BUSTER WALKER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JANIE A. WALKER, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
U-HAUL COMPANY, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Walker brought a wrongful death suit against U-Haul for negligence in connection with his wife's death, but he had previously recovered and satisfied a judgment for the same damages against the truck driver and another entity. The court affirmed summary judgment for U-Haul, holding that Walker's satisfaction of his earlier judgment discharged the liability of all joint tortfeasors, barring his subsequent action.
The court held that U-Haul, as a joint tortfeasor with Humphrey, was jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages, and that Walker's unconditional satisfaction of his judgment against Humphrey discharged U-Haul's entire liability. The satisfaction was not limited to those specific defendants as Walker contended.
[1] A satisfaction of a judgment against one joint tortfeasor discharges the liability of other joint tortfeasors for the same damages.
[2] The satisfaction of a prior judgment against a tortfeasor is not considered a pro tanto release of other joint tortfeasors unless the satisfaction is explicitly qualified…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear that the alleged negligent conduct of appellees, though separate and distinct from the negligent conduct of Dalton Ray Humphrey, necessarily concurred in bringing about the collision resulting in the death of Mrs. Walker, and thus appellees were joint tortfeasors with Dalton Ray Humphrey.”
Establishes that U-Haul, despite separate negligent acts, was a joint tortfeasor with Humphrey for the same damages.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWalker's wife was killed in an automobile collision caused by the negligence of Dalton Ray Humphrey while driving a truck owned by U-Haul Company. Wal…
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OWEN, Chief Judge.
Appellant, plaintiff below, suffered an adverse summary judgment in his suit for damages arising out of the wrongful death of his wife, the judgment for appellees having been entered on the grounds that they were joint tort feasors with another against whom appellant had previously recovered and satisfied a judgment for the same damages sought in the instant case.
Appellant’s wife had been killed in an automobile collision resulting from the negligence of Dalton Ray Humphrey while operating a truck owned by his employer, U-Haul Company of North Carolina, Inc. Appellant filed a wrongful death action as surviving spouse,- and a survival action as personal representative of decedent’s estate, naming both the operator and owner as defendants and alleging that their negligence was the proximate cause of appellant’s damages. Appellant recovered a judgment which he satisfied. The instant suit was then filed against appellees, alleging that as owners of the truck being driven by Dalton Ray Humphrey and the tow bar by which Humphrey was towing another vehicle at the time, said defendants “did so negligently maintain, equip, operate, manage and control said trucks as to drive them against the vehicle being driven and operated by [the decedent]”. Appellant also charged that defendants “were careless and negligent” in hiring Humphrey, and that the defendants were liable as the manufacturers of the tow bar since it “was inadequately designed, insufficient and faulty”. Appellant sought the identical compensatory damages which had been claimed and recovered in the prior suit arising out of this accident. Upon satisfactory proof of this latter fact together with proof that the judgment theretofore recovered had been fully satisfied, the court entered summary final judgment for appellees.
It is clear that the alleged negligent conduct of -appellees, though separate and distinct from the negligent conduct of Dalton Ray Humphrey, necessarily concurred in bringing about the collision resulting in the death of Mrs. Walker, and thus appel-lees were joint tortfeasors with Dalton Ray Humphrey. Davidow v. Seyfarth, Fla. 1952, 58 So. 2d 865; Nichols v. Rothkopf, 1939, 135 Fla. 749, 185 So. 725; Feinstone v. Allison Hospital, Inc., 1932, 106 Fla. 302, 143 So. 251; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Allen, 1914, 67 Fla. 257, 65 So. 8; Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Millens, Fla.App. 1974, 294 So. 2d 38; Wm. G. Roe & Company v. Armour & Company, 5 Cir. 1969, 414 F. 2d 862; Red Top Cab and Baggage Company v. Masilotti, 5 Cir. 1951, 190 F. 2d 668; 32 Fla.Jur., Torts, Section 19, Page 148.
Appellees having been jointly and severally liable with Dalton Ray Humphrey for the compensatory damages being sought by appellant, the latter’s satisfaction of his judgment against Dalton Ray Humphrey discharged the liability of appellees. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Millens, supra; Weaver v. Stone, Fla. App.1968, 212 So. 2d 80; Prosser on Torts, 3rd Edition, Section 45, Page 268.
Appellant contends, alternatively, that his satisfying the judgment obtained against Humphrey and U-Haul Company of North Carolina, Inc. was intended to release only those defendants and not all joint tort feasors, and under the authority of Talcott v. Central Bank & Trust Company, Fla.App. 1971, 247 So. 2d 727 (cert, disch. Fla. 1972, 262 So. 2d 658), such satisfaction of judgment should be considered only as a pro tanto release under Section 768.041, F.S. Appellant also relies upon the case of Mathis v. Virgin, Fla.App.1964, 167 So. 2d 897 (cert. den. Fla. 1965, 174 So. 2d 30). Both of these cited cases are readily distinguishable on the facts, and no question is raised in the instant case but that the satisfaction of the prior judgment which appellant obtained against Humphrey and U-Haul Company of North Carolina, Inc. was on its face free from any qualifications, restrictions or limitations. We also reject appellant’s suggestion that the failure to construe Section 768.041, F. S. so as to include satisfactions of final judgments as well as releases and covenants not to sue renders the statute constitutionally infirm.
Concluding that the court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of appel-lees, such judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
WALDEN, J., and RUDNICK, VAUGHN J., Associate Judge, concur.
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Nadio & Livio Christiani & Reserve Ins. Co. v. Popovich, 363 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…sage” as June 12, 1975, the date the bill was signed by the Governor. Section 768.31(7). . The satisfaction of a judgment against one alleged joint tortfeasor terminates claimant’s cause of action against another. E. g., Walker v. U-Haul Co., Inc., 300 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 588 (Fla.1975). . Section 768.3 l(2)(b) provides: “The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability . . . .” The same them…
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Morris N. Am., Inc. v. King, 430 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…nciple that “a satisfaction of judgment is the last act and end of the proceeding.” 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 979 at 80. See Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 609, 20 So. 800 (1896); Weaver v. Stone, 212 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Walker v. U-Haul Co., 300 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). See also Neustein v. Insurance Placement Facility, 271 Pa.Super. 126, 412 A. 2d 608 (1979). A satisfaction signifies that the litigation is over, the dispute is settled, the account is paid. Doubtless, it was this principle whic…
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Dunmore v. Eagle Motor Lines and F-B Truck Lines, 560 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…ability for such damages is not the same as the other defendants due to the effect of the comparative negligence defense raised by all defendants. For this reason, we find the decisions in the Roberts case, as well as Walker v. U-Haul Company, Inc., 300 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert. denied 314 So. 2d 588 (Fla.1975), and Gordon v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 242 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), cited by Eagle, are materially different and distinguishable. In each the amount of damages assessed in the jud…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mallory Johnson Allen, 67 Fla. 257 (Fla. 1914)
- Feinstone v. Allison Hosp., Inc., 106 Fla. 302 (Fla. 1932)
- WM. G. ROE & Co. v. Armour & Co., 414 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1969)
- Davidow v. Seyfarth, 58 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1952)
- Am. Cas. Co. of Reading v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 212 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Nichols v. Rothkopf, 135 Fla. 749 (Fla. 1939)
- Mathis v. Virgin, 167 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Corrine Millens, 294 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Talcott v. Cent. Bank & Tr. Co., 262 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1972)
- RED TOP CAB & Baggage Co. v. Masilotti, 190 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1951)