THERESA D. SEMKO, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM SEMKO, APPELLEE
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In a post-divorce dispute, the trial court entered a clarification order requiring distribution of the wife's retirement plan based on a final judgment that made no mention of such plan. The appellate court held that this so-called clarification was actually an impermissible modification of vested property rights that exceeded the court's authority.
A trial court may only clarify what is implicit in a final judgment. Because the final judgment made no mention of the wife's retirement plan, the subsequent order requiring its distribution constitutes an impermissible modification of vested property rights rather than a proper clarification, and such modification is improper absent the court's retained jurisdiction or other circumstances justifying modification under the rules of civil procedure.
[1] A trial court may clarify what is implicit in a final judgment, but cannot modify vested property rights through a motion for clarification.
[2] An order requiring the distribution of a party's retirement plan, when the final judgment only addressed stock distribution, constitutes an impermissible modification of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial judge may clarify what is implicit in the final judgment.”
Establishes the permissible scope of clarification orders in post-judgment proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' amended final judgment in a dissolution of marriage included a provision ordering distribution of 'the stock securities owned by the part…
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BASKIN, Judge.
Theresa Semko appeals an order on Motion to Clarify Final Judgment entered in post-dissolution of marriage proceedings. The amended final judgment included a provision ordering the distribution of “the stock securities owned by the parties, jointly, severally or in trust”; it did not refer to the wife’s retirement plan. Neither party appealed the amended final judgment. Upon the wife’s motion for clarification, the court entered an order stating that the stock distribution provisions in the amended final judgment included all stocks of the “Bell System Plan For Salaried Employees.” Appellant contends that the order, characterized as a clarification, is actually an impermissible modification of property rights. We agree.
A trial judge may clarify what is implicit in the final judgment. Tinsley v. Tinsley, 490 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). In the case before us, the final judgment ordering distribution of the parties’ property made no mention of the wife’s retirement plan.
Thus, the subsequent order requiring distribution of appellant’s retirement plan constitutes a redetermination of the parties’ property rights and improperly modifies a vested right. See Harrell v. Harrell, 515 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Miller v. Miller, 455 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), review denied, 462 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1985); Covin v. Covin, 403 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Schneider v. Schneider, 296 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Minis v. Ellison, 233 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).
See also Franks v. Franks, 469 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Poling v. Tresidder, 373 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (court may not modify provision of property rights adjudicated in final judgment by petition entitled motion for enforcement but which is actually an effort to seek determination of property interest).
Cf. Golub v. Golub, 336 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (order requiring transfer of stocks was enforcement of final judgment, not modification).
The court did not retain jurisdiction and the record does not disclose the presence of circumstances which would allow proceedings under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. See Kitchens v. Kitchens, 519 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Harrell. In the absence of appropriate circumstances justifying modification, the court may not engage in such considerations.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…gment.3 But after a final judgment is rendered, a trial court lacks jurisdiction under chapter 61 to determine property rights, unless the final judgment reserves jurisdiction for a specific purpose regarding identified property. See Semko v. Semko, 537 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Flanders v. Flanders, 516 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (absent facts support [*964] ing a reformation in equity, courts have no authority to modify a property settlement agreement). No reservation to redetermine property…1 / 2
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Spano v. Spano, 698 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…jurisdiction under chapter 61 after a final judgment to decide property questions, unless the final judgment reserves such jurisdiction for a specific purpose regarding identified property, or is reversed, or is otherwise set aside. Semko v. Semko, 537 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3rd DCA), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 989 (Fla.1989) (subsequent order requiring distribution of retirement plan constituted redetermination of property rights and improperly modifies a vested right); Flanders v. Flanders, 516 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (F…
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Travis v. Travis (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)…e new QDRO refers to as the Lockheed Martin Corporation Supplemental Retirement Plan. ---PAGE 4--- determine property rights, unless the final judgment reserves jurisdiction for a specific purpose regarding identified property. See Semko v. Semko, 537 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Flanders v. Flanders, 516 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)[]. Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960, 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (footnotes omitted). A clarification seeks to make a judgment clearer and more precise, as…
Authorities Cited
- Tinsley v. Tinsley, 490 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Golub v. Golub, 336 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Mintz v. Ellison, 233 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Covin v. Covin, 403 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Cyrilla Ann Harrell v. Harrell, 515 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Poling v. Tresidder, 373 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Schneider v. Schneider, 296 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Kitchens v. Kitchens, 519 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Franks v. Franks, 469 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Miller v. Miller, 455 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)