ELFRIEDE FESAK, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE FESAK, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, Elfriede Fesak appeals a judgment awarding her only rehabilitative alimony for three years rather than permanent periodic alimony. The appellate court affirms, finding the trial chancellor did not abuse his discretion in determining that Fesak, a registered nurse with employment history and savings, had the ability to provide for herself.
The court held that the trial chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding rehabilitative alimony for three years. The determination of whether to award periodic or rehabilitative alimony rests within the sound discretion of the chancellor based on the particular facts and circumstances, with regard for the principle of need and ability. The $500 attorney's fee award was also affirmed.
[1] The determination of whether to award periodic or rehabilitative alimony rests within the sound discretion of the chancellor, considering the facts and circumstances, nee…
[2] Rehabilitative alimony may be awarded when a spouse has the ability to provide for themselves.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The determination of whether a spouse should be awarded periodic alimony or rehabilitative alimony is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the chancellor based upon the particular facts and circumstances, with due regard for the basic principle of need and ability.”
Establishes the legal standard for alimony awards and the chancellor's discretion in determining the type and amount of alimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceElfriede and George Fesak were married on June 26, 1948, for 25 years. Their three children were all 21 years of age or older at the time of the disso…
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PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant seeks review of a dissolution of marriage judgment awarding her only rehabilitative alimony.
Petitioner-appellee, George Fesak, and respondent-appellant, Elfriede Fesak, were married on June 26, 1948. The three children born of this marriage presently are 21 years of age or older. On August 21, 1973, after 25 years of marriage, appellee George Fesak filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Respondent answered and the cause came on for trial, after which on October 10, 1973 the chancellor entered an order dissolving the marital bonds between the parties and directing the petitioner to pay (1) the rental on respondent’s apartment until further order of court, and (2) $35 per week as temporary alimony. Thereafter, on January 31, 1974 the chancellor entered his final order (1) directing petitioner to continue to pay $170 per month for rent to the respondent through May 1974, (2) awarding respondent $40 per week as rehabilitative alimony for the period ending three years after February 1, 1974, (3) denying respondent’s request for reimbursement of some $2,000 of medical expenses, and (4) directing petitioner to pay respondent’s attorney $500 as reasonable attorney’s fees. Respondent appeals therefrom.
Appellant first contends that the chancellor erred in awarding her only rehabilitative alimony for three years. We cannot agree.
The determination of whether a spouse should be awarded periodic alimony or rehabilitative alimony is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the chancellor based upon the particular facts and circumstances, with due regard for the basic principle of need and ability. Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, Fla.App. 1974, 299 So. 2d 30.
The facts revealed by the record in the case sub judice demonstrate the following: (1) the three children of the marriage are all 21 years of age or older; (2) petitioner, George Fesak, is a clerk and has a net monthly income of approximately $757; (3) respondent, Elfriede Fesak, is a registered nurse and during the course of the marriage worked for eight years between 1959 and 1970; (4) since 1970 she has worked for the City of Miami and has a savings account with a balance of about $500.
It is clear that appellant has the ability to provide for herself and thus, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the chancellor in his award of rehabilitative alimony.
Appellant-respondent also urges as error the award of $500 as attorney’s fees to be paid over a period of one and one-half years.
Under this point on appeal, we conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion and, therefore, we affirm the $500 award to respondent for attorney’s fees.
We also considered appellant’s remaining point on appeal and concluded that it was lacking in merit.
Accordingly, the judgment herein appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Goldberg v. Goldberg, 327 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…ter resting within the sound discretion of the trial judge based on the particular facts and circumstances before the court, with due regard for the basic principles of the wife’s need and the husband’s ability to pay. Fesak v. Fesak, Fla.App. 1974, 303 So. 2d 47. There appearing to be no abuse of judicial discretion, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. It is also well established that the trial judge has the discretion to grant or deny an application for attorneys fees.…
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Igna S. Mueller v. Mueller, 307 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…d discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it can be demonstrated that the court clearly has exceeded the limits of its discretion. Keller [*197] V. Keller, Fla.App.1974, 302 So. 2d 795; Fesak v. Fesak, Fla.App.1974, 303 So. 2d 47. In this case, the court determined that the needs of the ex-wife and the ability to pay of the ex-husband, together with the paramount concern for the best interests of the minor child, justified a slight, though not a drastic, increase in child s…
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Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…ter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court based upon the particular facts and circumstances, with due regard for the basic principle of need and ability. Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, Fla.App.1974, 299 So. 2d 30; Fesak v. Fesak, Fla.App.1974, 303 So. 2d 47. Having reviewed the record, transcript and briefs of counsel, we find, no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in his award of lump sum alimony. Accordingly, the judgment herein appealed is affirmed. Affirmed.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)