GRACE P. BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A court cannot sentence a defendant to probation; withholding sentence is a prerequisite for probation, and incarceration can be a condition of probation.
[1] A period of incarceration may be lawfully imposed as a condition of probation.
[2] A court cannot sentence a defendant directly to probation; withholding sentence, in whole or in part, is a prerequisite to placing a defendant on probation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was found guilty of a felony, adjudicated guilty, and sentenced to five years probation with the condition that she serve the first year in …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Withholding Imposition Of Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
DOWNEY, Judge.
This case involves the question whether a period of incarceration may be made a condition of a term of probation.
Appellant was found guilty of a felony. The court adjudicated her guilty and imposed a sentence of five years probation. One of the conditions of probation was that appellant serve the first year in the county jail. Appellant assigns the imposition of that condition as error. While the requirements that the probationer spend some time in jail or pay a fine are not usually thought of as conditions of probation, § 948.03(2), F.S., has been held to be sufficiently broad to allow the imposition of such conditions. State v. Williams, Fla.App.1970, 237 So. 2d 69; Lewis v. State, Fla.App.1974, 298 So. 2d 540. Accordingly, the appellant’s point on appeal is not well taken.
Although neither party has questioned it on appeal, we note that the method by which the court attempted to enter its order of probation was fundamentally erroneous. Appellant was found guilty, adjudicated guilty, and sentenced to five years probation. But there is no provision in the law authorizing the court to sentence a defendant to probation.
Probation is a creature of statute and the courts are limited to the authority afforded thereby. Chapter 948, F.S., authorizes the court in noncapital cases to determine whether a defendant should be placed on probation. If the court determines the defendant is a good candidate for probation the court may either adjudge him guilty or withhold such adjudication and in either case stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon the defendant and place him on probation under the supervision of the Probation and Parole Commission. If incarceration is prescribed, the court may direct the defendant be placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence. But in doing so, the court must stay and withhold the imposition of a part of such sentence.1
Thus, it can be seen the legislature has authorized the courts to sentence a defendant within the confines of the penalties provided by law or withhold sentence and place him on probation. Bateh v. State, Fla.App.1958, 101 So. 2d 869. The only deviation from those alternatives is that authorized by § 948.01(4), F.S., enabling the court to sentence a defendant to imprisonment for a specified period, withhold a portion of the sentence of imprisonment, and place the defendant on probation for a specified term. There is no authority for an adjudication of guilt and a sentence to straight probation. As the court in State v. Williams, supra, stated after reviewing several authorities: “These sources make it quite clear [that] probation is concerned only with suspension of the imposition or pronouncement of sentence.”
If a defendant could be sentenced to probation, there would be no judicial recourse in the event the defendant violated his probation. Because the court has already passed sentence, there would be no lawful basis for the imposition of punishment for the violation of the conditions of probation. However, as Chapter 948 envisions, when a sentence or a portion thereof is withheld, there would be a lawful basis for the imposition of punishment for the violation of a condition of probation, namely, the withheld sentence. Accordingly we hold that a court may impose a sentence (i. e., impose the sanctions of imprisonment or fine) upon a defendant found guilty of an offense, or it may withhold sentence in whole or in part and place the defendant on probation. However it cannot sentence a defendant to probation since the withholding of sentence or a portion thereof is an indispensable prerequisite to the entry of an order placing a defendant on probation. State v. Williams, supra; Lewis v. State, supra.2
We therefore vacate the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand this cause with directions to either sentence the appellant or place her on probation with such conditions as the court may deem appropriate. We reiterate that incarceration as a condition of probation is lawful.
Sentence vacated and cause remanded with directions.
OWEN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur. . Section 948.01(4), F.S., as amended by Chapter 74-112, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1974, grants the judiciary the explicit power to withhold part of a sentence and direct that a defendant be placed on probation “after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.”
. Of course as we indicated in footnote 1, the legislature has explicitly authorized the court to enter a sentence for a term of years, withhold a part thereof, and place the defendant on a period of probation to begin at the end of the portion of the term withheld.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976)…(1927); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1618(8) (1961), and a subsequent decision by the Second District in Sanders v. State, 268 So. 2d 553 (Fla.App.2d 1972). The Fourth District, in Lennard v. State, 308 So. 2d 579 (Fla.App.4th 1975), and Brown v. State, 302 So. 2d 430 (Fla.App.4th 1974), held the sentencing court, in imposing the split sentence probation alternative, must stay and withhold the imposition of part of the sentence. The First District, in Waters v. State, 290 So. 2d 503 (Fla.App.1st 1974), had befor…
-
State v. Wilcox, 351 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…een held that probation is a creature of statute, and the courts are therefore limited to the authority afforded by the applicable statute. Pickman v. State, 155 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963), cert. denied, 164 So. 2d 805 (Fla.1964); Brown v. State, 302 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). We hold that Section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1975) providing that a defendant placed on probation for commission of a felony offense be supervised by the Department of Offender Rehabilitation is mandatory. The petition for…
-
Pearson v. State, 371 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)…a single general sentence may not be imposed for two or more crimes. The state claims that Dorfman should not apply since an order of probation is by definition not a sentence but rather contemplates the withholding of any sentence. Brown v. State, 302 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). However, we believe this is a distinction without a difference, as virtually all of the same reasons for avoiding general sentences, as set out in Dorfman, supra, apply to general terms of probation: A general sentence aggregat…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mussa C. Bateh v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- State v. Wardell Robert Williams, 237 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Lewis v. State, 298 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)