CORNELIUS PURDY, ALIAS BUCK PURDY,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld a procedural bar to an appeal in a capital murder case, dismissing Cornelius Purdy's appeal from his death sentence because it was filed nine months after sentencing, well beyond the ninety-day filing deadline mandated by the Criminal Code.
Section 288 of the Criminal Code requires a defendant in a criminal case to take an appeal within ninety days after entry of judgment and sentence. An appeal not filed within this period is barred and must be dismissed. The statutory time limit operates as a mandatory procedural requirement intended to apply prospectively.
“We therefore hold that Section 288 of the Criminal Code, swpra, requires the defendant in a criminal case to take an appeal within ninety days after the entry of a judgment and sentence, except that an appeal from both judgment and sentence shall be taken within ninety days after the sentence is entered.”
Establishes the mandatory nature and scope of the ninety-day filing deadline for criminal appeals.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCornelius Purdy was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by electrocution on March 27, 1941, in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida. Purd…
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The appellant, Cornelius Purdy, alias Buck Purdy, on March 27, 1941, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by electrocution. On January 13, 1942, an appeal from said judgment and sentence entered in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, was taken to the Supreme Court, and some nine months intervened between the date of the sentence and the time of taking an appeal therefrom.
On January 27, 1942, a motion to dismiss said appeal was filed in this Court on the ground that the appeal was not taken within the ninety day period as provided for by Section 288 of the Criminal Code Chapter 19554, Acts of 1939, Laws of Florida). It is contended by counsel for appellant that the provisions of Section 288 supra do not preclude or prohibit the appellant from taking an appeal- at a time after the expiration of the ninety day period after the sentence is entered. Section 545 of Lewis’ Statutory Construction is cited by counsel to sustain their position, along with Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 575; Collins v. State, 33 Fla. 429, 15 So. 214. We have carefully examined the authorities cited in light of the contention as made by counsel for- appellant.
The Legislature had the power to enact the procedure Act and the time fixed by Section 288 thereof appears to be reasonable, and intended by the Legis*174lature to operate prospectively. Chapter 16302, Acts of 1933, Laws of Florida, reduced the time of suing out a writ of error in a criminal case to a period of six months from the date of entry of the judgment sought to be reversed, as provided for in civil cases. The Act was sustained by this Court in Lee v. State, 128 Fla. 319, 174 So. 589. We therefore hold that Section 288 of the Criminal Code, swpra, requires the defendant in a criminal case to take an appeal within ninety days after the entry of a judgment and sentence, except that an appeal from both judgment and sentence shall be taken within ninety days after the sentence is entered.
It therefore follows that the appeal sought to be dismissed was not taken within ninety days after March 27, 1941, but nine months and seventeen days subsequent to the entry of the judgment and sentence sought to be reversed, and for this reason the motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
BROWN, C. J„ WHITFIELD, TERRELL, BUFORD, THOMAS and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State of Fla. ex rel. Richard W. Ervin v. Smith, 160 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1964)…the notice of appeal in the trial court within the prescribed 90 day period. This is an absolute essential jurisdictional requirement. If the requirement is not met the appellate court simply has no jurisdiction — no power — to act. Purdy v. State, 150 Fla. 172, 7 So. 2d 109; Newsom v. State, Fla., 54 So. 2d 58; Bell v. State, 154 Fla. 505, 18 So. 2d 361; Lee v. State, 128 Fla. 319, 174 So. 589; Donin v. Goss, Fla., 69 So. 2d 316. Respondents, however, suggest that the restriction of the rule should be li…
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Hood v. State, 163 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)…the notice of appeal in the trial court within the prescribed 90 day period. This is an absolute essential jurisdictional requirement. If the requirement is not met the appellate court simply has no jurisdiction — no power — to act. Purdy v. State, 150 Fla. 172, 7 So. 2d 109; Newsom v. State, Fla., 54 So. 2d 58; Bell v. State, 154 Fla. 505, 18 So. 2d 361; Lee v. State, 128 Fla. 319, 174 So. 589; Donin v. Goss, Fla., 69 So. 2d 316.” The appeal is initiated by the filing of the notice of appeal and not by t…
Authorities Cited
- Lee v. State, 128 Fla. 319 (Fla. 1937)
- Noyes S. Collins v. State, 33 Fla. 429 (Fla. 1894)
- Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 575 (Fla. 1876)