courts from modifying property divisions after final judgment in divorce cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJerome Schneider filed for dissolution of marriage on February 28, 1972. The trial court found his ex-wife suffered from multiple sclerosis and psychi…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner-appellant seeks review of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage with respect to the determination of the alimony and property rights of the parties contained therein.
Petitioner, ex-husband, on February 28, 1972 filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Respondent, ex-wife, in response thereto filed an answer and counterclaim. Following a full evidentiary hearing thereon, the chancellor found that the respondent was suffering from multiple sclerosis and psychiatric problems and was unlikely to obtain gainful employment, and on August 2, 1972 entered a judgment dissolving the bonds of marriage between the parties. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was awarded custody of the three minor children and the exclusive use of the marital residence so long as he resides there together with at least one of the minor children. Appellant was directed to pay respondent $100 per week as permanent alimony and all medical bills reasonably and necessarily incurred by her. Thereafter, on August 14, 1972 petitioner-appellant filed a motion for a new trial and/or to alter or amend the final judgment of August 2, 1972, wherein he contested the reasonableness of the alimony provision and provision for payment of respondent’s reasonable medical care. By September 1972 the petitioner-appellant was in arrears in payment of the $100 weekly alimony to respondent, ex-wife. After several hearings, on July 25, 1973 the chancellor entered a new final judgment of dissolution of marriage wherein he awarded the custody of the children to the petitioner and directed that the marital residence be sold and the proceeds therefrom be divided in half, with one-half going directly to the respondent and the other half to be held in escrow to guarantee payments of alimony of $100 per week to the respondent.
On August 23, 1973 petitioner moved to vacate the final judgment of July 25, 1973 and on August 7, 1973 filed his notice of appeal therefrom. Petitioner and his counsel having failed to appear at the hearing on the motion to vacate, on September 19, 1973 the chancellor entered an amended final judgment directing the petitioner, ex-husband, (1) to transfer to the respondent, ex-wife, the marital residence and all contents therein as lump sum alimony, and (2) to pay respondent $50 per week. This appeal follows.
On appeal, petitioner-appellant argues the trial court erred in adjudicating the property rights of the parties by its final judgment of July 25, 1973 after the court had adjudicated the same property rights of the parties previously in its final judgment of August 2, 1972. We find this point is well taken.
We first note that the trial court’s order of September 19, 1973 is invalid for upon the filing of the notice of appeal of August 7, 1973, jurisdiction of the cause then vested absolutely in this court until the appeal finally is disposed of. See 2 Fla.Jur.Appeals § 136 (1963).
We also find that the judgment of July 25, 1973 is invalid as the property rights of the respective parties were settled by the chancellor’s entry of the final judgment of August 2, 1972. It is well established that once the property rights of the parties have been settled by the court in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the chancellor may not subsequently enter post judgment orders redetermining those rights. See Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, Fla.App. 1973, 277 So. 2d 43 and cases cited therein.
Accordingly, the judgments of July 25, 1973 and September 19, 1973 are reversed and the cause remanded with directions for further proceedings on petitioner-appellant’s motion for reduction of alimony payments based on his change in financial condition!
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Cyrilla Ann Harrell v. Harrell, 515 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…its “value”. The law in Florida is clear, once property rights of the parties have been established in a final judgment of dissolution, a chancellor may not subsequently enter post judgment orders redetermining those rights. Schneider v. Schneider, 296 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). See also Boswell v. Boswell, 352 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (order held void for lack of jurisdiction as property rights may not be adjudicated where not determined in final judgment and without reservation of jurisdiction). O…
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Semko v. Semko, 537 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…es a vested right. See Harrell v. Harrell, 515 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Miller v. Miller, 455 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), review denied, 462 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1985); Covin v. Covin, 403 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Schneider v. Schneider, 296 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Minis v. Ellison, 233 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). See also Franks v. Franks, 469 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Poling v. Tresidder, 373 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (court may not modify provision of property rights adjudic…
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Ambrose v. Emmy Rayne, 412 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…determined by the equity of the cause and should be for a specified period. It is always subject to modification whenever there is a change of circumstances. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980). Appellee’s reliance on Schneider v. Schneider, 296 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) is misplaced. Schneider deals primarily with a jurisdictional issue. However, support for appellant’s position is found in Schneider, where this court held that property rights, settled in a final judgment of dissolution, may not,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 277 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)