IGNA S. MUELLER, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN A. MUELLER, APPELLEE
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In this family law appeal, the ex-wife challenged a modification order increasing child support and denying her request for the ex-husband to pay her attorney's fees. The court affirmed the trial court's modest increase in child support and its determination that both parties should bear their own legal costs.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The modest increase in child support of $6 per week was justified based on the ex-wife's needs, the ex-husband's ability to pay, and the paramount concern for the child's best interests. Both parties had sufficient financial wherewithal to pay their own counsel, and the court properly denied the ex-wife's request for attorney's fees.
[1] A party seeking modification of a child support order bears the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances.
[2] Voluntary payments made by a parent beyond the amount required by a final judgment of support are not, in themselves, a sufficient basis for an order increasing payments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It requires little citation of authority that matters involving child support and attorney's fees are vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it can be demonstrated that the court clearly has exceeded the limits of its discretion.”
Establishes the standard of review for child support and attorney's fee determinations on appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' marriage was dissolved in October 1970 when their child Edward was two months old. The original judgment ordered the ex-husband to pay $2…
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HENDRY, Judge.
From an order modifying the final judgment of dissolution of marriage between the parties, the petitioner-wife has appealed. She contends that the court’s increase in child support and in payment by her ex-husband of one-half of the minor child’s medical, dental, surgical and drug expenses was not adequate.
In addition, the appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the parties are responsible for payment of their own attorney’s fees.
After a careful examination of the record in this case, we have concluded that the appellant has failed to show that the trial court committed reversible error. The marriage between the parties was dissolved by a final judgment entered October 30, 1970. At the time, the minor child, Edward, was two months old. Mrs. Mueller also has two other children from a prior marriage for which her ex-husband pays a total of $25 per week as child support.
In the final judgment, the appellee was ordered to pay $25 per week as child support for Edward and $25 per week as rehabilitative alimony for one year. Also, when the judgment was entered Mrs. Mueller was not working.
At the time of the modification hearing she was employed as a hairdresser, earning a gross salary of $148 per week. On the other hand, the record also shows that the appellee earns more than he did at the time the final judgment was entered. At the time of the modification hearing, he stated his gross weekly income as $283.48 per week.
From their affidavits, it also appears that the appellee’s net worth is approximately $11,000, while his former wife’s net worth is listed at approximately $18,000.
The appellant testified before the trial judge that her weekly expenses to send Edward to pre-kindergarten school and to provide day care for the child are $31 per week. The trial court based its modification award on this testimony, increasing the support payments by Six ($6) Dollars per week.
It requires little citation of authority that matters involving child support and attorney’s fees are vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it can be demonstrated that the court clearly has exceeded the limits of its discretion. Keller V. Keller, Fla.App.1974, 302 So. 2d 795; Fesak v. Fesak, Fla.App.1974, 303 So. 2d 47.
In this case, the court determined that the needs of the ex-wife and the ability to pay of the ex-husband, together with the paramount concern for the best interests of the minor child, justified a slight, though not a drastic, increase in child support.
In addition, the court determined that both parties had the financial wherewithal to pay for their respective counsel. We think the record supports the court’s conclusions.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the order appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Nash v. Nash, 688 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s award of temporary attorney’s fees finding that such an award was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. § 61.16, Fla. Stat. (1995); Mueller v. Mueller, 307 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). However, we reverse the entry of the income deduction order solely for the payment of attorney’s fees on the basis that such an order is not sanctioned by section 61.1301, Florida Statutes (1995). Humana Health Plans v. Lawton, 6…
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In re the Marriage of Joseph Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
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Gochenour v. Gochenour, 564 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Locke v. Locke, 413 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Westley v. Westley, 401 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Mueller v. Mueller, 307 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Meltzer v. Meltzer, 262 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); §§ 61.13, 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1989).…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Elfriede Fesak v. Fesak, 303 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Keller v. Keller, 302 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)