JACK DEAN, COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA, ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
PALM BEACH MALL, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the District Court of Appeal erred in reversing the trial court's judgment upholding the tax assessment.
[1] A tax assessment is presumed correct, and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove otherwise by excluding every reasonable hypothesis of a legal assessment.
[2] The opinion of a tax assessor is entitled to great weight, especially when it bears the approval of the trial court.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRespondent challenged tax assessments for its property. The trial court upheld the petitioner's assessment, finding the petitioner's appraiser's metho…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Presumption Of Correctness Of Tax Assessment cases and more on FLexlaw
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 279 So. 2d 56. Our jurisdiction is based upon conflict1 between the decision sought to be reviewed and Powell v. Kelly,2 Exchange Realty Corp. v. Hillsborough Co.,3 and McNayr v. Claughton,4 inter alia.
The facts of this case are as follows. Respondent, being dissatisfied with the 1968 and 1969 tax assessments imposed by the City of West Palm Beach and Palm Beach County, filed suit attacking the valuations. The 1968 county tax case was tried separately and does not concern us here. The 1968 and 1969 city ad valorem assessment suit and the 1969 county ad va-lorem assessment suit were consolidated for trial; the city now concedes its assessments were excessive and is not objecting presently to the retrial of its case. Of the four assessments initially challenged, only the 1969 county assessment is now before this Court. At the trial of the cause, Petitioner did not call its tax assessor for an explanation of how he had arrived at the valuation, relying instead upon a detailed appraisal report prepared by its expert appraiser, who testified that he had employed three accepted methods of property valuation (cost approach, market data approach and income approach) and had incorporated therein the various criteria of valuation set forth in Section 193.011, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.5 The opinion of Petitioner’s appraiser as to the fair market value of Respondent’s property was $15,900,000, compared to Petitioner’s tax assessor’s valuation of $15,100,000. On the basis of the evidence presented, the trial court not only upheld the validity of Petitioner’s assessment, but specifically found that the approaches of its appraiser were more objective than those of Respondent’s appraiser. Respondent appealed this judgment to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, which reversed the decision and remanded the case for a new trial to reconsider the matter of fair market value, because it found that Petitioner’s expert appraiser did not sufficiently relate the comparable sales he analyzed to the subject property, al though the court also found that the evidence did not justify Respondent’s proposed assessment of $11,400,000.
While recognizing the well-established presumption of correctness which favors the taxing authorities,6 we note that the trial court did not base its ruling on that presumption; instead, the court determined that, based on the conflicting evidence, the fair market value of Respondent’s property was that assessed by Petitioners. Thus, it is apparent that Respondent’s complaint and proof failed to create the required “complete case for equitable relief by excluding every reasonable hypothesis of a legal assessment against him”.7 It is important to our consideration to bear in mind that, while the opinion of the tax assessor is not conclusive, it is entitled to great weight, especially where it bears the approval of the trial court.8
In the instant case, the prima facie correctness of Petitioner’s assessment is further strengthened by the long accepted principle of law which requires an appellate court to presume that the factual findings of a trial court are correct.9 Beyond this presumption, however, an examination of the evidence before the trial court discloses that Petitioner’s appraiser testified in detail as to each of the approaches he used (cost, market data and income); therefore, we conclude that there was competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s judgment.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the District Court is quashed and the cause remanded with directions that the judgment of the trial court be reinstated.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and DEICLE, JJ., concur. . Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, F.S.A. . 223 So. 2d 305 (Fla.1969).
. 272 So. 2d 534 (Fla.App.1973).
. 198 So. 2d 366 (Fla.App.1967).
. “193.011 Assessment at just valuation.— The county assessor of taxes of the several counties shall assess all the real and personal property in said counties in such a manner as to secure a just valuation as required by § 4, Art. VII of the state constitution. In arriving at a just valuation, the county assessors of taxes of the several counties shall take into consideration the following factors:
“(1) The present cash value of the property ;
“(2) The highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be put in the immediate future; and the present use of the property;
“ (3) The location of said property;
“(4) The quantity or size of said property;
“(5) The cost of said property and the present replacement value of any improvements thereon;
“(6) The condition of said property;
“(7) The income from said property; and
“(8) The net proceeds of the sale of the property, as received by the seller, after deduction of all of the usual and reasonable fees and costs of the sale, including the costs and expenses of financing.”
. Exchange Realty Corp. v. Hillsborough County, supra, see Note 3; Powell v. Kelly, supra, see Note 2; City of Tampa v. Palmer, 89 Fla. 514, 105 So. 115 (1925); inter alia.
. Exchange Realty Corporation, supra, see Note 3.
. State ex rel. Kent Corporation v. Board of County Com’rs of Broward County, 160 Fla. 900, 37 So. 2d 252 (1948).
. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla.1971); Jeffreys v. Simpson, 222 So. 2d 224 (Fla.App.1969).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Atl. Int'l Inv. Corp. v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…trictions and problems which plaintiff has experienced with respect to the subject property. We must affirm the trial judge unless the finding is manifestly unreasonable and clearly against the weight of the evidence. Dean v. Palm Beach Mall, Inc., 297 So. 2d 298 (Fla.1974); Blake v. Farrand Corp., Inc., 321 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Walker v. Connolly, 299 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Hill v. Coplan Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 296 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Dade County v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.…
-
GAC Props., Inc. v. Colding, 308 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…retion in the valuation of property for taxation purposes. Harbond, Inc. v. Anderson, Fla.App.2d, 1961, 134 So. 2d 816. Though their assessments are presumed to be correct, the presumption is rebuttable. See Dean v. Palm Beach Mall, Inc., Fla. 1974, 297 So. 2d 298. The appellant made a prima facie case sufficient to overcome the presumption. At that point in the trial, there had been no evidence introduced in support of the assessment. Hence, the motion for dismissal should not have been granted. Reversed…
-
Miami Atl. Dev. Corp. v. TAX Assessor, 41 Fla. Supp. 148 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1974)…subject property was a condominium on January 1,1973. With regard to the second issue dealing with the correctness of the actual assessed value of the subject property, the tax assessor’s actions are presumed correct. Dean v. Palm Beach Mall, Inc., 297 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1974); City National Bank of Miami v. Blake, 257 So. 2d 264 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972); District School Board of Lee County v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1973). [*157] As above mentioned, the nature of the ownership, whether by condominium or othe…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- City of Tampa v. Palmer, 89 Fla. 514 (Fla. 1925)
- Powell v. J. R. Kelly as Tax Collector of Bradford Cnty., 223 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1969)
- Carroll v. State, 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971)
- McNAYR v. Claughton, 198 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- State v. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs OF Broward Cnty., 160 Fla. 900 (Fla. 1948)
- Linwood Jeffreys v. Simpson, 222 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- Colbath v. Colbath, 272 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Palm Beach Mall, Inc. v. The City OF W. Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)